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This dissertation basically asks the question of whether the public- private 
dichotomy in Arendt‟s theory is an absolute one. This question is a result of the fact 
that the intricate layers in the distinction between the public and the private in 
Arendt‟s works has not critically examined within the literature. In answering that 
question, this dissertation argues that the multi-layered terrain of Arendt‟s political 
theory makes it possible to point out some conceptual spheres that transcend a 
particular understanding of the mentioned dichotomy. This kind of inquiring reading 
enables one to escape the chains of dichotomous thinking and to come up with an 
alternative theoretical space for thinking Arendt‟s conception of politics. 
Correspondingly, this dissertation points out the concepts of work and social as 
possible loopholes that transcend the dichotomous thinking in Arendt‟s theory. 
Possible implication of pointing out these loopholes is to challenge to the fixed 
nature of the public-private distinction. This challenge directly effects how one 
positions the political within the dichotomy. If the political is not observed within the 
confines of the public-private distinction in every context, it means that it sometimes 
exists within an in-between space of sociability. The idea of civil society as an 
associational life in contemporary political experience corresponds to that in-between 
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space.  This particular reading points out a contemporary political experience, in 
which the political and the social co-exist. It also offers an Arendtian perspective to 
critically reflect on how we experience politics within the space of contemporary 
civil society. 
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Bu tez temel olarak Arendt‟in siyasi teorisindeki kamusal-özel ikiliğinin 
mutlaklığını sorgulamaktadır. Arendt üzerine olan literatürde Arendt‟in 
çalıĢmalarındaki kamusal-özel ayrımının komplike katmanlarının eleĢtirel olarak 
incelenmemesi bu sorgulamanın temelini oluĢturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda tezde 
Arendt‟in siyasi teorisinin çok katmanlı yapısı dolayısıyla bahsi geçen ikiliği aĢan 
kavramsal alanların var olabileceği savunulmaktadır. Bu tarz bir okuma dikotomik 
düĢünmenin zincirlerini kırabileceği gibi, Arendt‟in tanımladığı „siyaset‟ kavramı 
için alternatif teorik bir alanın varlığına iĢaret etmektedir. Bu açıdan tezde Arendt‟in 
teorisindeki „iĢ‟ ve „toplumsal olan‟ kavramları dikotomik düĢünmeyi aĢan kaçıĢ 
noktaları olarak sunulmaktadır. Bu sunumun olası sonuçlarından biri kamusal-özel 
alan ayrımının sabitliği sorgulanmayan doğasına meydan okumaktır. Bu meydan 
okuma ise belirtilen ikiliğin içinde „siyasi olan‟ın nasıl konumlandırıldığını doğrudan 
etkiler. Eğer siyasi olan her durumda kamusal-özel ayrımının içerisinde 
gözlemlenmiyorsa, bu pek tabi siyasi olanın zaman zaman toplumsallık adı verilen 
ara alanda gözlemlenebileceği anlamına gelir. Bu tezde bu ara alan günümüz siyasi 
hayatının deneyim alanı olan sivil toplum olarak nitelenmektedir. Bu nitelikteki bir 
okuma toplumsal ve siyasal olanın kaynaĢtığı siyasi bir deneyime iĢaret etmenin 
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yanında, günümüz sivil toplumunda siyaseti nasıl deneyimlediğimiz üzerine Arendtçi 
bir bakıĢ açısı önermektedir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE STORY OF MY DISSERTATION 
 
 
1.1 The Beginning 
When I started writing my PhD dissertation proposal, I had nothing clear in 
mind except for the fact that I was going to write on Arendt. I was initially 
acquainted with Arendt‟s unique way of thinking in political theory classes, where 
we were supposed to read some sections from Arendt‟s books. Not until studying for 
the comprehensives, I noticed her originality and unique stance in Western political 
thought. When I was reading for the comprehensive exams, her unorthodox stance 
with regard to some of the basic concepts of political theory left a strong impression 
in my own thinking. For example, I could not situate Arendt‟s conceptualization of 
freedom (1993) within any of the categories provided by Berlin (1991), by liberal 
theories and by different perspectives on socialism and social contract theories. 
Similarly I noticed two main contentions in the secondary literature: that in Arendt‟s 
works there is no conception of the state that is comparable to other works in 
political theory and that modern constitutional state is not her main concern.
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 Tsao, however, (2004) argues that although Arendt does not mention the idea 
of modern state in most of her works, especially in one particular work, The Origins 
of Totalitarianism, Arendt presents her idea of the state, which suggests a similarity 
with Hegel‟s understanding of the state. To me what was striking about Tsao‟s 
interpretation was not his endeavor of presenting an affinity between Arendt and 
Hegel. Through Tsao, I realized for the first time that there is no consensus in the 
secondary literature on what Arendt really says or means while she is elaborating on 
something. In addition, I found out that works on Arendt do not mention a general 
theory of Arendt, but deal with her works separately. This is what makes reading 
Arendt both difficult and rewarding. As Canovan (1974: 15) argues Arendt‟s mode 
of thought is not a system. In her different works one sees different layers of her 
ideas as they change and develop from one work to another. But this does not mean 
that there is no consistent structure of her ideas. Arendt‟s political thought is not a 
random collection of ideas and concepts floating freely from context to context. They 
“constantly refer to and illuminate one another” (Canovan, 1974: 15). Although the 
unsystematic character of her thought sounds challenging, I was encouraged by the 
idea of seeing different layers of basic concepts of political theory from an Arendtian 
point of view. 
For me the next step was to decide on which subject I was going to write 
about. For a period of time, I just read Arendt without focusing on a specific subject. 
The purpose of reading primary sources was to find out a particular issue in Arendt‟s 
theory. I came up with several subjects such as lying in politics, civil society, 
violence, and public sphere in Arendt. In those readings, I noticed how Arendt‟s line 
of thinking was shaped by different but related distinctions. Among these 
distinctions, the public and private one seemed important in terms of its key role in 
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defining what political is. Initially when I decided to focus on the distinction between 
the public and private spheres in Arendt‟s works, I was also reflecting on the 
relationship between the public sphere and the social context I live in.  
In Turkish society, the public sphere is a controversial term. One could 
constantly hear about this term without being sure what it means in the specific 
context it is used. Like every dichotomous conceptions, the public and the private 
distinction is used to draw limits and boundaries in Turkish context. The distinction 
is used to include and exclude social actors from particular types of experience. Most 
of the empirical studies, which address the controversy, focus on the construction of 
the public sphere in the context of the binary opposition between secularism and 
Islam. When these studies problematize the public sphere in terms of the institutional 
regulations characterized by the binary opposition between the state and religion, 
what is often at stake is another dichotomous understanding of gender identities, 
especially with regard to the visibility of women‟s presence in the public space.1 
Although my initial interest in the concept of public sphere and its dichotomous 
relation with the private was formed in such a context, I wanted to understand the 
epistemological underpinnings of these discussions.  
My initial intention was to present clear accounts of the public and the private 
spheres, and the dichotomous relation between them. From my own readings of 
Arendt, I was convinced that Arendt would provide me with an unorthodox but a 
well-formed conceptualization of the distinction between the public and the private. I 
also thought her original way of thinking would enrich any discussion of the public 
sphere in a specific context. 
                                                          
1
 For some of the studies on public sphere debate in Turkey see: Deniz Kandiyoti (1987); Alev Cinar 
(2008); Mary Lou O‟Neil (2008). 
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 After deciding on writing about the public and the private distinction in 
Arendt, I have made a quick literature review on the distinction itself. The distinction 
between the public and the private is a central one in discussions that take place in 
political and social contexts. Beside its importance, it is also a controversial one as 
different orientations refer to different meanings while using this distinction. 
Weintraub (1997: 3, 4, 7) explains the multiple and ambiguous character of the 
distinction perfectly. According to him, “the conceptual messiness” of the distinction 
stems from the fact that “what is being contrasted” differs from perspective to 
perspective. According to Weintraub the liberal model refers to the public and the 
private distinction in terms of the difference between the state and the market 
economy. The republican approach uses this distinction to differentiate political 
community and citizenship from the state and the market economy. Social historians 
and anthropologists seek to differentiate the public as sociability from any other 
relations. The feminist perspectives refer to the public-private distinction to 
distinguish the economic and political order from the family. 
The ambiguous character of the distinction accompanied by different 
meanings in different perspectives, presented to me a theoretically rich domain in 
terms of pursuing an epistemological inquiry of the concepts of the public and the 
private. At the end of my inquiry for this dissertation, I came to the conclusion that 
the ambiguity in the public - private distinction is always attributed to the main 
assumption that although there is always a line separating the domains, the content of 
each domain or where the line is drawn is open to further inquiry. In addition to this 
ambiguity, the public-private distinction has a determining power over the question 
of what is political and this determining power keeps the interest in the ancient 
distinction still alive in political theory. The line between the public and the private is 
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usually accepted as the one drawing the boundaries of the political, defining what is 
political and what is not. For instance, Heller (1991: 340) defines the modern 
conception of the political as “the practical realization of the universal value of 
freedom”. According to her, this realization is only possible within the public sphere. 
The political is defined within the confines of the public. On a different theoretical 
plane, feminist critiques of western political thought is often based on questioning 
how the boundaries of the political and the public are drawn in the modern liberal 
state system. Feminists argue that within the liberal tradition, the distinction has been 
made in a way that confined women and female activity to the private sphere and, 
excluded them from the public agenda (Benhabib, 1992: 107-108). Those feminists, 
who take an essentialist position, oppose to the exclusion of women from political 
domain and argue that what is being undermined in the public–private distinction is 
that the private has a political character. The discussions on the essentialist 
distinction between the public and the private revolve around what is and what 
should be political.       
Because of the determining role of the distinction on the political nature of a 
given phenomenon, I thought that looking into the constituting elements of each 
sphere in the distinction and how the dividing line has been drawn would provide a 
fresh outlook of the political. I thought that Arendt would be the best choice in 
providing a comprehensive and unconventional depiction of the distinction in 
question. The reason behind such an automatic expectation was that during my 
preliminary studies on Arendt, I noticed her difference in not accepting the given 
problematizations of the basic concepts of the political theory. I was particularly 
intrigued by how she was depicting different layers in each concept she analyzes, 
enabling scholars to examine different dimensions of the same concept in different 
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historical and theoretical contexts. I assumed I would find a similar mode of analysis 
on the distinction between the public and the private in general and the political in 
particular. I intuitively thought Arendt would open new doors and create new 
possibilities to look into the political in the context of the public and the private 
distinction. 
I was, however, really surprised when I started reading Arendt with these 
tentative premises in mind. I assumed that originality is a result of flexibility and 
ambiguity in thought. For me, absence of standards would provide new possibilities 
for seeing different dimensions of a given phenomenon. I was expecting this mode of 
thinking from Arendt. But, I was mistaken. As Kateb (1977: 148) states Arendt‟s 
standards are so strict and she applies these standards so narrowly that her works are 
full of strict dichotomies. Every concept in her theory seems interrelated. She uses 
the concepts to define each other consequently. Every concept seems to belong 
essentially to one specific space or sphere. I asked to myself: if everything is based 
on unquestionable dichotomies then how could Arendt be so original and 
unconventional.  
My confusion about Arendt‟s rigidity deepened when I read the critical 
secondary literature on Arendt. Some prominent scholars were criticizing Arendt in 
terms of her exclusionary stance. They argue that her boundaries are so strict that she 
excludes most of the subjects and issues of contemporary world as nonpolitical. For 
instance, Habermas criticizes Arendt‟s distinction of labor, work, and action and her 
attribution of the political only to the activity of action. Habermas (1977: 16) states 
that “…narrowing of the political to the practical permits illuminating contrasts to 
the presently palpable elimination of essentially practical contents from the political 
process”. Heller (1991: 335) also criticizes Arendt for the exclusion of everyday 
  7 
issues from the political realm. According to Heller, Arendt‟s conception of the 
political remains too narrow to cover contemporary daily practices.   
Although Arendt is criticized for the rigidity of her dichotomous thinking, it 
is interesting that no one has critically examined the intricate layers in the distinction 
between the public and the private in her works. Most scholars writing on Arendt 
take a position of agreeing or disagreeing with Arendt‟s distinction of spheres of life 
as being public or private, political or nonpolitical, free or bound to necessity. These 
scholars, who do not question whether the distinctions she employs are put in 
absolute terms, close the doors for employing an Arendtian way of thinking on a 
specific contemporary political phenomenon.  Most of the works on Arendt deals 
with such major concepts as evil, violence, freedom, action, revolution and the 
political. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, all of these concepts are 
interrelated in understanding the original character of Arendt‟s political theory.  
The starting premise of this dissertation is that there is no scholarly work that 
examines how, in spite of her strict distinction, Arendt herself works through the 
public-private dichotomy in multiple yet inter-relational ways. We do not know to 
what extent the distinction between the public and the private in Arendt‟s thinking is 
an absolute one. Most importantly what would be the implications of this questioning 
on the reading of the political in Arendt? I had this question in mind while I started 
reading one of Arendt‟s major theoretical works, The Human Condition (1958).    
 When I was reading The Human Condition, I noticed that in that particular 
work of Arendt and in the secondary literature on that book, the public and private 
spheres are defined on the basis of a negation. The basis of negation is in prioritizing 
the definition of the public in such a way that once the public is defined, the rest 
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unquestionably becomes the private. This particular way of prioritizing the public, 
automatically assumes that the private sphere has a residual character. Everything 
that has to do with the public appears to be bright and positive and everything that 
belongs to the private sphere is associated with darkness and being hidden. My first 
reaction was to save the private from its residual character. I thought that in my 
dissertation I should try to show how the private in Arendt was valuable in itself, and 
how the public meant nothing without the private sphere. I was hoping to make a 
reading of the public from the residual private. Eventually, I realized that studying 
Arendt with prejudices and pre-identified findings would be a betrayal to her theory 
and originality. Although Arendt is prioritizing the public over private, she clearly 
indicates in several places that public and private needs each other. They have an 
interdependent relationship. Without the private being kept in its dark and protective 
sphere, the apparent character of the public means nothing. Arendt‟s objective is not 
to demonize the private but to insist on keeping the strict line that separates each 
sphere from each other. After realizing that, I gave up my idea of saving the private 
from its residual character. I accepted its residual character. 
 Nevertheless, there was something that still bothered me with the distinction 
itself. Later I realized that my unease originated from the way Arendt defined her 
concepts. In one of her works, she substantiates a particular concept in a particular 
way. However, in another work she uses the same concept in a completely different 
context under a different disguise. Even in the same book, for instance in The Human 
Condition, the public that she refers in the beginning of the book is different from the 
public that she refers at the end. In its first problematization, the public is a pre-
defined physical space in which free and equal citizens act. In the second 
problematization, public is not a stable physical space but a constituted phenomenon 
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that is realized within the moment of performance and action. It gains reality in the 
moment of performance. It is realized within a particular instance almost 
momentarily, with nothing definitive left for the next moment of performance.  I 
could not decide whether using the same concepts to refer to different meanings was 
simply an inconsistency. Was Arendt an inconsistent political thinker, who did not 
bother to present her ideas in a systemic and coherent way?  
 I have found out the answer to this question while reading the secondary 
literature on Arendt. It was a relief to realize that I was not the only one who was 
confused by Arendt‟s way of thinking. According to Canovan (1974: 109), Arendt is 
different from other thinkers who deal with one line of argument at a given time, 
because Arendt “has a great many linked trains of thought in her mind”. Arendt‟s 
way of thinking is multi-dimensional as she thought several lines of thought at the 
same time without clarifying their relationship to her reader (Canovan, 1974: 109). 
Actually, this multi-dimensional way of thinking is what makes her theory rich. 
Arendt‟s way of thinking is full of new dimensions and possibilities. This is why 
questioning the absolute character of her distinction between the public and the 
private is important.  
Based on the complexity embedded in Arendt‟s multi-dimensional way of 
thinking the way Canovan problematizes, the working premise of my dissertation is 
as follows: if the boundaries of the distinction between the public and the private are 
drawn differently in different contexts, then, any element, concept or phenomenon 
that is thought as belonging to a specific sphere could be seen as belonging to the 
other, or even not belonging either to the public or the private. If the public is defined 
in a particular way in a particular context, the concepts and activities that belong to 
that sphere gains a public character. But, if the same concept of the public is defined 
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differently in another context, then, the same concepts and activities may not 
correspond to that particular understanding of the public. What is public in one 
particular context could not be ascribed as public in another. The multi-layered 
terrain of Arendt‟s political theory raises the possibility of looking into a multitude of 
ambivalences and sometimes so-called inconsistencies in her thinking as a ground to 
investigate whether there are some conceptual spheres that transcend a particular 
understanding of the dichotomy between the public and the private. Such an 
inquisitive reading of Arendt enables the reader to escape the chains of dichotomous 
thinking and to come up with an alternative theoretical space for thinking Arendt‟s 
conception of politics.  
Having these considerations in mind, I have done a detailed reading of her 
works. During my research, I realized that some instances and concepts in some 
works of Arendt could not be identified as belonging to a specific space, either public 
or private. The first concept that attracted my attention was the concept of „work‟ in 
Arendt‟s theory. In The Human Condition, although Arendt relies on the public-
private dichotomy, there are some questionable areas in her tripartite analysis. The 
activities of action and labor find their proper place within the spaces of the public 
and the private respectively. Action belongs to the political space of the public. 
Labor belongs to the space of cyclical movement and necessity, which is the private. 
Interestingly, the concept of work could not be categorized as belonging to a public 
or private sphere. On the one hand, work has some common characteristics with the 
concepts of labor and action, respectively. On the other hand, at some points, it has 
differences from the activities of labor and action. At another level, it has 
characteristics that transcend the dichotomy between the public and the private. 
Identifying such a convoluted understanding in Arendt‟s problematization of vita 
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activa in the context of her explanation of work in relation to labor and action gave 
me an opportunity to look at her dichotomous thinking from a different perspective.  
   The second concept, demonstrating both public and private characteristics is 
the concept of the social in Arendt. Its dual character is more obvious than the 
concept of work. In her critique of modernity, Arendt herself points out the concept 
of social as a hybrid phenomenon, where the private concerns become public. In fact, 
the duality in the character of the social bothers Arendt. She approaches the rise of 
the social in modern world in a negative way. At this point, identifying many often 
seemingly conflicting layers in her thinking gave me an opportunity to look into the 
possibility of examining the potential embedded in what appears to be an 
inconsistency. In Arendt‟s different works, the concept of the social refers to 
different phenomena, processes and activities. I turned this multi-dimensionality into 
my advantage and took the liberty of focusing on one of the implications of the social 
that has an affirmative meaning in Arendt‟s theory. I thought that this particular 
social, which had the characteristics of both public and private, could serve as an 
alternative space, in which an unchartered territory of political reality could be 
incorporated into an understanding of the political. An analysis of this alternative 
space would at the same time address some criticisms of Arendt‟s work by 
examining the so-called excluded daily life through a reconsideration of the in-
between phenomena of daily life. 
As a result of my reading and research, I ended up with two different 
concepts, namely the concepts of work and social that did not fit in either the public 
or the private spheres. In my reading of Arendt‟s theory, their in-between character, 
having elements of both the public and private, brought them together. Relatively 
speaking, in The Human Condition the concept of work, transcends the dichotomy of 
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public and private „smoothly‟ without raising the question of the (in)consistency in 
Arendt‟s political theory. When it comes to the concept of social, although it was 
already demonized by Arendt, I continued searching for different socials in Arendt‟s 
convoluted thinking and at the end constructed an affirmative meaning/facet of the 
social. I am well aware of the fact that the alternative affirmative reading of the 
social, I offer in this dissertation, might receive skeptical response from those who 
read Arendt in a certain way. There is, however, a plenitude of alternative readings of 
Arendt. 
At first, I did not think of any existential link between the concepts of work 
and social other than seeing them as possible loopholes that transcend the 
dichotomous thinking in Arendt‟s theory. However, when I was reading Canovan‟s 
(1974) book, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt, I realized that my choice to 
focus on these two concepts was not a mere coincidence. Canovan states that in 
Arendt‟s critique of modernity there are critical concepts. The first one is the social 
(Canovan calls it society) and the second one is the worldlessness. Worldlessness is a 
concept that refers to a problem for the modern human being. According to Arendt, 
human beings create the world, in which they could become free individuals by 
acting. The world is the only place where people could become free. They have a 
common purpose of preserving this world in which they could actualize themselves 
as true human beings by being political and free. According to Arendt, under modern 
conditions, action is replaced by labor and people lose their ability to act. Being kept 
inside the cyclical movement of laboring they have been losing their ability to 
become political and free. They have been losing the common world that binds them 
together as true human beings. Arendt identifies this modern condition as 
worldlessness.  
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In her critique of modernity we could observe two realities simultaneously: 
the rise of the social and the worldlessness. The concept of work in this context is 
pivotal, as it is the activity that creates the world. At this point, I argue that Arendt‟s 
emphasis on the concepts of work and the social are related with her existential 
concerns of modern conditions for life. Her unease with the modern conditions of life 
such as worldlessness led her to bring forth the importance of the world and its 
constitutive activity. Within the same context, she points out the rise of the social 
realm as a modern and hybrid one that challenges the necessary separation between 
the public and the private realms of life. I argue that in addition to their in-between 
character, these two concepts – work and the social - can be understood within the 
context of her critical remarks on modernity.  
At the end, I was left with a basic question with regard to the strictness of 
Arendt‟s dichotomy between the public and the private. Even though the two 
concepts – work and the social - that I chose to focus on as two particular instances 
of complexity in Arendt‟s thought emerge from the same context of Arendt‟s critique 
of modernity, when examined separately in relation with Arendt‟s main concerns in 
her other works raised the possibility for me to identify two different conceptual 
contexts in pointing out loopholes in Arendt‟s conceptualization of the public- 
private dichotomy.  
 
1.2 From Story Telling to Writing the Dissertation 
The starting point of this dissertation is that Arendt‟s theory is full of 
dichotomies, such as the public versus the private, freedom versus necessity, labor 
versus action, political versus non-political (or pre-political), open versus the hidden, 
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light versus darkness. The public-private dichotomy is an important one as it draws 
the limits of what is political and what is not. With respect to this dichotomy, Arendt 
is criticized for narrowing down the sphere of politics because she attributes the 
politics to the public. In addition, her idea of the public is strictly separated from 
private and social concerns. This results in exclusion of many issues of contemporary 
daily life from agenda of politics. 
With respect to this dichotomous thinking in Arendt‟s political theory, this 
dissertation mainly asks the basic question of whether the public-private dichotomy 
in Arendt‟s theory is an absolute one. I develop my critical inquiry in three main 
parts. 
The first part consists of chapters 2 and 3. This part presents Arendt‟s political 
theory in general and secondary literature on the public-private distinction in 
particular. It starts with Arendt‟s unique methodology of storytelling and the key 
concepts in her theory. I argue that story telling is the source of her original way of 
thinking within Western political theory. For the purpose of this dissertation this 
original way of thinking led me into developing a method of my own. To start with 
Arendt‟s own works, her methodology of telling the stories of actual political events 
leads her into a thought pattern where she tries to understand the elements that are 
crystallized into the political phenomenon in question. In doing that Arendt, extracts 
different dimensions of these political elements instead of relying on the already 
substantiated concepts of the political within the Western political thought. As each 
story refers to a different context, hence crystallization of different elements, each 
concept within the story is worked out in a different way. I identify this unique 
methodology in Arendt‟s thinking as multi-layered thinking, which originates from 
story telling and develops into an elaborate analysis of the political. I, however, note 
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that Arendt‟s method of telling the stories of actual political experiences of actual 
political actors in different contexts and in relation to different concepts leaves the 
reader with an unsystematic structure in Arendt‟s works.  
To delineate this problem I develop a method of my own which I 
provisionally call interdefinitonality. Although Dossa (1989: 74) coined the term 
“mutual interdefinition”, in this dissertation I transformed Dossa‟s definition into a 
tool of analysis by incorporating Weintraub‟s (1997) identification of  “the 
conceptual messiness” in the public-private distinction within the political theory 
literature, Benhabib‟s (1993; 1996) questioning of this distinction from within the 
feminist literature, Canovan‟s (1974) cross referencing to Arendt‟s works, and 
Kateb‟s (1977) critical analysis of the strict dichotomies in Arendt‟s works. As a 
result what I mean by interdefinionationality as a method is as follows:  The concepts 
delineated in Arendt‟s works are not defined in isolation from each other, but they 
are interrelated. Although they are fluently presented within the plot of the same 
story, it becomes difficult to arrive at a specific and clear definition of each concept 
when they are used in different stories, in different political, historical, and 
theoretical contexts. Moreover when this fluidity in Arendt‟s different works is 
accompanied by the dichotomous way of thinking it presents particular difficulties in 
understanding whether or not Arendt sees the public-private distinction as the fixed 
core of her thought pattern. For instance, the concepts of freedom, action, and 
political are defined by referring to each other. Acting is the way of attaining 
freedom. Becoming free is synonymous with being political. Being political means 
acting. All of these concepts are basically situated within the public sphere in the 
specific context of the public-private dichotomy.  
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Having these considerations in mind, Chapter 2 first analyzes some works of 
Arendt, in which Arendt deals with actual political events as part of her methodology 
of story telling. Then, based on my selection from the works of secondary literature, I 
present two specific concerns of Arendt with regard to her theoretical insights. These 
are: understanding the meaning of unprecedented phenomenon of contemporary 
political experience and being critical of modernity. These two concerns are selected 
deliberately as they provide the contexts for the discussions in the dissertation. They 
at the same time enable me to make use of my own method of reading Arendt and 
other‟s works by means of interdefinitionality. 
My elaboration on Arendt‟s methodology and key concepts in her theory lead me 
to argue that „the mutual interdefinition‟ in her theory results in separation between 
specific sets of concepts. For instance, while freedom, political, and action are used 
to substantiate each other, they necessarily compose a theoretical set. On the 
contrary, the concepts of necessity, non-political/pre-political, and behavior are used 
to substantiate each other and compose another theoretical set. These different 
theoretical sets become meaningful with regard to each other within a dichotomous 
line of thinking. The public-private dichotomy in Arendt‟s theory provides a 
theoretical context to uncover these theoretical sets in a comprehensive way. In 
addition, with regard to Arendt‟s critique of modernity elaborated in Chapter 2, I 
observe that Arendt is critical of the rise of the social and disappearance of the 
separating line between the public and the private.  In this specific context I argue 
that keeping the separating line between the public and the private realms is of 
crucial importance for Arendt. This insistence makes many readers of Arendt to 
elaborate on the distinction in non-negotiable terms.  
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In respect of these observations, in Chapter 3, I focus on the public-private 
dichotomy in Arendt‟s theory, which is seen as the backbone of her theory. The 
chapter is composed of two main parts. In the first one, mainstream secondary 
literature on Arendt‟s separation between the public and the private is elaborated. 
The mainstream secondary literature affirms the importance of the public versus 
private dichotomy in Arendt‟s theory and sees this distinction in non-negotiable 
terms. They do not challenge the strict distinction as the core of Arendt‟s thought nor 
do they pay particular attention to the constantly shifting story lines and changing 
theoretical contexts in Arendt‟s different works. They do not search for any concepts, 
spheres, or any experiences in Arendt‟s theory that might transcend the basic 
distinction in Arendt‟s thinking. The second part of the chapter is reserved for 
feminist readers of Arendt who have an alternative perspective on the public versus 
private distinction. They make a critical reading of the distinction. These feminist 
scholars are also divided into two. The first group is not critical of where the dividing 
line between the public and the private is drawn, but they are critical of Arendt‟s 
prioritizing of the public sphere as the political one. They try to reassert value and 
political character to the private sphere. The second group of feminist scholars does 
not deal with a gendered reading of each sphere. Through using Arendt‟s original 
perspective, especially on politics, they make use of her theoretical concepts and 
insights in feminist theory. The latter group of feminists‟ perspective is welcomed in 
this dissertation. 
Secondary literature is delineated so as to clarify the original stance of the 
dissertation, which sees the distinction in question not in absolute terms. These 
feminist scholars are the ones who encourage me to make use of Arendtian 
perspective and her conceptual originality in the areas that are thought to be excluded 
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by Arendt‟s theory. In relation to that, this dissertation accepts that there is basically 
a strict separation of the public and the private in Arendt‟s theory. However, I also 
argue that there are loopholes in Arendt‟s theory through which one could explore 
other possibilities in Arendt‟s thought. As Arendt is telling the stories of historical 
experiences, sometimes the empirical reality she refers to challenges her own strict 
dichotomous thinking. Because of the contingency of a given actual event, some 
experiences could not easily be situated within the public- private dichotomy. 
The second part of the dissertation presents particular instances in Arendt‟s 
theory that emerges as loopholes. This part consists of Chapters 4, 5, and 6. In 
chapter 4, I present the „work‟ in Arendt‟s theory as an in-between concept in the 
context of public-private dichotomy. Its importance lies in the fact that its in-between 
character with regard to public versus private dichotomy is not a result of historical 
contingency. It does not emerge under different disguises in different contexts of 
different stories. It is an in-between concept in itself. It is conceptualized as one of 
the activities of vita activa in The Human Condition. These activities are labor, work, 
and action, respectively. In the context of the dichotomy in question, action is 
associated with the public and the labor is associated with the private. However, the 
concept of work could not be situated in the dichotomy between the public and the 
private. It has similarities with and distinctive characteristics from the concepts of 
labor and action. Work does not have a proper and stable position within the cyclical 
and consumable sphere of the private, fluid and ephemeral domain of the public. 
Sometimes it transcends the characteristics of each sphere and sometimes those 
spheres are combined within the experience of working. It presents a particular 
analysis to understand the public and private distinction in an original way. I argue 
  19 
that the concept of work becomes important for showing the intrinsic flexibility of 
Arendt‟s theory with respect to the dominant dichotomous thinking.  
Following the concept of work, Chapter 5 presents the concept of social as yet 
another instance to explore a more flexible understanding of the public-private 
distinction in Arendt‟s thought. The concept of social is a modern phenomenon and 
is the subject of Arendt‟s critique of modernity. The difference between the concept 
of social and work is that Arendt clearly states the former is a hybrid sphere, in 
which the public and the private intertwine. According to Arendt, the rise of the 
social in modern times has damaged the dividing line between the public and the 
private. The private concerns become public. Both the public and private spheres 
suffer from this modern condition. What is hidden and dark come before the light of 
the public. Behavior rather than action, necessity rather than freedom has started to 
dominate truly human life. This is surely a negative depiction of the phenomenon of 
the social. By supporting its claim through a particular secondary literature, this 
dissertation takes up the concept of the social as a hybrid sphere in which the public 
and the private are combined. However, it also argues that thanks to the 
multidimensional character of Arendt‟s thinking, one could encounter different facets 
of the social in Arendt. In her different works, while telling the stories of different 
historical figures from different contexts, Arendt depicts different layers of this 
phenomenon. 
With respect to several dimensions and facets of the social, Chapter 6 states that 
in some specific works of Arendt, one encounters four different facets/dimensions of 
the social. By referring to each work, I present these socials as the economic social, 
the biological social, the social as mass society and the social as sociability. I focus 
on one of the mentioned accounts: the social as sociability. Benhabib (1995) also 
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points out this facet of the social. She defines this “social” as a space of sociability in 
terms of the quality of life in civil society and civic association. Following this 
definition, I make my point by referring to one of Arendt‟s earlier works, Rahel 
Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, in which Arendt herself tell the life story of a 
historical figure as a combined experience of public and private. I argue that the story 
of Rahel Varnhagen is a depiction of how a political experience could flourish in a 
social context of sociability that is neither public nor private.  This is an affirmative 
conception of the social within Arendt‟s theory that is not detrimental to political 
experience. This co-existence of the social and the political, which is usually 
attributed as public, in Arendt‟s own work allows me to introduce the concept of 
social in Arendt as one of the possibilities to explore the relationship between an 
alternative, more flexible understanding of the social and the political. 
The third part deals with the possible implications of pointing out loopholes in 
Arendt‟s theory in terms of the public- private dichotomy. It consists of Chapters 7 
and 8. In respect of these implications, I argue that seeing affirmative social as an 
alternative space for human activity of action would give us the chance to see the 
political in Arendt from a different and more inclusive perspective. As the separating 
line of the dichotomy determines what is political and what is not, challenging that 
separation or seeing it in a combined way would change the conception of political. 
Detaching the political from the public in a specific instance and attributing it to the 
social, which partially has the public characteristic, points out an instance of the co-
existence of the political and the social in the political experience of the individual. 
Stating this togetherness in a specific experience raises the possibility of 
understanding the political in Arendt in a more inclusive way by focusing on the 
notion of contemporary political experience. 
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 My argument is that any challenge to the strict, fixed nature of the public-
private distinction directly effects how one positions the political within this 
dichotomy. In Arendt‟s theory the political is situated within the public. But, if the 
political is not observed within the confines of the strict separation between the 
public and the private in every context, it means that it sometimes exists within an in-
between space. This dissertation argues that this in-between space can be the social 
as sociability in Arendt‟s thinking. I argue that even in Arendt‟s own works there is 
the depiction of the existence of a political experience in a social context, the 
existence of the political within a social space has further implications for the 
contemporary political experience of an ordinary citizen, whose life experience could 
not be divided into two convenient spheres of life as public and private.  
To elaborate on that experience, Chapter 7 clarifies the concept of the 
political in Arendt. I argue that the concept of the political in Arendt is a dynamic 
concept that has many dimensions. As it is the case with the social, this dynamism is 
a result of, firstly, Arendt‟s multi-layered way of thinking, and secondly, the 
interdefinitionality in her theory.  With regard to Arendt‟s multi-layered way of 
thinking, I argue that it is possible to challenge predetermined position of the concept 
of the political within the public space. The public in the context of the public-private 
dichotomy is a tangible, pre-defined space that draws the limits of the political. 
However, while Arendt tells the stories of political experiences of different actors, 
the contexts and actual experience do not correspond to this fixed relation between 
the political and the public space. In different contexts, the political does not 
necessitate a pre-defined tangible public. It emerges within the space of sociability.  
With regard to interdefinitionality, I indicate that the political in Arendt is 
synonymous with the concept of action and it has the conditions of plurality, 
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equality, and exclusion of necessity. It is also a constitutive concept as during its 
performance it constitutes reality, freedom and the public sphere. With regard to the 
aim of this dissertation, the constitutive characteristic of the political in terms of the 
public space is prominent. I argue that if one takes into account this constitutive 
characteristic, the widely accepted predetermined relationship between the political 
and the public in the mainstream literature will be dismantled. The public space starts 
to appear not as a pre-requisite but as a constituted element of the political. I think 
that this is why we observe the political in spaces of sociability rather than in a pre-
defined tangible public sphere. The political that emerges in a social context of 
sociability, constitutes its own public. In other words, the particular reading of the 
political enables it to emerge within a social context. 
 Chapter 8 argues that while in some of Arendt‟s own works the separating 
line between the public and the private shifts in different directions, in specific 
political experience of actors, this situation opens the door for further discussion on 
the contemporary political experience. Presenting that in some specific instances, the 
political could emerge and survive within the social context of sociability gives me a 
chance to elaborate on contemporary political issues. Arendt is criticized to exclude 
social issues from the political agenda. In relation to that, in Chapter 8, I relate the 
particular reading of Arendt that questions the essentialist separation between the 
public and the private to one of the contemporary issues/context: civil society. The 
reason behind my choice of civil society is partly related with my reading of the 
social as sociability. This particular reading presents civil society as an affirmative 
in-between space.  I analyze how this co-existence of the political in an affirmative 
third space could possibly be actualized. Moreover, in the literature, civil society is 
presented as the space for an ordinary citizen to participate and contribute to the 
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political process. I argue that this idea of civil society as an associational life based 
on the idea of civility could act as a space of experience for Arendt‟s vision of 
participatory politics. At the end, besides pointing out a contemporary political 
experience, in which the political and the social co-exist, I offer an Arendtian 
perspective to critically reflect on how we experience politics within the space of 
contemporary civil society. 
In Chapter 9, I argue that this dissertation is important in three ways. Firstly, 
by pointing out specific loopholes in Arendt‟s theory in the context of the public 
versus the private dichotomy, the dissertation challenges the idea that the dichotomy 
of public versus private in Arendt‟s theory is an absolute one. Secondly, by making 
use of a more flexible, interdefinitional reading of Arendt‟s works, this dissertation 
suggests a new perspective to look into the concept of the political experience in 
Arendt. This new perspective points out a different account of the political 
experience in Arendt‟s theory, in which the political emerge within a social context 
of sociability. In general, these particular readings of the social and the political point 
out instances of their co-existence in Arendt‟s theory. This is important in terms of 
questioning the mainstream literature on Arendt‟s works, which attributes the 
political to the public and undermine the possibility of the co-existence of the 
political and the social. Thirdly, this co-existence of the political and the social as 
sociability within the civil society provides space for further discussion on the 
contemporary political experience. The particular reading of each concept enables 
the dissertation to suggest the civil society as a space of political experience, in 
which the lost treasure of the political can make its revival. 
 
  24 
CHAPTER 2 
 





The objective of this chapter is to introduce Arendt‟s unique way of thinking 
and her original approach to political theory by presenting my method of reading 
Arendt‟s works with the main premise based on conceptualizing actual political 
experience. Arendt tells the story of an actual political event. While doing that, she 
sometimes relies on the basic concepts in Western political thought and other times 
she introduces new concepts in her theory. Her reflections on these well-established 
concepts of the Western political thought are still original. By looking into the 
experience of actual events, Arendt discloses the contingencies, different facets, and 
different dimensions of a given phenomenon. This original method of looking into 
the historical and contemporary events for revealing new theoretical insights is vital 
for this dissertation. In fact, this aspect of Arendt‟s thinking is what makes this 
dissertation possible. Her multi-layered theoretical conceptualization of a specific 
concept provides the Arendt reader to find different aspects, dimensions, and facets 
of the same concept in different works, which tell different stories. Throughout the
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dissertation, I use these different facets and dimensions of the social and the political 
in Arendt as loopholes to challenge the dichotomy of public and private that 
dominates Arendt‟s political theory. 
For fulfilling its aim, this chapter starts with presenting Arendt‟s methodology of 
storytelling. Arendt tells the stories of actual political events in order to understand 
the experience itself. She does not provide causal relationships but rather points out 
the elements that are crystallized into the experience in question. In the following 
part of the chapter I look into several of her works, which are key demonstrations of 
her method of analyzing actual political events in order to demonstrate how Arendt 
makes use of this methodology. These works are selected not only for their ability to 
show Arendt‟s methodology, but also for serving as primary contexts for Arendt‟s 
theoretical concepts. Her basic concepts that constitute the theoretical backbone of 
this dissertation, such as freedom, political, action, public realm, and the social as the 
modern society push themselves forward within the stories of each delineated 
political event. The order of her works presented is a chronological one just to keep 
track of Arendt‟s line of thinking through time. 
Looking into Arendt‟s different works that delineate different events leaves the 
reader with another challenging dimension of reading her theory that Arendt is not a 
systematic thinker. I mentioned in the previous chapter that Arendt did not write 
systematic theoretical books in which she substantiates her concepts separately. 
When she uses one concept it is often to substantiate another concept. The analysis of 
inter-related concepts is also contextualized according to different claims, which 
were brought up in the initial problematization of these concepts. I refer to this 
constant shift of the contexts, concepts and claims as the method of inter-
definitionality which leaves the reader with the unchartered territory of analyzing the 
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relationship between such concepts as action, freedom, revolution, public realm, 
private realm, the social, the reality, violence and the evil. In coming up with an 
analysis of the inter-definitionality of any of these given concepts, the reader has to 
extract each related concept from the story she tells. This, however, does not imply 
that Arendt‟s political theory is the aggregation of related concepts that float in thin 
air like stories unfold in story telling. Arendt‟s theorizing has a consistency in itself 
as her main concerns led her to look into specific contexts and instances to 
understand the political experience. Although there is a disturbing disagreement in 
the secondary literature on what Arendt really means by each concept she refers, 
there is more or less an agreement on what her main concerns are.  
With regard to that, the last part of the chapter presents what I think as Arendt‟s 
main concerns in her political theory. I extract two main concerns from her different 
works and I refer to related secondary literature in order to support my points. It 
should be pointed out that these two concerns are selected on purpose, because they 
serve as the contexts for this dissertation. The section on Arendt‟s concern of 
understanding the meaning of unprecedented phenomenon in contemporary political 
experience presents Arendt‟s eagerness on dealing with the actual phenomenon by 
clarifying its conceptual elements. This section introduces the concepts of freedom, 
action, and the public as important concepts emerged from Arendt‟s endeavor of 
understanding the unprecedented phenomenon in contemporary political experience. 
These are also the main concepts in the dissertation in dealing with the dichotomy of 
public versus private. The second section is on Arendt‟s critique of modernity, which 
could be thought as the context inspired the basic inquiry of the dissertation. As 
argued in Chapter 1, the concepts of work and social, which are presented as 
loopholes in challenging the strict dichotomy in Arendt‟s theory, become meaningful 
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in the context of her critique of modernity. Before making detailed elaborations of 
these concepts in Chapter 4, 5, and 6 respectively, it is crucial to point out the related 
context of modernity. 
 
2.2 Hannah Arendt: A Distinguished Political Theorist with an Original 
Methodology 
Hannah Arendt is one of the outstanding figures of 20
th
 century political theory.  
In spite of the general assumption that she is a political philosopher, in some of her 
works, notably in “What is Freedom?” (1993), she had taken a critical stand in favor 
of political theory while explicitly discussing her objections to philosophical claims 
on will and sovereignty. Elsewhere, in a letter she wrote to Jaspers in 1955 Arendt 
introduced her ideas, which were subsequently published in The Human Condition as 
follows: “I would like to bring the wide world to you this time … I want to call my 
book on political theories „Amor Mundi‟” (Quoted in Young-Bruehl, 2006: 79). 
What lie at the heart of her insistence on political theory is her idea of politics as 
plural, contingent and unexpected phenomenon. In its simplistic form, she does not 
want to suggest a blueprint or a prescription that tells people what to do in the future 
(Canovan, 1998: viii-ix). She tries to understand the phenomena of contemporary 
political experience by analyzing its constitutive elements in relation to the basic 
concepts of political theory such as freedom, the political, and action.  
In relation to her unique stance in political theory, she is thought as having 
written the master pieces of political analysis of 20
th
 century (Young-Bruehl, 2006: 
1). In fact, her uniqueness lies both in her style of thinking and in the way of 
presenting her thoughts. Firstly, her striking originality and disturbing unorthodoxy 
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rests on the fact that she writes about actual political events as a political theorist 
(Canovan, 2002: 1). As indicated by Canovan (2002: 7) “the entire agenda of 
Arendt‟s political thought was set by her reflections on the political catastrophes of 
the mid-century.” She develops her ideas on the basis of actual events as she builds 
her theory of politics on the basis of rethinking the actual actions of political actors. 
This is a fundamentally creative approach to political theory, based on 
conceptualizing actual political experience.  
Before delineating this creative aspect of Arendt‟s political thinking, it would be 
essential to elaborate on the second original aspect in her political thought: her 
methodology. Her usage of actual political experience as the basis of her political 
theory has its implications in her original way of writing. Arendt never wrote a 
systematic political philosophy (Villa, 2007: 1). Her methodology of storytelling as 
critical theory fits well within her motivation of turning to actual political events for 
substantiating the basic concepts of her political theory through „understanding‟ the 
existing and experienced phenomena. The endeavor of „understanding‟ present 
phenomena requires some kind of phenomenological impulse for the explanation of 
the mentioned phenomena through experiencing it. In this way one could free oneself 
from any tradition that could blind one‟s judgment (Canovan, 2002: 4). The 
experience needs to be told to other people to become a reality; in this context the 
experience of story telling requires plurality of people similar to Arendt‟s 
conceptualization of action. Since both the story teller and those who read the story 
experience different things, the plurality in action challenges a number of given  
conventions. 
With regard to this characteristic of Arendt‟s methodology, Disch indicates that 
Arendt‟s conception of storytelling redefines conventional understanding of 
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objectivity and impartiality. According to Disch (1993: 666), Arendt‟s storytelling 
proposes an alternative version of impartiality, which is „situated impartiality‟, which 
could be summarized as detached reasoning. It involves telling oneself the story of 
an event from the plurality of perspectives that engenders the event as a public 
phenomenon. With regard to Arendt‟s point on the plurality of perspectives that 
makes an event a public one, one should underline that in principle Arendt 
challenges the Western political tradition initiated by Plato that abandons the plural 
experience of politics and requires the withdrawal of the political thinker from the 
plural „social‟ world. She is critical of political thinker‟s abandonment of the world 
for the singular activity of contemplation. Arendt wants to reassert the importance of 
action as a political activity that actualizes political freedom among plurality of 
equals.  
Stating that Arendt‟s methodology is an endeavor of narrating a story of an event 
through different perspectives would not be sufficient to cover her unique way of 
theorizing the actual political events. There is another approach that could be named 
as “configuration” and the “crystallization of elements” (Benhabib, 1990: 172). This 
second approach in Arendt‟s methodology is derived from her major work, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), in which she “gives a historical account of the 
elements which crystallized into totalitarianism, and this account is followed by an 
analysis of the elemental structure of totalitarian movements and domination itself” 
(Arendt, 1953: 77-78). Following Arendt‟s claim, one could state that, through 
looking into the past, Arendt detects different layers and fragments of the past and 
gives the account of how these fragments crystallized into the form they are in the 
present. Benhabib argues that in Arendt‟s account, all historical writing is the writing 
of the story of crystallized elements of the past into the present time. On this point, 
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Arendt is apparently influenced by her friend Walter Benjamin, who is thought of as 
the „poetic thinker‟ who was nourished by the fragments and aphorisms that he was 
collecting (Canovan, 2002: 4-5).  
This method of narration is used by Arendt to tell the stories of actual political 
experience. At this point, it is crucial to look into Arendt‟s several works that are  
key demonstrations of her method of analyzing actual political events in order to 
arrive at new theoretical insights. 
 
2.3 Actual Political Events as the Source of Arendt’s Political Theory 
The first work that will be discussed is The Origins of Totalitarianism (1954), not 
only because of the place it occupies in the chronological list of Arendt‟s works, but 
also because it is the first prominent work of Arendt that gives account of her line of 
thinking, her political and theoretical concerns, and her methodology. The Origins is 
an endeavor to understand the unprecedented modern phenomenon of totalitarianism. 
In the introduction, Arendt (1966: xxi) clearly states her aim as dealing with 
totalitarianism, its origins, and its elements; however it is again Arendt who indicates 
that the book does not really deal with the origins of totalitarianism, but rather gives 
an historical account of the elements, namely Anti-Semitism, Imperialism, and 
Totalitarian domination itself, which were crystallized into Totalitarian phenomenon.  
Having this motivation in mind, she commences the book by identifying her concern 
with the establishment of totalitarian governments in Russia (1929) and Germany 
(1933), respectively, as she sees them as the decisive events of the 20
th
 century. The 
Origins is a perfect example of how Arendt finds out and presents the different layers 
and fragments of the past by referring to the history of Anti-Semitism and 
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Imperialism, and gives the account of how these fragments crystallized into the form 
of Totalitarianism as a modern concept. It is beyond the aim of this part of the 
chapter to reflect upon how these historical fragments has brought about the modern 
phenomenon of totalitarianism. It is suffice to say that The Origins is Arendt‟s first 
work, in which Arendt gives the account of her critical stance of the modern 
society‟s totalizing effect that destroyed man‟s capacity to experience and to act in 
political terms in his engagement in totalitarian movement. While telling the story of 
totalitarianism, Arendt makes the reader feel that her conception of the political or 
political experience is different than the one experienced in the modern totalizing 
society. She also presents her uneasiness with respect to associating the term social 
with a mass society. In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, her understanding of the social and the 
political will be examined in a detailed manner. 
The second work that demonstrates her narration of the actual political 
experiences would be On Revolution (1963). In this work, Arendt argues that the 
physiognomy of 20
th
 century is composed of the phenomena of wars and revolutions. 
But she also claims that the ideologies of the 19
th
 century, such as nationalism, 
internationalism, capitalism, imperialism, socialism and communism, have been 
exhausted. Therefore, for the phenomena of 20
th
 century, namely wars and 
revolutions, there is only one motivating cause, which is freedom versus tyranny 
(Arendt, 1990: 11). In this context, she is highly critical of the loss of the concept of 
freedom from the vocabulary of revolution. Within the literature and discourse of the 
political experience, freedom has become a concept that is only used in the 
discussions of war and as justification of the use of violence (Arendt, 1990: 12). 
These discussions and justifications take up the concept of freedom in the sense of 
negative and positive freedom, i.e. freedom from and freedom to. But as it is argued 
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in Chapter 1, Arendt‟s understanding of freedom is different. Her conception of 
freedom is based on acting of plurality of equal people in the public sphere. It is 
synonymous with being political and being political could only be actualized through 
acting, i.e. through starting something anew such as founding of the political bodies. 
    Within this line of thinking, Arendt attempts to resituate the concept of freedom 
into the vocabulary of revolution by re-examining historical facts about two great 
revolutions of 18
th
 century: the French Revolution and the American Revolution. 
Between these two revolutions, Arendt praises American revolutionaries for their 
capacity to act and founding anew body politic. She approves that the American 
Revolution was made for the sake of freedom, as revolutionaries acted and found a 
new federal state. However, she thinks that the French revolution failed because 
French revolutionaries made the revolution for the satisfaction of immediate 
biological needs, such as hunger. Their motivation was not the attainment of freedom 
through acting for the sake of beginning something anew. By elaborating on the two 
great revolutions of the 18
th
 century, she underscores her concern about the concept 
of freedom as one of the central concepts of her political theory. On Revolution is a 
great example of how Arendt extracts her theoretical tools from the contexts of actual 
political events.  
In her later works, Arendt continued to search for understanding the 
unprecedented modern phenomenon through looking at the actual political events. In 
this way she could write the history of the present in order to make sense of the 
political experience of the past. One of her best examples of this endeavor is 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1968), which has been 
written just after On Revolution.  This book considers an actual political event while 
it is happening: the public court room trial in Israel of Adolph Eichmann, the German 
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Nazi Party and SS official who was administratively responsible for the emigration 
and evacuation of Jewish people from national territories under Nazi control. In 1960 
he was caught in Buenos Aires and flown to Israel nine days later. He was brought to 
trial in the District Court in Jerusalem on April 11, 1961, accused of committing 
crimes against the Jewish people, against humanity and, war crimes (Arendt, 1976: 
21). The trial is supposed to be focused on what has Eichmann done: Arendt is 
adamant that it is not supposed to be a trial focused on the enormous suffering of the 
Jews, not about the responsibility of the German people and mankind, and not about 
anti-Semitism and racism (Arendt, 1976: 5). Reporting on the trial for the American 
magazine The New Yorker, Arendt was able to be present in the courtroom, providing 
her a rich source of detail for narrating the meaning of the event. Compatible with 
her unique methodology stated above, she narrates and extracts the significant 
fragments in the story. In this way, she arrives at two original insights that are 
important for her political theory. 
The first is the concept of the banality of evil: what Eichmann has done is 
evil. But this evil is banal because Eichmann‟s accomplishment is administrative 
rather than passionate, thoughtless rather than intentionally provocative. Eichmann 
refused to think about what he was doing, and therefore, gave up one of the most 
important universal mental faculties of mankind, which for Arendt are thinking, 
willing, and judging. Thoughtlessness of his deeds, in other words obeying the 
commands without thinking, is exactly what makes Eichmann‟s evil banal. In this 
case, although his actions were monstrous, the doer was ordinary and common place. 
(Arendt, 1978: 4). So as to demonstrate the uniqueness of the phenomenon, Arendt 
(1976: 288) points out:  
  34 
That such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak 
more havoc than all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, 
are inherent in men- that was, in fact, the lesson one could learn in 
Jerusalem. But it was a lesson, neither an explanation of the 
phenomenon nor a theory about it.  
The uniqueness lies in the fact that because of its unprecedent damaging 
consequences, this specific evil of being thoughtless is beyond all evil activities 
people know up to that specific moment. 
The second new concept Arendt (1976: 246-247) introduces in this book is a 
unique and unprecedented type of crime, „a crime committed en masse‟, which 
should be treated differently from other crimes. This new crime Arendt is talking 
about is against human status and anything that is related with the nature of mankind. 
She defines it as “an attack upon human diversity as such, that is, upon a 
characteristic of the “human status” without which the very words “mankind” or 
“humanity” would be devoid of meaning” (Arendt, 1976: 268-269). Therefore it is 
against freedom, against the necessary plurality of mankind and the human status of 
the individual. This new type of crime clearly negates everything Arendt appreciates 
about the political possibilities of human life. Its unprecedented character makes it 
hard to handle and cope with. In addition to these difficulties, Arendt is also worried 
about its reproductive and repetitive potential. She clearly says that “[i]t is in the very 
nature of things human that every act that has once made its appearance and has been 
recorded in the history of mankind stays with mankind as a potentiality long after its 
actuality has become a thing of the past” (Arendt, 1976: 273).  Arendt recognizes 
Eichmann‟s crime as a threat to human diversity, freedom, and plural existence of 
mankind. She tells us the story of Eichmann in a way emphasizing what she cares 
about the political possibilities of human life: diversity, freedom, and plurality. These 
are among the core elements of her conception and theory of politics. 
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Arendt‟s concern for the preservation of human freedom as the substance of 
politics and the content of public affairs could also be observed in On Violence 
(1970). This book is also a great example of how she makes use of actual political 
occurrences for developing the content of her political theory, as this book is 
composed of reflections on events and debates of the 20
th
 century. The immediate 
historical context of the book is the Cold War period. Arendt (1970: 3) sees the 
twentieth century as a century of violence, but the danger of the Cold War context is 
that the technical developments of implements of violence come to a deadly point 
that could not be justified with any kind of political goal. More specifically, 
according to Arendt, in the 20
th
 century war as a phenomenon, which is associated 
with the implements of mass violence, becomes the basic social system. Even its 
potential becomes the principle structuring force in society (Arendt, 1970: 9). In 
addition, Arendt is highly critical of the idea that categorizes politics within the 
context of domination and legitimate use of violence. She does not equate political 
power with the organization of violence. She indicates that “one should cease to 
reduce public affairs to the business of domination” (Arendt, 1970: 6). This point is 
another possible motivation behind Arendt‟s eagerness in conceptualizing and 
contextualizing concepts like violence, power, action, strength, force, and authority 
in this book. This conceptualizing and contextualizing activity gives us some clues 
about her political theory. 
Tracing the fundamental concepts of Arendt‟s political theory in her 
reflections of the actual political events is also possible in her thoughtful essays that 
are gathered under the heading of Crises of the Republic (1972). The first essay, 
“Lying in Politics”, is composed of reflections on the Pentagon Papers, which were 
issued as forty seven volumes, subtitled as a “History of U.S Decision Making 
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Process on Vietnam Policy,” and published in The New York Times in June 1971. 
This political development inspired Arendt to write on the act of lying that the 
Pentagon Papers revealed had become a crucial element in contemporary politics. In 
her own words “[s]ecrecy-what diplomatically is called “discretion”, as well as the 
arcana imperii, the mysteries of government- and deception, the deliberate falsehood 
and outright lie used as legitimate means to achieve political ends, have been with us 
since the beginning of recorded history” (Arendt, 1972: 4). Her concern revolves 
around the distortion of reality, and therefore the limitations on mental freedom and 
imagination in the context of politics, action, and public realm. She is critical of 
lying-the deliberate denial of the factual truth- and wants us to see the connection 
between lying and action- the capacity to imagine an alternative and to act in order to 
change facts. The common denominator is imagination. 
The second essay, Civil Disobedience, elaborates on organized campaigns of 
civil disobedience, at the end of 1960s and beginning of 1970s which posed the 
question “Is the Law Dead?” (Arendt, 1972: 51). In her analysis of the mentioned 
debate Arendt depicts the phenomenon of civil disobedience as plural and political. 
According to Arendt (1972: 56), civil disobedients are “organized minorities, bound 
together by common opinion, rather than by common interests”, and “their concerted 
action springs from an agreement with each other.” In her conceptualization she 
states the difference between the criminal act and civil disobedience to law in terms 
of public versus private distinction. She states that “[t]here is all the difference in the 
world between the criminal‟s avoiding the public eye and the civil disobedient‟s 
taking the law into his own hand in open defiance” (Arendt, 1972: 75). The 
criminal‟s violation of law is a private act. On the contrary, the civil disobedient 
challenges the law in front of the plurality of people. This is what makes the act of 
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civil disobedient a plural and political one. Once again, it could be observed that in 
her elaborations of the actual political events she underscores some basic concepts of 
her political theory while substantiating her arguments. These concepts are freedom, 
action, the public sphere and reality.  
All in all, from the above-mentioned summary and analysis of Arendt‟s 
works, it is seen that Arendt substantiates the prominent concepts of Western 
political tradition through telling the stories of actual political events and their 
crystallized elements. With regard to that specific methodology, the reader observes 
that her area of interest varies from totalitarianism to revolution; violence in political 
experience to freedom. The next step in understanding her way of thinking and 
unique stance in political theory is to interrogate her main concerns that motivate her 
to look into mentioned specific events. 
 
2.4 Basic Concerns in Arendt’s Political Theory 
 
2.4.1 Understanding the Meaning of Unprecedented Phenomenon of 
Contemporary Political Experience 
The key point in extracting the basic concerns in Arendt‟s political thinking 
from her most important texts is that Arendt‟s main motivation is „to understand‟. 
Understanding the nature of contemporary phenomena of 20
th
 century has become 
the main motivation behind her journey in political theory. In relation to that 
motivation of understanding, she gives great importance to elaborating the meaning 
of the basic concepts of the tradition of Western political theory. At this point one 
should bear in mind that her work is not a repetition of already substantiated political 
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concepts through a literature review. On the contrary she uses her knowledge of the 
tradition as a deep foundation for making an original and unique re-conceptualization 
of the basics of political theory in order to understand and explain the unprecedented 
events of 20
th
 century.  
Her eagerness in understanding through dealing with the meanings of the 
well-known concepts of Western political thought is also indicated by Arendt 
scholars. Maurizio Passerin D‟Entréves (1994: 1) states that “…she grappled with 
the most crucial political events of our century, trying to grasp their meaning and 
historical import, and showing how they affected our categories of moral and 
political judgment.” Besides revealing the effects of actual political events in our 
understanding of contemporary political experience, she has the concern for 
preventing the recurrence of evil developments and experiences of 20
th
 century‟s 
mass society, which is associated with meaninglessness with its totalizing and 
homogenizing effects. According to Michael Gottsegen (1994: 3) what inspires 
“Arendt is the hope that an understanding of the phenomenon might offer some 
protection against its recurrence.” In fact, this is why Arendt looked into the actual 
events of her time as well as in the past. As is stated in the previous section, she 
examines the actual events and points out the new concepts such as mass society, 
banality of evil, or crime en masse, arising from these events. In this way, Arendt 
offers the reader a clearer conceptual understanding of politics historically and 
critically. The clarified new concepts in turn challenge and reformulate both classical 
political arguments and our ability to use these different formulations to comprehend 
our present reality. 
In relation to Arendt‟s agenda that shed light on the nature of politics, the 
public realm, and the new form of barbarism that becomes the main characteristic in 
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our modern lives the first work that one should turn to is The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (Villa, 2007: 2). This should not be surprising. In this book she tries 
to make sense of modern phenomenon of totalitarianism that seems to have 
destroyed the very capacity for experience and caused isolation and lack of normal 
social relationships by making people abandon the self into the mass (Arendt, 1966: 
308, 316-317).  With its totalizing claims this new phenomenon of the 20
th
 century 
that concretely functioned in the form of death camps of the Second World War, has 
led to the abolition of the separation between the private and the public life (Arendt, 
1966: 336). What is at stake with this prominent piece is that Arendt tries to 
understand the meaning of a specific phenomenon by giving a historical account of 
the elements that turn out to be totalitarianism. While fulfilling this aim, she makes a 
clear cut definition of the totalitarian government through indicating the difference 
between totalitarianism and other forms of domination. In this respect, one of her 
reference point in demonstrating the difference between totalitarian government and 
other dictatorships and tyrannies is the concept of terror. According to Arendt (1966: 
6) “[a] fundamental difference between modern dictatorship, and all other tyrannies 
of the past is that terror is no longer used as a means to exterminate and frighten 
opponents, but as an instrument to rule masses of people who are perfectly obedient.” 
Her eagerness to define the totalitarian form of government comes from her 
concern that there is a scarcity of knowledge with respect to totalitarianism. 
Although the modern phenomenon of totalitarian rule of government destroys 
humanity and the essence of man, Arendt has a hope to understand the mechanic of 
this destructive process. The Origins is the result of Arendt‟s conviction that it is still 
possible to discover the underlying elements of a context such as totalitarian rule, in 
which everything becomes unrecognizable for human comprehension (Arendt, 1966: 
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xxx). This discovery would be crucial to prevent the recurrence of this destroying 
phenomenon of totalitarianism. According to Elisabeth Young-Bruehl (2006: 35), 
Arendt‟s main question in The Origins can be summarized as “Would it be possible, 
by understanding totalitarianism, to judge future totalitarianisms accurately as they 
arose or in their infancy?” 
Just after The Origins of Totalitarianism, we come across with one of 
Arendt‟s most crucial works, in which she reveals her insistence on understanding 
and offering conceptual reformulations of the basic elements in Western political 
thought, namely The Human Condition (1958). Although this work would be 
analyzed in Chapter 4 “The Concept of Work in Arendt‟s Theory: A Loophole” in 
detail, it would be essential to point out main arguments in order to have an idea of 
her way of conceptualization of the basic elements of Western political thought. 
This is Arendt‟s most influential philosophical work before she shifted her 
concern from dealing with thinking what we are doing to what we are doing while 
we are thinking (Young-Bruehl, 2006: 160).
2
  In this master piece, she suggests we 
reconsider the human condition through thinking about what we are actually doing. 
Arendt argues that the reconsideration could be realized through dealing with those 
activities that are traditionally within the range of every human being, which are the 
basic parts of human condition, namely labor, work and action. These three activities 
correspond to one of the basic conditions for man who lives on this earth. The human 
condition for labor is life; the human condition for work is worldliness; and the 
human condition for action is plurality (Arendt, 1958: 7). Labor is presented in 
relation with the individual survival; work is presented in relation with permanence 
                                                          
2
 On the latter issue see Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind. San Diego: Harcourt Brace &Co., 
1978: 3-238. 
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and durability upon the futility of mortal life; action is presented in relation to 
founding and preserving political bodies. This is actually the theoretical context 
where Arendt conceptualizes one of her basic concepts in her theory, which is action. 
Within this context, action and speech are the activities that create human life and are 
the means to attain human excellence. They are the activities that reveal man‟s 
unique distinctness while he is among his equals (Arendt, 1958: 176). In her 
conceptualization, acting refers to “to begin” and speech refers to “to disclose” and 
they are interrelated, as she argues that speech is what activates action‟s revelatory 
character. 
The sphere in which action takes place is related to another important 
component in Arendt‟s theory, which is the public realm. Again in this book, Arendt 
conceptualizes the public sphere and differentiates it from the nature-bounded private 
sphere of necessity and labor. With regard to the public sphere that is actually the 
sphere of human affairs, Arendt (1958: 25) argues that two activities namely action 
(praxis) and speech (lexis) constitute this realm from which the necessity and 
usefulness is strictly excluded. In her understanding, the difference between the 
public and the private corresponds to the distinction between the political and 
household in ancient city state (Arendt, 1958: 28). This distinction is related with 
Arendt‟s fascination with political life in ancient Greece that presents us two orders 
of existence: idion (man‟s own) and koinon (communal). According to this 
understanding, the human capacity for political organization is in direct opposition to 
oikia (home) and the family (Arendt, 1958: 24). In relation to this kind of agonistic 
understanding of the separation between the public and the private, we could argue 
that Arendt is clear with the distinctions and definitions. In her understanding, the 
political could exist within the confines of the public sphere that is constituted by the 
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actions of human plurality. This understanding is a perfect example of her efforts on 
making distinctions while conceptualizing the basic elements of her political thought. 
Arendt‟s eagerness on conceptual distinctions continues in her latter works. In 
spite of her insistence on the meaning, she does not define her concepts absolutely or 
finally; many of her key concepts reappear in slightly reconfigured contexts in her 
different works. One exception to that situation is On Violence. In this book by 
substantiating the concept of violence in relation to the concept of action, and by 
indicating its difference from other concepts such as power, force, strength, and 
authority, Arendt develops a whole political vocabulary of the constitutive categories 
of what she understands as violence . It should be pointed out that this is not a simple 
definitional theoretical exercise on Arendt‟s part, rather it aims at (and aids) the 
construction of a theoretical framework for political theory on the basis of conceptual 
distinctions. Arendt argues that power “corresponds to the human ability not just to 
act but to act in concert…it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long 
as the group keeps together,” (1970: 44). In this statement she situates the concept of 
power within the public realm where human action in concert is possible. On the 
other hand, by emphasizing the singular and individual characteristic of strength, and 
the arbitrariness and instrumental character of violence, which is designed and used 
for the purpose of multiplying natural strength, Arendt excludes these concepts from 
the political realm of the public (Arendt, 1970:4, 44, 46).  
Arendt‟s concern to differentiate the concepts that are compatible with and 
appropriate for each other centers on one major concept, namely freedom. Her 
treatment of the concept of freedom as the essential characteristic and aim of human 
political life is best depicted in On Revolution. As it is indicated in the previous 
section, she is highly critical of the loss of the concept of freedom from the 
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vocabulary of revolution, which is one of the composing elements of the 
physiognomy of 20
th
 century. In order to comprehend the central role of freedom in 
Arendt‟s theory, it will be important to recall two points. First,  Arendt never defines 
her concepts in isolation, but relates them to other central concepts in her theory. 
Arendt elaborates on the central concern in On Revolution in her essay “What is 
Freedom?”. In this essay she indicates that raison d’étre for politics is the attainment 
of freedom. The second important point to recall is that these two works are also 
indicative of what I refer to as inter-definitionality as a method to read Arendt‟s main 
conceptual and political concerns. With regard to inter-definition, Arendt (1993: 146, 
149) argues that action is the sphere of politics and action takes place within the 
public realm, in which a plurality of human beings interact and perform. She points 
out that at first instance, freedom could be experienced mundanely in a pluralistic 
public sphere through action. She criticizes those who conceive freedom as a quality 
of interaction between “I” and “the self”. According to Arendt, freedom is not a 
quality of reason but of an action. In relation to this, she states that experiencing of 
freedom within the self and at the level of the mind starts with the conversion of Paul 
who thinks that freedom to convert is a result of the conversation between “I” and 
“the self” (Arendt, 1993: 158). She opposes the idea that conceives of freedom as an 
inner quality of the individual and within the same line of logic, she criticizes Mill‟s 
idea that thoughts could not be restricted but to some extent action could be. Related 
to this point she claims that the individual firstly experience freedom through action, 
then after it is turned inwards and conceptions like freedom of thought comes to the 
stage at the second level (Arendt, 1993: 148). She also indicates that the construction 
of „free will‟ as an inner quality of individual‟s freedom led to control over other 
people through the application of „free will‟ discourse such as in the „contract 
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theories‟, and it has become the very source of domination and subjugation in the 
name of the  sovereignty of free will (Arendt, 1993: 163-165). Pointing out this 
characteristic of freedom in Arendt‟s theory is not only crucial for understanding one 
of her basic concepts of an inter-definitional context, but also important for 
understanding her motive in her reflections like in On Revolution. 
 
2.4.2 Arendt’s Critique of Modernity  
Arendt‟s critique of modernity is a rich source that nourishes her theoretical 
engagement. In this context, most of the Arendtian scholars see her as the political 
theorist who has contributed to the reassertion of the value of politics in the modern 
world in which politics had become subordinate to social and economical interests 
(Canovan, 2002: 1). Arendt‟s critique of modernity could be traced back to her 
philosophical elaboration on complex relationship between thought and action. She 
identifies the separation of thought from the action as the problem that lies in the 
heart of the tradition. (Arendt, 2005). As Jerome Kohn (2005: viii-ix) puts it in the 
introduction part of The Promise of Politics:  
 [T]hinkers, who in their solitary activity are withdrawn from that 
world, tend to consider man in the singular, or, which amounts to 
the same, men as multiples of a unique species, and to ignore, or in 
Marx‟s case misconstrue, the experience of political freedom that 
Arendt sees action‟s greatest potential. Hence action, as Arendt 
came to understand it, is largely missing from the tradition of 
political and philosophic thought established and handed down by 
these thinkers.  
At this point Arendt appreciates Marx‟s break with this traditional thinking to 
a certain extent. According to Arendt, Marx put the concept of  labor of the human 
being at the centre of political activity instead of promoting the traditional view that 
sees philosophic contemplation as the source of right and truth in politics. However, 
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she does not claim that Marx puts an end to the tradition. On the contrary, she is also 
highly critical of degradation of political action into the category of means and ends. 
Seeing action as the means necessary to achieve a higher end disturbs her as much as 
she is bothered by the idea which  subordinates  politics to economics (Kohn, 2005: 
xxvii-xxviii; Dossa, 1989: 21).  
Following that concern, Arendt specifies her uneasiness with modernity by 
referring to the establishment of totalitarian governments in Russia and Germany. As 
Canovan (2002: 11) puts it “[t]he special danger of modernity, as she saw it, was that 
those who felt the impulse to act tended to look for some kind of irresistible trend to 
side with, some natural or historical force with which they could throw in their lot”. 
With regard to the totalizing and homogenizing effect of the modern mass society, 
what bothers Arendt is the withering of the sense of the self in human beings as a 
centre of value (Gottsegen, 1994: 4).  
Although there are discussions on whether Arendt is a “reluctant modernist” 
or a “great anti-modernist”3, her critique of the rise of modern conditions within the 
context of modern society becomes one of the central focuses of her work. Arendt‟s 
critique of modernity can be felt in her reflections of the political reality. For 
instance, in On Violence, Arendt becomes critical of the idea of progress which is an 
important component of the Left‟s discourse of the modernization process. I think 
Arendt sees the concept as a tool, which supports the legitimization of violence. 
Although she refers to how the concept of violence comes to stage in 17
th
 century 
                                                          
3
 See Dana R. Villa, “Hannah Arendt: Modernity, Alienation, and Critique” in Hannah Arendt and the 
Meaning of Politics, eds. By Craig Calhoun and John McGowan. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, pp. 179-206. In his essay Villa elaborates on the Benhabib‟s arguments that Arendt 
is in fact a reluctant modernist with her theory of action that stresses intersubjectivity, dialogue, and 
democratic will formation and George Kateb‟s depiction of Arendt as a “great antimodernist” as she 
yearns for a place on earth that becomes stable and permanent through memorable deeds. 
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and becomes a dogma in 19
th
 century, she especially has problems with an obsessive 
belief in the concept of progress that leads to technical developments of implements 
of violence, which in turn becomes politically uncontrollable. (Arendt, 1970: 30). In 
addition, in Crisis of the Republic, after clarifying the concept of civil disobedience, 
Arendt clarifies the conditions that make civil disobedience come into existence. In 
her explanations, the increasing bureaucratization of modern representative 
government render the initiation of creative and unique political action impossible by 
means of alienating human beings from their human potential with its machine like 
organization (Arendt, 1972: 89).  
Although these minor points reveal her unease with the phenomenon of 
modern society and the process of modernization, one could find her major critique 
of modernity in her prominent theoretical work, The Human Condition. While 
elaborating on the concept of work as one of the constitutive activities of vita activa, 
Arendt situates her analysis of this concept in the context of her critique of 
modernity. In her endeavor, Arendt‟s critique of modernity would be limited to her 
discussions on the relationship between the concepts of labor, work, and action.  
Within the context of the activities of vita activa Arendt‟s criticism of the 
modern age is that animal laborans, who is associated with the private sphere of 
human life, has become dominant. At this point, as Levin (1979: 521, 523) suggests, 
one has to be careful about what Arendt refers to while she is talking about animal 
laborans. She is not talking about a social class or a social category, rather she 
indicates “an activity, a way of life, even a relationship to the world.” Arendt‟s 
criticism that laboring as a private activity has conquered the public space of the 
political is less concerned with the working class movements of that time. She is 
instead more concerned with the change in the attitudes of people in their relation to 
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public life. According to Arendt, as everyone becomes animal laborans in their 
relations to the world, what is left is the private activities that are displayed in the 
public sphere. As the society turns into a society of laborers, in modern times, the 
activities that are attributed to the necessity becomes valuable. Never-ending and 
self-defeating circle of production and consumption starts to rule the lives of people 
(Suchting, 1962: 48). The modern world creates people being able to think but 
lacking thought, engaging activities without taking meaningful actions and having 
jobs without any ethic of productive work (Applebaum, 1992: 500-501). The futility 
of modern times raises the tension between the dichotomies of public versus private, 
politics versus economics, freedom versus necessity as “[t]he private has superseded 
the public, politics yielded to economics and freedom has been submerged by 
necessity” (Levin, 1979: 529). 
At the outset, within the context of the modern world, Arendt‟s criticism 
seems to fit well within the dichotomy of public versus private. However, the 
concept of work is also at the stage. This point is supported by Applebaum (1992: 
494) as he indicates that use-values, which are related with what the end product and 
the goal are, and have been associated with work, have given way to exchange value, 
which values automation and productivity, and are associated with labor and 
quantity. From that argument, it is clear that Arendt‟s criticism of the modern world 
is not limited to the intrusion of the sphere of labor, which is private into the sphere 
of action, which is public. Work as a third category has been also affected by labor‟s 
triumph in terms of dominating people‟s relations to the world. Different from both 
action and labor, work has an indispensable share in Arendt‟s political thinking. 
Arendt‟s critique of modernity that is depicted in The Human Condition is not 
limited with her elaborate analysis of the concept of work. In my own reading of 
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Arendt‟s critique of modernity, the concept of the social is more important than the 
concept of work. While substantiating the concepts of the public and the private, 
Arendt (1958: 28) introduces the concept of social, which is an element of the 
modern age and finds its political form in the nation-state. Specifically, Arendt draws 
our attention to the phenomenon of the rise of the social in modern age. According to 
her, today, politics becomes a function of society. The rise of the household (oikia) 
or of economic activities in relation with the public realm has had the effect of 
blurring the distinction between the public and the private (Arendt, 1958: 33). In her 
understanding, this signifies a danger, as society, on all its levels, excludes the 
possibility of spontaneous action and outstanding achievement under the name of 
normalization as long as it expects certain kind of behavior (Arendt, 1958: 40). At 
this point, Arendt sees modernity as damaging to the clearly defined distinction 
between the public and the private spheres and a loss of our capacity of action and 
political experience. In the broader context of contemporary political structure, the 
social in Arendt  
includes not merely the shift from oikia to market economy without 
central direction but also central control of that economy; it includes not 
only “free market” laissez faire but also socialist or communist 
regulation, economies directed by a government on a technical, 
administrative basis, in a sort of “gigantic, nation-wide administration of 
housekeeping”(Pitkin, 1998: 11).  
This idea of modernity having the connotations of „damage to‟ and „a loss of‟ 
can be identified in her other works as well. In On Revolution, in the contexts of 
French and America Revolutions, Arendt argues that entering of social and economic 
matters into the public realm does not commence with the outburst of the revolutions 
in the eighteenth century. Arendt points out that transformation of government into 
administration, rule of the bureaucracy, and transmutation of law into decrees 
become the prominent characteristics of the absolutism before the revolutions 
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outbreak. However, with the downfall of political and legal authority that also 
corresponds to the outburst of revolutions the concept of the people gains 
prominence. The power of the people shifted into a chaos of violence as “their need 
was violent, and, as it were, pre-political; it seemed that only violence could be 
strong and swift enough to help them” (Arendt, 1990: 91). With the entrance of 
violence into the public realm through the emergency of fulfillment of the needs of 
the poor, the public realm is damaged. The results are total misery and total terror 
(Arendt, 1990: 112). 
In addition, in On Violence Arendt talks about how her conception of the 
political and freedom have been damaged by the modern conceptions of politics. 
While indicating the mutually exclusive character of the relation between power and 
violence, Arendt (1970: 81) argues that “the greater the bureaucratization of public 
life, the greater will be the attraction of violence.” The important point here is that in 
Arendt‟s thinking bureaucracy is a form of government that is deprived of political 
freedom. Political freedom means the power to act. Therefore, bureaucratization, 
which is a fertile ground for violence, becomes a dead spot for Arendt‟s basic points 
of concern: the political, freedom, power, and the public realm.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter points out Arendt‟s unique and original stance within the 
Western political thought by presenting her methodology and key concepts. By 
challenging some of the traditional views of Western political thought and presenting 
a critique of unprecedented conditions of modern society, Arendt tries to understand 
our actual experiences and offers her readers different ways of grasping what it 
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means to experience political reality as experience. She tells the readers stories of the 
actual events by revealing different layers in them. In this way, she presents a unique 
way to her readers to understand the contemporary political experience.   
With respect to this dissertation, this unique way is important for two 
different reasons. Firstly, by revealing the different layers of a given phenomenon 
Arendt offers her readers different perspectives to look into the same phenomenon. 
This multi-layered way of thinking should not be thought as inconsistency. It is a 
richness that inspired me and made this dissertation possible . If Arendt did not give 
different accounts of the social and the political in her different works, this 
dissertation could not have offered an analysis of the reconfiguration of these 
concepts.  
Secondly, in her unorthodox way of engaging in political theory, Arendt is 
not following a systematic way of conceptualization. Her main concepts 
simultaneously emerge as her story telling unfolds. These concepts do not seem as 
separate notions in a systematic theory but as related elements of a plot. As Pitkin 
suggests, Arendt tried to show us that we have lost what is valuable to us. By 
stressing our collective powers and responsibilities, politics and public life, Arendt 
tries to help us to get rid of our modern tendency to privatize and personalize (Pitkin, 
1998: 2). Within this context public life, freedom, action, public realm, plurality, 
reality and political emerged as the key concepts in her theory. These are the 
interrelated elements of our modern story. It is very hard to separate these concepts 
epistemologically and ontologically. In her line of thinking, the raison d’être of 
politics is freedom; to be free means both not to be subject to the necessity of life or 
command of another and not to command oneself (neither to rule, nor to be ruled). 
Freedom is ontologically rooted in the fact of natality; the concept of natality 
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signifies new beginning/ to begin something a new, which is the capacity for action. 
Freedom‟s field of experience is action; through politics one realizes one‟s 
individuality in the sphere of action. Action takes place in the public sphere which 
exists due to human plurality. At the same time, politics articulates reality that is the 
fact of being seen and heard by others. At  the end politics is a means to attain human 
excellence. 
Every concept is related to one another and they are defined in the context of 
the public versus the private dichotomy. Politics, action, reality, and freedom are the 
elements defined in the domain of the public. This interrelatedness and 
interdefinitionality provides a kind of fixed nature. Concepts are essentially bound to 
each other in terms of definition. In the following chapters this dissertation examines 
whether it is possible to break this fixed nature caused by the dichotomous thinking 
of the public and the private. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND THE 




When we look through the works on Arendt, it is interesting to note that there 
is not much critical work on the way she identifies and conceptualizes the public 
versus private dichotomy. As indicated in Chapter 1, the concepts of evil, political, 
freedom, violence, action and revolution are among the ones which are frequently 
studied in the context of Arendt‟s political thought.  
It is patent that all of these works entail the conceptualization of public and 
private spaces as Arendt‟s political theory is structured on “mutual interdefinition” 
(Dossa, 1989: 74). In other words, she defines her key concepts with reference to 
other concepts. Her conceptualization of freedom on the basis of action, the public, 
and the political is a good example. The mentioned mutual interdefinition leads some 
thinkers to view the conceptual contrast between the public and the private as the 
founding element of Arendt‟s political theory (Villa, 1992: 712; Dossa, 1989: 74). As 
a consequence, they depict the dichotomy in non-negotiable terms. The boundaries
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 are left intact, because there is no doubt on the possibility of fluidity of the strictly 
defined boundaries between the public and the private in Arendt. 
The most important reason behind the mentioned lack of interrogation is the 
fact that in The Human Condition (1958), where Arendt makes her conceptualization 
of the public and the private explicitly, Arendt turns to Athenian political life, which 
strictly separates  two orders of existence: idion (man‟s own) and koinon 
(communal). In Greek thought, the human capacity for political organization is 
strictly excluded from the privacy of oikia (home) and the family (Arendt, 1958: 24). 
Arendt (1958: 25) argues that activities of action (praxis) and speech (lexis) 
constitute the realm of human affairs. The notions of necessity and usefulness do not 
belong to this realm of human affairs, because they are seen as belonging to the 
private sphere of life. Arendt‟s underlying motive behind holding such a strong 
distinction between the public and the private could be thought of as her critique of 
the traditional liberal division between those two realms. Liberalism valorized the 
private and prioritizes the protection of economics, family and religion from any 
interference on the side of the state (Zaretsky, 1997: 212). Arendt celebrates an 
earlier tradition that valorizes the public as the space of the free representation of 
equal citizens, as opposed to a private space of social inequality and embodied 
coercion.   
In relation to that critique, Zaretsky argues that Arendt agrees with Marx that 
politics should be rooted in a conception of the fundamental human condition. 
Nevertheless, her understanding of the basis of this conception lies in the distinction 
between the public and the private, rather than in labor (Zaretsky, 1997: 220). In 
other words, her distinction between the public and the private and her reversal of the 
accustomed order between them become the backbone of her critique of the modern 
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liberal dichotomy between these realms and its reformulation of freedom as the 
ability to avoid participation in politics. Therefore, Arendt‟s public/private 
distinction is an essential part of her theoretical engagement, but one that cannot be 
taken for granted in its definition. 
The important point is that Arendt sees a weakness in the separation between 
the public and the private in the liberal conception, but she tries to overcome this 
weakness by constructing a tighter separation. At this point, her endeavor of 
understanding the modern phenomenon of totalitarianism comes to the stage as the 
explanation of insisting on the distinction between the public and the private. 
According to Calhoun (1997: 236), Arendt defines the key feature distinguishing the 
totalitarian form of government from tyranny in relation to the fact that 
totalitarianism controls the private life of people in addition to limiting their public 
existence. Calhoun also states that Arendt‟s critique of modernity sees the modern 
phenomenon of totalitarianism and the emergence of a new hybrid sphere of the 
social as shaking the stables boundaries between the public and the private. This 
situation makes the distinction of the public from the private vital. Public space, 
which “is the crucial terrain of the humanly created as distinct from the natural 
world, of appearance and memory, and of talk and recognition,” and the private 
space of necessity should each be kept intact against penetration of the other. 
(Calhoun, 1997: 233). In other words, in her elaboration on and substantiation of the 
new phenomenon of totalitarianism, Arendt needed this separation between the 
public and the private.  
Keeping all of these considerations and arguments in mind, the question of 
this dissertation is whether Arendt relies on that strict separation all the time. Does 
Arendt keep this strict separation between the public and the private in all of her 
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political reflections? Are there any theoretical spaces and concepts that transcend this 
strict dichotomy, which could be identified as a loophole? Before trying to find 
answers to these questions, it would be crucial to look through secondary literature 
on the public and the private distinction in Arendt‟s theory. By pointing out that there 
is a lack of critical interrogation in terms of the questioning the limits of the 
mentioned dichotomy, the original contribution of this thesis would become explicit.  
In this chapter, the secondary readings on the public and the private 
distinction are divided into two main sections. The first one includes the mainstream 
secondary readings, which covers the writings of scholars who would not be 
associated with any kind of particular tradition or movement within the field of 
political theory. The second one is composed of feminist writers who engage in a 
more critical analysis of the public and private distinction. Although, none of the 
writers specifically deals with the essentialism of the distinction itself as opposed to 
the essentialism of the categories, their insightful elaborations define the context for 
the main argument of the dissertation: that there are possibly indistinct concepts and 
spaces in Arendt‟s theory that transcend the non-negotiable distinction between the 
public and the private. 
 
3.2 Mainstream Secondary Reading 
When one looks through the conventional conceptualizations in secondary 
readings, one would come to the conclusion that the Arendtian conceptualization of 
the public versus the private is made in non-negotiable terms. There is no mention in 
the secondary literature of the possibility of mingled spaces or concepts, which carry 
the dual traces of the public and the private. These works are loyal to Arendt‟s 
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conceptualization of the pubic versus private distinction that is depicted in The 
Human Condition. They do not just reaffirm the strict dichotomy between these 
spaces, but they also assert that the conceptualization of public versus private in 
Arendt‟s political theory is made through a negation. To be more precise, these 
works argue that, firstly, the public is constructed; and secondly that the ones 
excluded from the construction of the public engender the private through the 
negation of the affirmative elements of the public. 
One of the most crucial examples of the works on Arendt‟s political theory is 
Dossa‟s The Public Realm and The Public Self: The Political Theory of Hannah 
Arendt. In his comprehensive analysis of Arendt‟s theory, he argues that the notion 
of the public realm is the key to Arendt‟s political theory. With regard to the 
public/private distinction, Dossa (1989: x) depicts the private realm as having a 
secondary place, and as a peripheral phenomenon unfit for appearing in the central 
space of the public. While he is elaborating on Arendt‟s conception of politics, he 
demonstrates a perfect example of interdefinitionality in Arendt‟s theory. Dossa 
(1989: 73) states that in Arendt‟s theory, the content of politics is the exercise of 
freedom in action and speech in the public realm, which is the space of appearance. 
In fact, he enumerates two factors for being political. The first one is contempt for 
natural privacy and the second one is the obligation of being an actor who could be 
seen and heard by others (Dossa, 1989: 64).  
As it could be observed from that argument, Dossa reads Arendt‟s conception 
of public and private spheres as opposites in the context of the political. As he 
directly puts it “Arendt‟s theory formally defines the public realm in opposition to 
that which is private, natural and removed from the common.” (Dossa, 1989: 73). 
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This type of negation is also apparent in Dossa‟s elaboration on public space 
and human status in Arendt‟s political theory. Dossa states that in our shared human 
condition there are two possible distinct ways of life: bodily life and worldly life. In 
this account, bodily life is private and immanent; it is nearly beastly. On the other 
hand, worldly life is public and transcendent; it is truly human (Dossa, 1989: 96). 
While substantiating the public in Arendt as the space for fulfillment of the human 
potential par excellence, Dossa is eager to rely on the non-negotiable distinction 
between the public and the private by depicting these spaces as existing in a negated 
relationship. 
The mentioned relationship between the public and the private based on a 
negation is also pointed out by other prominent Arendt scholars. For instance, 
Michael G. Gottsegen (1994: 50) argues that the public in Arendt is the lasting space 
and world, which is built by action. In his reading of Arendt, he argues:  
She depicts the public realm as filled with the light of speech which 
illuminates all that appears within the realm; the private realm, by 
contrast, is depicted as an essentially mute sphere, a sphere of 
darkness, a hiding place, a place of privacy, into which the light of the 
public does not- or should not- penetrate.  
He also points out that what is shared in the common realm of the public is political, 
therefore, by default, he refers to the private as non-political. This is also another 
good example of the interplay between Arendt‟s concepts: the public, action, and the 
political. While underscoring the relationship of the mentioned concepts, Gottsegen 
relies on the non-negotiable distinction between the public and the private. They are 
simply the opposites. The boundaries of the one should be protected against the 
other‟s intrusion. 
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 The mentioned interplay between Arendt‟s concepts based on non-negotiable 
distinction between the public and the private is also patent in George Kateb‟s work. 
In his endeavor of interrogating the features of politics in Arendt, Kateb (1977) 
constructs his argument on the basis of the public versus private dichotomy. 
Basically, Kateb (1977: 142) argues that, in her discussion of the political, Arendt 
gives special importance to two concepts: freedom and worldliness. In Arendt, the 
freedom could only exist in the engagement of political action, and the political 
action could only take place in the „world‟ out there. Kateb (1977: 148) states that in 
political action a person reveals himself through presenting himself publicly. This 
public life is basically his political life. Besides his public engagement, the person in 
question has also a nonpolitical life, in which “he is reduced to his biological species-
being, or to the typicalities of social conduct, or to a losing struggle to preserve an 
amorphous personality against social pressure…” (Kateb, 1977: 149).  Therefore, the 
publicly engaged action signifies the political life and politics. This is “the only 
vehicle of freedom” (Kateb, 1977: 148). However, what is biological, domestic, 
social, intimate and private could not be associated with freedom (Kateb, 1977: 144). 
They are simply nonpolitical. 
What Kateb is doing while presenting his argument on Arendt‟s conception of 
politics is to point out two completely different spheres of life of a person, namely 
the political and the nonpolitical, respectively. The first one corresponds to public 
and the second one corresponds to private and/or social. The dichotomy of the 
political versus the nonpolitical life is presented through another dichotomy of the 
public versus the private, which is apparently non-negotiable.  
With regard to preservation of the integrity and viability of the mentioned 
public as the space of freedom, one should look through the work of Dana R. Villa. 
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He argues that Arendt sees the public sphere as a theatrical space of appearances, and 
she tries to protect the integrity of this theatrical space from the attacks of modern 
monsters: capitalism, the social, and world destroying force of automatism. In 
Arendt‟s concern for the protection of the specific space of public, one could 
recognize her eagerness for providing a space for action. At this point Villa (1997: 
183) argues that Arendt‟s concern for the protected space of action relies on the 
presence of stable boundaries between the “space of freedom”, which is obviously 
the public space, and the automism of nature and labor that are situated within the 
private sphere. 
As indicated above, what lies beneath the need for the clear distinction 
between the public and the private, is Arendt‟s conception of politics as talk and 
shared opinion that gives central importance to human plurality and the equality 
between citizens. The political that rests on the exchange of opinions through speech 
could only take place in a distinct space of the common public. This common public 
excludes the private life concerns of each and every citizen. Villa argues that this 
conception is inspired by Athenian political life. Villa (2007: 9) suggests:  
Foremost amongst these fundamental experiences [experiences of talk 
and exchanging opinions] was the sheer clarity of the distinction 
between the public and private realms, a distinction which the 
Athenian citizen experienced every time he left the household in order 
to take part in the assembly or talk in the agora. 
The clearly defined distinction through the negation between the public and 
the private is marked by the residual character of the private. This point is also stated 
by those who do not share the idea that what is public in Arendt is also political. For 
instance, Canovan (2002a: 116) indicates that the private is composed of the material 
and natural side of human life-all the labor in Arendt‟s terminology- such as 
necessity, consumption, production, procreation, which are away from the light of 
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the plural public space. Moreover, in her unorthodox article, “Politics as Culture: 
Hannah Arendt and the Public Realm”, where she makes an analogy between high 
culture and Arendt‟s concept of political, Canovan (1994: 183) argues that Arendt‟s 
focus on the public realm relies on the claim that “human mortality can be 
transcended by the durability of the public world and the public memory of 
individuals‟ deeds.” In this article, she demonstrates a good example of the 
interdefinitionality in Arendt by describing the relationship between the political 
action, the public realm, and freedom as the specific characteristic of public realm. 
She underlines that freedom is not an element of private life (Canovan, 1994: 179). 
In fact, Canovan‟s conception of the public realm is extracted from Arendt‟s 
major work, The Human Condition, because Canovan starts her argument by 
defining two characteristics of the public in that book. The first characteristic is 
being seen and heard by others. This characteristic what makes the public a space of 
appearance. It is important because of the fact that the public throws light on the 
subjects and make them of common concern. The other characteristic is „the world‟, 
which is different from the natural environment that is signified by the earth. The 
world is the stage for the public that hosts the action. The world is relatively durable 
and permanent. It gathers people together but also prevents them falling over each 
other by creating built and human institutions. By doing this, the world creates the 
public space (Canovan, 1994: 180-181). In Canovan‟s (1994: 181) words “[t]his is 
the world of civilization, composed of buildings and machines, of works of art and 
lasting institutions such as states.”  
The mentioned conception of the public in Arendt‟s theory leaves Canovan 
with a clearly marked distinction between the public and the private. In relation to 
that distinction Canovan states that the private has a definite location as it is based on 
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the household. All the economic production, all the natural and economic side of 
human life take place within the private. Following that point Canovan (1994: 183) 
indicates: 
According to Arendt, then, the private and the public realms are in principle 
quite different concerns. The private realm, away from the public eye, is 
concerned with the life and welfare of the species, and with whatever can 
minister to that: but the public realm is there to conduct the affairs of the 
world in a blaze of publicity.  
Therefore, it is clear that Canovan also reads Arendt within the secure boundaries 
between the public and the private.  
 
3.3 The Alternative Perspective: Feminist Readings Of Arendt 
Besides the elaborations on how Arendt criticizes the modern liberal 
distinction between the public and the private, one would expect to come across 
more critical considerations of the distinction itself among feminist scholars of 
Arendt‟s work. Feminist political theorists have criticized the split between the two 
realms in the tradition of Western political thought, because according to them this 
distinction is a product of patriarchal power relations. While Arendt is critical on her 
own terms of the modern blurred position of the necessary distinction between the 
public and the private, the feminists are critical of the distinction itself and the 
patriarchal political system that decides what is politically valuable within each 
realm. They are challenging the power of decision making that ascribes value to each 
realm, and are trying to show the value of the ignored content of the private. 
With regard to this aspect, feminist interpretations could be classified in two 
different camps. The first one tends to criticize Arendt not on the basis of where she 
draws the line between the private and the public, but how she treats each realm. In 
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other words, they are not fully critical of the existential side of the distinction. They 
tend to keep the distinction intact but try to assert value or nomination to what exists 
in each realm. They usually do not criticize a gendered reading of the public and the 
private, but endeavor to assert an equivalent given value from one gendered realm to 
the other. In respect of Arendt‟s writing, the common argument is that the activities 
associated with animal laborans such as child rearing and housekeeping, which are 
situated within the private and usually attributed to females, should be treated as 
equal in terms of value with any male activity that takes place within the public.
4
  
The second camp, having the former‟s critiques in their minds, makes an 
effort to appropriate the rich possibilities in Arendt for feminist theory, and demands 
a transformation or modification of Arendt‟s basic statements. Although these 
feminist scholars make a great contribution in terms of making use of Arendtian 
theory within feminist understanding, they do not challenge Arendt‟s insistence on 
keeping the distinction intact. In addition, they do not try to point out any loopholes 
in Arendt‟s theory. These scholars simply try to use elements of Arendt‟s political 
thinking, such as plurality, performative characteristics, distinctiveness, and 
participatory aspect of her conception of politics, as enriching possibilities to their 
political and theoretical understandings. This chapter basically deals with this group 
of feminist scholars, as their approach is more critical in terms of existential concerns 
of the public and the private distinction in Arendt. They do succeed in making an 
alternative reading of Arendt, but fail in questioning the flexibility of the distinction 
within the political theory of Arendt. 
                                                          
4 See Adrienne Rich, 1979; Mary O‟Brien, 1981. 
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The first feminist writer who demands a transformation in Arendt‟s political 
theory in order to attain more plausible results in contemporary political life is Hanna 
Fenichel Pitkin. In her thoughtful essay, “Justice: On Relating Private and Public”, 
Pitkin (1981: 327) re-examines of the meaning of public and private in Arendt‟s 
political thought by arguing that we are experiencing a widespread turning away 
from public life. Pitkin (1981: 328), like the conventional readers of Arendt, gives a 
good account of the interdefinitionality in Arendt by stating that the public is 
synonymous with the political and the political implies action in a community of 
peers in Arendt‟s theory. 
Pitkin reads Arendt‟s distinction between the public and the private as 
corresponding to that between the political realm and the household. In this relation, 
Pitkin states that the private in Arendt, affected by ancient Greece, is the pre-
political, even non-political realm. The political realm, on the other hand, is 
composed of equals, but made up so by equality that has nothing to do with universal 
or natural rights, wealth, talent, or ability. Their equality of status is artificial, which 
is not at all a pejorative term for Arendt, since it indicates a human achievement 
based on the worldly realm of human work and creativity (Pitkin, 1981: 331). 
Within this context, Pitkin reads the public realm as the gendered space of the 
agora. She is highly critical of the exclusion of any phenomena that are associated 
with necessity and usefulness from public life. Pitkin (1981: 336) argues:  
On this account, the exclusion of "everything merely necessary or 
useful" from political life means simply the exclusion of the exploited 
by their exploiters, who can afford not to discuss economics, and to 
devote themselves to "higher things," because they live off the work 
of others. But there is more wrong here than injustice. 
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Therefore, Pitkin suggests, within this context, it is hard for one to make sense of 
politics itself.  
According to Pitkin, what is missing in Arendt is a higher goal that keeps the 
citizens together and provides meaning to their conversations on political events in 
the public. Pitkin thinks that Arendt is so obsessed with the protection of the public 
realm and political freedom from the interference of „the social‟ with its concern in 
modern times that she fails to assign an account of what is at stake. For Pitkin, 
political action and the public needs a substantive content, motivation, in other words 
an account of what is at stake. She argues that we need to include social and 
economic issues to the public concern, and can do so without destroying the political 
freedom. The balancing concept is justice, as “justice is precisely about the 
connections between profit and right, utility and meaning, private claim and public 
policy.” (Pitkin, 1981: 343). 
It is patent that Pitkin is critical of Arendt‟s existential stance in terms of the 
public and the private distinction. She argues that social questions should be 
incorporated with the public sphere in order to provide content and motivation for 
politics through the medium of social as well as political justice. However, it is also 
obvious that Pitkin does not recognize the possible existence of flexible points in 
Arendt‟s theory that mingle the public and the private and therefore would ease the 
transformation that she demands. In her reading, Pitkin, rather than exploring other 
possibilities in other of Arendt‟s works, is eager to hold on to the distinction in the 
way Arendt defined it in The Human Condition.  
Another feminist writer who takes the public in Arendt as depicted only in 
The Human Condition is Mary G. Dietz. In her essay, “Hannah Arendt and Feminist 
Politics”, Dietz sees the public realm in Arendt -bios politicos- the realm of 
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citizenship- as the domain of freedom.  Dietz (1994: 231) argues that Arendt‟s 
political vision was Hellenic, as her model of public was the Greek polis of male 
citizens. According to Dietz, the public in Arendt needs its other to assert itself. Not 
surprisingly, the other for the public is the private, which is a space of necessity, 
painful labor, and blackness (Dietz, 1994: 239-240). 
After presenting her conception of the public in Arendt, Dietz discusses the 
work of feminists that elaborates on the political theory of Arendt. Basically there are 
two mainstream positions. The first argues that Arendt‟s denial, in The Human 
Condition, of the status of the reproductive labor, is a reaffirmation of the superior 
position of masculinity in today‟s patriarchic society. Arendt‟s positioning of the 
female realm of reproduction as a private space that cannot be the site of freedom is a 
crucial point for feminists like Adrienne Rich and Mary O‟Brien. From the other 
position, feminists such as Nancy Hartstock, Hanna Pitkin, and Terry Winant point 
out the feminist dimensions of Arendt‟s political thought. For Instance, Arendt‟s 
appreciation of the concept of natality, while talking about political action as the new 
beginning/beginning something anew, is an important case for them (Dietz, 1994: 
232). 
By taking these interpretations into consideration, Dietz (1994: 232) argues 
that “an “Arendtian feminism” must continue to maintain an analytical distinction 
between political life on the one hand, and reproduction on the other, and also 
recognize the problematical nature of a feminist politics grounded in reproductive 
processes.” Dietz argues that one should read the activities of vita activa with a 
genderless perspective, as there is nothing intrinsically or essentially masculine about 
the public realm, or feminine about the private realm of necessity and labor. Dietz 
suggests we leave behind such a gendered reading and focus on Arendt‟s visionary 
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and liberating conception of human activity in terms of politics. In Dietz‟s (1994: 
247) perspective:  
By articulating a conception of politics and political equality as 
collective action and the mutual engagement of peers in a public realm 
Arendt has us focus on what it means to be “speakers of words and 
doers of deeds” whose particular and distinctive identities deserve 
revelation in the public space of citizen politics. As a result, we shift 
our focus on human practices away from sheer biological, bodily 
processes on the one hand, and economic productivity on the other, 
and toward the constitution of public, political life. 
Dietz calls for an alternative perspective in reading Arendt that appreciates 
the collective action and mutual engagement in Arendt‟s theory of the political. 
Although Dietz makes an original reading that releases the gender concern in 
Arendt‟s thinking, she does not challenge or abandon the public/private distinction 
itself. 
Like Dietz, another important feminist Arendt scholar, Bonnie Honig, argues 
that Arendt‟s agonistic and performative account of politics could be a good source 
for feminist theory. According to Honig (1995: 136): 
In spite of Arendt‟s insistent reliance on her public/private distinction, 
the resources for its politization are present within her account of 
politics and action. A reading of Arendt that grounds itself in the 
agonistic and performative impulse of her politics must, for the sake 
of that politics, resist the a priori determination of a public/private 
distinction that is behind augmentation and amendment.  
In Honig‟s point of view, an open, resistible, creative conception of politics that 
rejects narrowly expressive, identity-based politics opens the doors of feminist 
politics to the political theory of Arendt.  
With regard to this hope of possible contribution of Arendt to feminist 
politics, Honig creates an alternative perspective not in terms of the public and 
private distinction but in terms of applying the agonism in Arendt to feminist 
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politics. In fact, Honig (1995: 136) does not hesitate to state that the public vs. 
private distinction in Arendt‟s theory is rigid; so rigid that this distinction does not 
allow the politization of social justice and gender issues. She also states that the 
distinction is nonnegotiable (Honig, 1995: 146). Honig (1995: 145) supports this 
reading by arguing that binary oppositions in Arendt secures her public/private 
distinction with “a multilayered edifice” as Arendt is so careful to protect the public 
from the private but at the same time other way around. This multilayered edifice is 
composed of the following binary oppositions : performative versus constative, “We 
hold” versus “self-evident truth”, multiple self versus univocal body, male versus 
female, resistible versus irresistible, courageous versus risk-aversive, speech versus 
mute silence, active versus passive, open versus closed, power versus violence, 
freedom versus necessity, action versus behavior, extraordinary versus ordinary, 
inimitable versus imitable, disruption versus repetition, light versus dark, in short: 
public versus private (Honig, 1995: 144). 
In her gendered-free reading, Honig valorizes Arendt‟s theory in terms of its 
performative character.  The diverse and distinct people within the public realm do 
not share a priori solid identity before taking an action. Their common concerns are 
just the care for the world and an agonal passion for distinction. Within the same 
line, Honig is in favor of development of individuality during participation in 
concerted political action. Although Honig combines two different accounts of the 
public in Arendt, namely agonism and associationism, she does not make a critical 
elaboration on how Arendt draws the line between the public and the private and 
whether there are some points that transcends this distinction in Arendt‟s political 
theory. 
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Similarly, Seyla Benhabib also differentiates the agonistic account of the 
public realm in Arendt from the associational one. Benhabib (1993: 97) also starts 
with enumerating the characteristic distinctions in Arendt that disappoint feminists: 
freedom versus necessity, the public versus private and the male versus the female; 
therefore, she commences her analysis in the secure area of distinctions.  
What is striking about Benhabib‟s analysis is that she is explicitly stating the 
phenomenological essentialism in Arendt. She makes her point by starting the 
questioning of what is and what is not an appropriate matter to be discussed in the 
public realm. According to Benhabib (1993: 104), the problem is Arendt‟s 
phenomenological essentialism, in which:  
„public space‟ is frequently either defined as that space in which only 
a certain type of activity, namely action as opposed to work and labor, 
takes place, or it is delimited from other „social‟ spheres with 
reference to the substantive content of the public dialogue.  
The mentioned fixed nature is in fact what this dissertation puts into question. Is this 
fixed nature valid in all Arendt‟s political works and reflections? 
Benhabib‟s (1993: 99) controversial but enlightening interrogations pose the 
following question: “Have feminist theorists told us where this line needs to be 
drawn, or is the phrase „the personal is political‟ an invitation to another version of 
authoritarian politics?” This is also one of the basic questions of this chapter, while 
questioning to what extent feminist writings that have the claim of making an 
alternative reading of Arendt‟s political theory are successful in questioning the rigid 
boundaries of the public and the private distinction.  
Having these considerations in mind, Benhabib states that feminists like 
Nancy Hartsock and Ann M. Lane opts for the modifications of the agonal model of 
politics in Arendt‟s theory. According to them, Arendt‟s vision of the political 
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community as a shared common world in which the individual engages the political 
activity with his equal peers and distinguishes himself, offers a great opportunity. 
Seeing power as a collaborative, libratory empowerment is also effective. According 
to Lane, Arendt‟s account and experience of the social world and its relation with the 
pariah identity also shed light on women‟s struggle (Benhabib, 1993: 100). 
At this point Benhabib modifies Arendt‟s conception of the public as a 
dialogic and procedural model. She differentiates between two models of the public 
as the agonistic and associational and then opts for the latter in the context of modern 
politics. “According to the „agonistic‟ view, the public realm represents that space of 
appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism and preeminence are 
revealed, displayed, shared with others”; different from that associational public 
space emerges whenever men act together in concert. It is not topographical or 
institutional (Benhabib, 1993: 102). 
Differentiating different accounts of the public sphere in Arendt, and trying to 
extract a dialogical and procedural model from the associational account is a great 
contribution in terms of making an alternative reading of Arendt. However, 
Benhabib, does not give a satisfactory answer to the question that she asks with 
regard to feminists theorists. Neither does she interrogate on the essential distinction 
between the public and the private and question the possibility of grey areas in 
Arendt‟s theory.  
Nevertheless, there is one point where Benhabib implicitly questions this 
fixed distinction when she raises the possibility of action within the private realm. 
Although Benhabib does not state explicitly that there is a possibility of flexibility in 
the fixed distinction between the public and the private, she gives a context in which 
we could say so. By referring to Arendt‟s essay “The Crisis in Education”, Benhabib 
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(1996: 135-136) argues that education that is given while raising one‟s child is such 
an important activity within the private space that essentially being a private activity 
child rearing at the same time opens the space for the formation of future actors in 
the public space. Thus, there is a small but crucial link between the shaping of the 
citizen within the private, and the actions of the citizen in the public. This small 
detail could be thought as a supporting point for the dissertation‟s main interrogation 
of finding out in-between spaces and concepts in which the public and the private 
mingles in Arendt‟s political theory.  
In fact, a newer work on Arendt revitalizes the hope for searching for the 
possibility of co-existence of the public and the private in a specific instance or 
experience. In her book, Speaking Through the Mask: Hannah Arendt and the 
Politics of Social Identity Norma Claire Moruzzi (2000) makes a political reading of 
Arendt. Moruzzi says that she reads Arendt‟s works against Arendt in order to break 
down the widely accepted strict distinctions in Arendt‟s thought (Moruzzi, 2000: 1). 
In her reading of Arendt, Moruzzi employs psychoanalytic lenses and uses Joan 
Riviere‟s conception of feminine masquerade as an enacted social identity. With 
regard to this reading, Moruzzi (2000: 3) argues, “if social identity can be understood 
as artifice, the self-conscious enactment of a social role can be a specific aspect of 
political agency.” In this respect, Moruzzi accomplishes to make an Arendtian 
reading in the context of social identity, which is thought as a doubtful concept in 
Arendt‟s political theory. 
In her work, Moruzzi takes up historical figures, such as Rahel Varnhagen 
and Benjamin Disraeli, who are the leading actors in Arendt‟s political reflections. 
Within same lines, while constructing her argument on social identity and political 
practice, Moruzzi elaborates on a historical figure who is absent in Arendt‟s analysis. 
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This historical figure is Alcibiades. Moruzzi (2000: 142) argues that although Arendt 
refers to political experience in Greek city state while she is making her point on the 
public, action, and freedom, Arendt does not mention any life story from that time 
that is a “performative political experience that enacts social identity in the public 
realm”.   
According to Moruzzi, Alcibiades‟ story is that kind of life story from ancient 
Greece, which incorporates action, story-telling and self-enactment on the one hand, 
and transgression of the strict boundaries of the public and the private life in Ancient 
Greece, on the other hand. As Moruzzi (2000: 142) puts it, “Arendt‟s public realm is 
based on a norm of masculinity that precludes not reproductive physicality, but a 
differently social identity.” What is striking about Alcibiades is that he was an 
exemplary Athenian: a great citizen, a great soldier and a great political leader. 
However, besides these public characteristics, he also constantly enacted a feminine 
masquerade. Moruzzi (2000: 143) argues that “he challenged the exclusion of the 
feminine from the public sphere” with his addiction to “luxuriating in pleasure”, 
which is thought as slavish and feminine at that time. Even by the way he dressed up 
(a crown with a garland of ivy and violets) he confused the social identity codes of 
that time, because one could see a combination of “ideal masculinity” and “a 
masquerade of femininity” in him at the same time (Moruzzi, 2000: 147). 
Although, Moruzzi does not challenge the fixed distinction between the 
public and the private in Arendt‟s theory, she uses the historical figure of Alcibiades 
to challenge the reality of the distinction within the actual events on which Arendt is 
basing her conception. This example is a perfect depiction of how a historical public 
figure, who embodies all characteristics associated with Arendtian public life and 
politics, could embrace essentially private traits in the same context. This line of 
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thinking motivates one to question the fixed distinction between the public and the 
private by searching for any mingled concept and/or space that entails both the public 
and the private in Arendtian sense. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
All in all, this chapter points out the secondary literature on the distinction 
between the public and the private spheres in Arendt‟s political theory. In the 
mainstream reading, the dichotomy between the public and the private is not read 
critically. The Arendtian scholars, who are making the mainstream reading, base 
their own argument on Arendt without questioning the fixed distinction between the 
public and the private. This distinction is usually made through a negation that is 
non-negotiable.  
When it comes to feminist Arendtian scholars, one comes across two different 
camps. The first camp criticizes Arendt not on how fixed the distinction is. 
According to them, Arendt ignores the private realm that is associated with 
femininity and prioritizes masculine public over feminine private. For the second 
camp, which is the main focus for this chapter, there exists critical reading of the 
public and the private distinction in Arendt‟s theory. They try to make use of 
Arendt‟s agonistic and associational understanding of the political and the public 
sphere in their feminist conceptualization of politics. However, in their endeavor they 
tend to keep the public and the private distinction in Arendt intact. There are some 
theorists like Benhabib and Moruzzi who refer to the possibility of flexibility of the 
distinction by arguing that in real life experience any public experience could be 
given rise within the private or mingled with a private trait. However, there is no 
critical work that questions the possibility of intermediate/in-between concepts and 
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spaces in Arendt‟s theory that would ease usage of Arendt‟s theoretical way of 
thinking in various political contexts and concerns. The following chapters will try to 
provide this kind of alternative insight by presenting examples of an intermediate/in-
between concept of work, and space of the social in Arendt‟s theory, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 





This chapter elaborates on the concept of work in the political thought of Hannah 
Arendt. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the concept of work has a 
distinguished place, which emerges as a loophole in the context of the public versus 
private dichotomy in Arendt‟s political thinking. In order to develop this argument I 
present a close reading of Arendt‟s The Human Condition. This text has been chosen 
for two important reasons. Firstly, the mentioned book is counted as one of the most 
prominent of Arendt‟s political writings. Secondly, and more importantly, it is in this 
project that Arendt conceptualizes the three activities of vita activa: labor, work, and 
action. It is also crucial to note that there is no time-specific historical context for the 
concept of work in Arendt. However, one should bear in mind that The Human 
Condition privileges the Greek city state ideal of politics, and considers other actions 
against this ideal.  
With regard to the arguments that would be proposed in this chapter, one should 
look at how Arendt has been read in the mainstream way in terms of the public
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 versus private dichotomy generally and the concept of the work specifically. In this 
respect, it could be stated that in the mainstream reading of Arendt, labor as one of 
the fundamental activities of vita activa is associated with necessity and is situated 
within the private. Additionally, the concept of action, which is also another 
fundamental activity, is associated with the concepts of freedom and the political and 
situated within the public. In this chapter, I argue that the third activity of vita activa, 
work, emerges as a loophole. It is an intermediate concept that has characteristics 
which could be associated with both the private and the public realms. Moreover, I 
argue that at some points work transcends this categorical dichotomy. In relation to 
that argument I conclude that work is a crucial concept in itself as it shows how the 
strict dichotomy between the public and the private could be loosened. As the 
concept of work becomes a loophole, I argue that the strong distinction between 
public and private is blurred one when we make a closer reading of The Human 
Condition. 
In terms of the structure of the chapter, it begins with an overview of The Human 
Condition as Arendt conceptualizes the three composing activities of vita activa in 
this book. This overview presents the dichotomies and concepts in the context of 
activities of vita activa. In order to clarify my point about how Arendt herself 
differentiates the concept of work from other two activities in the context of the 
public versus private dichotomy, I carefully underscore the differences between 
labor, work, and action, respectively. In the name of a comprehensive analysis, I also 
underscore the interdependent relationship between these concepts. Then after, I 
present a discussion on whether it is possible to situate the concept of work spatially 
within the dichotomy of the public versus the private by elaborating on the work‟s 
ability to create a world for both animal laborans and acting/speaking men, public 
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character of the work of art and homo faber’s capacity of establishing his own public. 
As a conclusion I argue that the concept of work in Arendt has an in-between 
character and transcends the dichotomy between the public and the private. 
 
4.2 Overview: The Human Condition  
The Prologue to The Human Condition is the perfect piece through which one 
could identify Arendt‟s motivation and purpose behind writing one of her most 
important works. In the Prologue section, Arendt clearly indicates her proposal, 
namely reconsidering the human condition in the contemporary world. Arendt (1958: 
5) simply suggests us to consider what we are „doing‟. 
Her motivation behind the apparently simple suggestion is ascribed to two 
important phenomena. These phenomena could also be thought as the context in 
which Arendt speaks to us. The first event that marks a turning point and activates 
Arendt‟s reaction is the launching of the first “earth-born object made by man” into 
the universe in 1957 (Arendt, 1958: 1).  According to Arendt the importance of the 
event lies not in itself, but in the „strange‟ reaction that it provokes. It is seen as the 
first step toward man‟s escape from the imprisonment to the earth (Arendt, 1958: 1). 
Arendt states that what is new in this event is not the level of the scientific and 
technological development that is attained by human beings, but rather is seeing the 
earth as the prison for men‟s bodies. She is highly surprised by this repudiation of the 
earth by mankind. According to her, the earth is the quintessence of the human 
condition and any attempt to escape from this very essence would mean a desire to 
escape from the human condition itself (Arendt, 1958: 2). This problematic, even 
self-destructive desire allows her to propose rethinking what we are doing.  
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In terms of scientific and technological developments that enable us to fulfill our 
strange desire, Arendt argues that we test our limits of our ability to destroy all 
organic life on earth. However, she thinks that this is actually a political question and 
the discussions of the human beings‟ ability to destroy all organic life on earth 
cannot be left to professional scientists (Arendt, 1958: 3). Their language of 
mathematical symbols and formulas does not have an ability to express political 
questions.  In its simplest terms, their language is speechless
5
. Through the 
mathematical formulas we could not talk about our capacities and abilities, and the 
choices we should make among them. Arendt fears that as a result of such 
exclusively technical focus, we would rely on artificial machines for solving 
practical problems, and we would end up with a situation in which we lose the 
meaning of our abilities, and become helpless and thoughtless creatures (Arendt, 
1958: 3).  
In relation to the above mentioned situation, Arendt draws a picture of a world in 
which speech has lost its power. According to her, all that we do, know, and 
experience can only make sense through speech. Speech is the act that makes us 
human, and makes human life meaningful and political (Arendt, 1958: 3). Moreover, 
at this point one should keep in mind that she is writing in the heyday of the Cold 
War and under the shadow of the arms race of weapons of mass destruction. In 
relation to this context, it should not be surprising that she is highly critical of man‟s 
desire to escape from the „insecure‟ earth whose insecurity has been created by man 
himself because of his inability (lost ability) to speak and think. 
                                                          
5
 I am using speech in Arendt‟s and Aristotle‟s specific meaning as the ability to decide moral values 
such as the right and the wrong. As Aristotle (1992: 60) says speech indicates what is useful and what 
is harmful; what is just or unjust.  
  78 
The second decisive phenomenon for Arendt‟s unease with our contemporary 
situation is automation. Arendt argues that automation‟s claim that it would liberate 
the laboring from labor, and the theoretical glorification of labor that ends up with 
factual transformation of the contemporary society into a laboring one, are 
threatening and self-defeating events (Arendt, 1958: 4-5). In relation to this, the 
characteristic of self-defeating could be understood in two different ways. Firstly, 
labor in Arendt‟s theoretical line of thinking could be thought as self-defeating as it 
is seen in the context of consumption, rather than production. In a society that is 
identified as laboring one, what is produced is doomed to be consumed. The defining 
activity for the existence of the society could not escape from consumption, and 
therefore from consuming itself. Secondly, with the help of the automation, a society 
of laborers demands to be liberated from labor. As a result of this demand, the 
members of this society would be without the only activity that is left to them, 
namely labor. Laborers without labor, they would be nothing more than consumers. 
Prompted by these decisive and threatening contemporary phenomena, 
reconsideration of what we are doing becomes the main theme of The Human 
Condition. Arendt argues that the reconsideration could be realized by dealing with 
those activities that are traditionally within the range of every human being and are 
the basic parts of our shared human condition, namely labor, work and action. So as 
to have an understanding of the nature of contemporary society, she traces back 
modern world alienation, which is composed of escaping from the earth to the space 
and from „the world‟ to the self (Arendt, 1958: 6). Thus, at the end of the prologue 
section, in response to her presentation of the contemporary crisis, Arendt states that 
she will make an historical analysis. 
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4.2.1 Introducing the Vita Activa 
The first chapter, “The Human Condition”, begins with the introduction of the 
three composing human activities of the vita activa. Each of these three activities, 
which are labor, work and action, correspond to one of the basic conditions for man 
who lives on earth. The human condition for labor is life; the human condition for 
work is worldliness; and the human condition for action is plurality (Arendt, 1958: 
7). Within the context of vita activa, labor is presented in relation with individual 
survival; work is presented in relation with permanence and durability imposed upon 
the futility of mortal life; and finally, action is presented in relation to founding and 
preserving political bodies. Action is the activity that creates the condition for 
remembrance and history (Arendt, 1958: 8).  
With regard to these activities and their corresponding conditions, Arendt 
states that the most general condition of human existence is birth-death/natality-
mortality. All of the mentioned activities (labor, work, action) are related to this most 
general condition. However, the closest one to the condition of birth-death/natality-
mortality is action, as it is related to new beginning and could be defined as 
beginning something anew. She even states that action is the political action par 
excellence and natality might be the central category for the political (Arendt, 1958: 
9).  
In order to give a more detailed analysis of the term vita activa, Arendt also 
looks through the changes in meaning. According to her, with the disappearance of 
the city state, the term vita activa lost its original meaning and commenced to be 
understood as all active engagement with the things of this world (Arendt, 1958: 14). 
Originally, vita activa means a life devoted to public-political matters, and this 
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situation is highly related to Aristotle‟s understanding of freedom. According to 
Aristotle, freedom means being in full independence from the necessities of life and 
the obligatory relationships they originated. Men could choose three different ways 
of life in freedom. One of them is the life devoted to matters of politics.  Therefore, 
one could argue that the vita activa is highly related to the concept of freedom and 
Arendt‟s conception of freedom was influenced by Aristotle‟s line of logic. As 
Arendt puts it; the change in the meaning of vita activa results in a change in the 
hierarchical order between the revised vita activa (now a debased form of busyness) 
and the vita contemplativa (now the exalted realm of thought). She states that the 
superior position of the vita contemplativa is not a product of Christianity but could 
already be found in late antiquity, which could be marked by the fall of the self-
governing city state. Despite the hierarchical presumption in debates of Western 
political thought tradition about the vita activa and vita contemplativa, Arendt (1958: 
17) clearly indicates that her account of the activities that compose vita activa is 
neither the same as nor superior to the central concern of the vita contemplativa. This 
point is a crucial one for comprehending the way in which Arendt constructs her 
arguments about the activities of vita activa. 
 
4.2.2 The public and the Private in The Human Condition 
The second chapter of the book is where Arendt clearly puts forward the 
arguments about her understanding of the distinction between the public and the 
private realms. This chapter could be thought as the conceptualization of her 
theoretical understanding with regard to The Human Condition, because one 
encounters many of her prominent definitions within the chapter. Firstly, the terms 
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action and political are defined in relation to the condition of plurality and the 
exclusion of necessity. Borrowing from Greek thought, she begins with two orders of 
existence: idion (man‟s own) and koinon (communal). According to Greek thought, 
the human capacity for political organization is in direct opposition to oikia (home) 
and the family (Arendt, 1958: 24). Two activities, namely action (praxis) and speech 
(lexis) constitute the realm of human affairs from which necessity and usefulness 
(efficiency) are strictly excluded (Arendt, 1958: 25).  Free action is defined as 
“finding the right words at the right moment” and to be political within the context of 
the polis means deciding everything through speech (words and persuasion), not 
through force and violence (Arendt, 1958: 26). Within the light of these definitions 
and activities of man, a fully realized human being is a political animal making free 
decisions with others, not a social one constrained by urgent physical necessity. 
After defining the constituent concepts of her understanding of the distinction 
between the public and the private, Arendt endeavors to substantiate the definitions 
of the public and the private through different means. One of them is using 
dichotomies. The distinction between the public and the private corresponds to the 
distinction between the political and household in the ancient city state (Arendt, 
1958: 28). It also corresponds to dichotomies of freedom versus necessity, 
permanence versus futility, and honor versus shame (Arendt, 1958: 73). Concepts in 
each dichotomy correspond to specific realm in the context of the public versus the 
private dichotomy. While the concept of freedom corresponds to the public realm, 
the concepts of violence and force correspond to the private realm (Arendt, 1958: 
31).  
In her endeavor of substantiating the concepts of the public and the private, 
Arendt introduces another category in this chapter. It is the social. According to 
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Arendt (1958: 28) the concept of the social is an element of the modern age and finds 
its political form in the nation-state.  Arendt draws our attention to the phenomenon 
of the rise of the social in the modern context of nation-state governance.  According 
to her, today, politics has become a function of social obligations linked to the 
management of necessity, and the entrance  of  household concerns (oikia) or of 
economic activities into the public realm has blur the distinction between the public 
and the private (Arendt, 1958: 33). In her understanding, this signifies a danger, as 
this model of society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of spontaneous action 
and outstanding achievement under the name of normalization and the expectation of 
certain kinds of behavior (Arendt, 1958: 40). Through defining the concept of social 
as a third category that carries the traces of both the public and the private in a 
distorted way, Arendt conceptualizes the public and the private in a subtle manner. 
By indicating the disappearing characteristics of both of the public and the private, 
Arendt, in a way, defines and draws the conceptual limits of both concepts. The 
hybridized concept of the social becomes a schizophrenic space, whose negated parts 
in a way indicate the constituting parts of the both the public and the private.  
Despite her substantiating strategies, Arendt, at some points, clearly defines 
what the public and the private are. In this work, she favors the agonistic public 
space of the Greek city states, where everybody had constantly distinguish himself 
from all the others, showing through unique deeds or achievements that he was the 
best of all (Arendt, 1958: 41). On the other hand, “the private realm of the household 
was the sphere where the necessities of life, of individual survival as well as of 
continuity of species were taken care of and guaranteed” (Arendt, 1958: 45). After 
defining the private, she turns to the public realm and continues to substantiate it by 
indicating that public signifies two closely interrelated but not identical phenomena. 
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Firstly, “everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and 
has the widest possible publicity” (Arendt, 1958: 50). In relation to this context, 
appearance constitutes reality; she substantiates the public through appearance and 
reality. Secondly, the public “signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all 
of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it” (Arendt, 1958: 52). In 
direct opposition to this definition, being private is pointed out as being deprived of 
seeing and hearing others and of being seen and heard by them (Arendt, 1958: 58). 
To be private is to be alone and therefore without external verification of one‟s own 
reality. It is to be deprived of truly human life, objective relationships, and any 
achievement of permanence.  
 
4.2.3 Labor 
After defining the spatial contexts for the activities of the vita activa and their 
conditions, Arendt analyzes each activity in a detailed manner. The first activity in 
vita activa that Arendt deals with is labor. It is identified with the body and necessity 
of the biological life. Throughout the chapter named “Labor”, she tries to make a 
detailed analysis of the difference between the „labor of our body‟ and „work of our 
hands‟ and how the concept of labor occupies the first place in the hierarchy within 
the vita activa in the modern age. 
The activity of labor is identified with consumption, and defined as having a 
cyclical characteristic as it has no definite beginning and end. Arendt (1958: 105-
106) indicates that “[o]f all human activities, only labor, and neither action nor work, 
is unending, progressing automatically in accordance with life itself and outside the 
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range of willful decisions or humanly meaningful purposes.” Arendt (1958: 143) tells 
the consumption process as follows:  
Labor, to be sure, also produces for the end of consumption, but 
since this end, the thing to be consumed, lacks the worldly 
permanence of a piece of work, the end of the process is not 
determined by the end product but rather by the exhaustion of labor 
power, while the products themselves, on the other hand, 
immediately become means again, means of subsistence and 
reproduction of labor power. 
The exhaustion of labor power could be interpreted in a way that labor is a 
self defeating concept in the context of consumption.  
As indicated above, Arendt states that there is an absence of worldly 
permanence in the context of labor. This could be thought of as worldlessness. In 
fact, in Arendt‟s understanding, worldlessness corresponds to the activity of labor. 
Arendt (1958: 115) puts this argument as follows:  
The only activity which corresponds strictly to the experience of 
worldlessness, or rather to the loss of world that occurs in pain, is 
laboring, where the human body, its activity notwithstanding, is 
also thrown back upon itself, concentrates upon nothing but its own 
being alive, and remains imprisoned in its metabolism with nature 
without ever transcending or freeing itself from the recurring cycle 
of its own functioning.  
In this analysis, transcending cycle of physical immediacy is not possible, not 
because the body is locked in pain, but because it is locked within its own physical 
preoccupations, including also pleasure and desire. For animal laboran, who is the 
subject of the activity of labor, having the notion of a world becomes impossible. 
Spatially the animal laborans and their activity of labor are situated within 
the private. As the bodily functions of the life process are private and labor has the 
relation with the human condition of life, labor is thought as belonging to the private 
space. But ironically, it is also the least private. Arendt (1958: 111) states:  
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Of these [bodily functions, including fertility], labor, because it is 
an activity and not merely a function, is the least private, so to 
speak, the only one we feel need not be hidden; yet it is still close 
enough to the life process to make plausible the argument for the 
privacy of appropriation as distinguished from the very different 
argument for the privacy of property.    
Nevertheless, as we are dealing with the activities, labor takes its proper place 
within the private in Arendt‟s theoretical understanding. 
 
4.2.4 Work 
After a detailed conceptualization of labor, chapter four gives a detailed 
account of the second activity within the vita activa: work. In this chapter, Arendt 
distinguishes „the work of our hands‟ from „the labor of our bodies‟. This 
differentiation also finds implication within the distinction between the subjects of 
labor and work respectively. Arendt (1958: 136) clearly differentiates the laboring 
body, animal laborans, from homo faber, who constructs the human artifice and 
human world. Arendt (1958: 137) indicates the importance of the world and human 
artifice by indicating that “[w]ithout a world between men and nature, there is eternal 
movement, but not objectivity.” Moreover, she also states that human artifice is what 
gives the stability and solidity to the unstable and mortal man (Arendt, 1958: 136). 
In this chapter, the work of homo faber is defined through the activities of 
fabrication and reification. Arendt (1958: 139) indicates that fabrication and 
reification, that create human artifice, consist of violation of the nature, in other 
words they correspond to violence against nature. In addition, fabrication also goes 
hand in hand with the process of making. There is a predictable end in fabrication, 
i.e. in the work of homo faber. The work of homo faber is the reification of a thought 
through physical means and attainment of a final product. Homo faber thinks in 
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terms of ends and means as he is a fabricator. Homo faber is incapable of 
understanding the meaning of the world that he creates. The anthropocentric 
utilitarianism prevents him to understand the meaning of his creation as it becomes 
“the paradoxical “end in itself”” for him (Arendt, 1958: 155).  
After making the conceptualization of work, Arendt clearly puts her argument 
that labor, work and action, and their subjects, namely animal laborans, homo faber, 
and acting/speaking man respectively, are in an integrated and interdependent 
relationship. Arendt (1958: 173) argues:  
If the animal laborans needs the help of homo faber to ease his 
labor and remove his pain, and if mortals need his help to erect a 
home on earth, acting and speaking men need the help of homo 
faber in his highest capacity, that is the help of the artist, poets and 
historiographers, of monument builders or writers, because without 
them the only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell, 
would not survive at all. 
But she also points out that for the world to become a home for the 
acting/speaking men, a home whose stability will endure and outlast the ever-
changing movement of men‟s life and actions, the determining measure could not be 
the sheer necessity of biological life or the utilitarian instrumentalism of fabrication 
and usage. This is the point where she commences a detailed analysis of action and 
its characteristics, as it is the activity that could only take place within the world that 
is constructed by the work of homo faber. 
 
4.2.5 Action 
In chapter five, Arendt elaborates on the third activity in the vita activa. In 
her account, action and speech are the activities that create human life and are the 
means to attain human excellence. They are the activities that reveal an individual 
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man‟s unique distinctness while he is among his equals (Arendt, 1958: 176). In her 
conceptualization, acting is “to begin” and speech is “to disclose” and they are 
interrelated, as she argues that speech is what activates action‟s revelatory character. 
In this chapter, Arendt identifies the public as the space for action. It is the realm of 
acting and speaking men, who are different from animal laborans-the slaves of the 
biological necessity-and homo faber-the fabricating and producing utilitarian. In 
relation to this conceptual identification, another concept, namely the political, takes 
its proper place in her conceptualization of action within the context of the public. 
Arendt (1958: 198) argues that “the political realm rises directly out of acting 
together, the “sharing of words and deeds””. Thus action not only has the most 
intimate relationship to the public part of the world common to us all, but is the one 
activity which constitutes it.” From this quotation we could easily see that Arendt 
sees the public realm as the political one. 
In this chapter, Arendt also enumerates the characteristics of action. The first 
one is boundlessness. Arendt (1958: 190) argues that “since action acts upon beings 
who are capable of their own actions, reaction, apart from being a response, is always 
a new action that strikes out on its own and affects others.” According to Arendt 
(1958: 190), action “always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent 
tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries.” This 
boundlessness is kind of a signifier for the frailty of human affairs that belong to the 
public realm. The second characteristic of action is defined as unpredictability. 
Although one can identify a definite moment for its beginning, its consequences and 
ends are unpredictable, as it is a process. The reason behind this unpredictability of 
the ends and consequences of action is the fact that action has no end, as it is a 
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continually renewing process of action and reaction as new beginnings. Action 
would endure until mankind comes to an end (Arendt, 1958: 233). 
 The interdefinitionality in Arendt‟s mode of thinking emerges once again in 
her endeavor of substantiating the concept of action and the public realm. At this 
point the concept of reality comes to the stage as a complementary one. In relation to 
reality, Arendt (1958: 208) states that “without a space of appearance and without 
trusting in action an speech as a mode of being together, neither the reality of one‟s 
self, of one‟s own identity, nor the reality of the surrounding world can be 
established beyond doubt.” The space of appearance, namely the public space and 
the presence of action within this space, are the guarantee of reality of oneself and 
one‟s existence.  
In the chapter, Arendt also points out that there has been a frustration with 
action throughout the Western tradition, because of the unpredictability of action‟s 
outcome, the irreversibility of the process, and the anonymity of its authors. This is 
in fact the reason behind the substitution of acting with making within the tradition 
(Arendt, 1958: 220). Arendt indicates that, beginning with Plato, there is an escape 
from „action‟ to „rule‟. In fact, the concept of “to rule” takes its roots from the 
household, from the private. Plato was successful in isolating beginning from action, 
as he is successful in differentiating acting from thinking and thinking (the vita 
contemplativa) from the vita activa more generally. Therefore, knowing what to do 
(philosophy) and doing (techne) have become two different performances. The 
motivation behind this revision was to bestow upon the realm of human affairs the 
solidity inherent in work and fabrication, and to provide action with the solidity of a 
means and ends connection, rather than the open-ended ambiguity inherent in the 
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open-ended process (Arendt, 1958: 222-225). The reasons behind the substitution of 
making for acting are indicated by Arendt (1958: 229) as follows:  
The substation of making for acting and the concomitant 
degradation of politics into a means to obtain an allegedly “higher” 
end-- in antiquity the protection of the good men from the rule of 
the bad in general, and the safety of the philosopher in particular, in 
the Middle Ages the salvation of souls, in the modern age the 
productivity and progress of society--is as old as the tradition of 
political philosophy. 
 
In the last parts of the chapter, Arendt raises different arguments by 
introducing different concepts in relation to the characteristics of action. Firstly, in 
relation to irreversibility of action, the faculty of „forgiving‟ is seen as the possible 
redemption from it. Forgiving fulfills the condition of plurality as you would need 
another man to be forgiven.  Forgiving is very important for the preservation of the 
faculty of acting as Arendt (1958: 237) argues “[w]ithout being forgiven, released 
from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, 
be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover, we would remain 
the victims of its consequences forever.”  
Secondly, in relation to unpredictability, we have the concept of „making a 
promise‟. The power of promise in fact could heal the unpredictability and this is 
very important for the maintenance of the public sphere as it injects trust within the 
relationships between acting and speaking men. According to Arendt (1958: 244), 
the unpredictability of action is twofold: “the basic unreliability of men who never 
can guarantee today who they will be tomorrow, and out of the impossibility of fore 
telling the consequences of an act within a community of equals where everybody 
has the same capacity to act.” It could be observed that unpredictability has potential 
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damaging effects for acting in a plurality in the absence of trust. With the darkness it 
imposes, it could make acting together impossible. The power of making a promise 
reveals itself at this point. It makes acting together possible through constructing 
bonds of trust between equals, and it sheds some kind of a light onto the darkness of 
human affairs, becoming the only alternative to a mastery that is based on 
domination as a form of rule over  oneself  or over others (Arendt, 1958: 244). 
 
4.2.6 The Vita Activa and the Modern Age 
The last chapter, “The Vita Activa and the Modern Age”, is not directly 
related to the public versus private dichotomy, but includes crucial implications of 
the situation of the vita activa in the modern world. Arendt commences with 
enumerating three different events that have contributed to the two-fold world 
alienation. These events are the discovery of America and exploration of the whole 
earth, the reformation that was affected by and resulted in individual expropriation 
and the accumulation of social wealth, and the invention of the telescope and rise of 
a new science, which considers the nature of the earth from the view point of the 
universe. The last one is also related with the discovery of the Archimedean 
standpoint. Arendt argues that with the rise of the new science and the discovery of 
the Archimedean standpoint, which is accompanied by the rise of Cartesian doubt, 
human beings lose their common sense, their fundamental sense of a common 
knowledge and experience. The loss of common sense is also accompanied by the 
rise of the social and the reversal of the hierarchical order between the vita 
contemplativa and the vita activa. All of these events resulted in the victory of 
animal laborans, in other words, the rise of a society of laborers without labor, which 
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is seen as a threatening development that motivates Arendt to look through „what we 
are doing‟. 
 
4.3 Identifying the Loophole in the Concept of Work  
After presenting the prominent dichotomies and concepts in The Human 
Condition, in this section I will do a critical reading of the concept of work. As it is 
stated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the concept of work is a crucial one in Arendt‟s 
critique of modernity. In her critique, Arendt draws our attention to modern 
condition of worldlessness, in which people lose the world that binds them together. 
The reason behind this modern condition is labor‟s triumph over activities of action 
and work. Action and work are replaced by labor. Use-values related with the end-
product gave way to exchange values associated with labor and quantity. As a 
consequence, people have been losing their ability to preserve the common world 
constructed by activity of work, and their ability to act upon this world at the same 
time. Within this context, I argue that work, as one of the composing activities of vita 
activa is an in-between concept in the context of the public versus private dichotomy. 
Arendt herself differentiates the concept of work from both labor and action. In 
addition, the concept of work could not be situated spatially in terms of the public 
and private distinction. Although the activity of labor essentially belongs to the 
private and the activity of action essentially belongs to the public, the activity of 
work could not be situated in one of these spaces. Some of its characteristics and 
abilities as an activity transcend the binary opposition between the public and the 
private. There emerges a loophole in the concept of work, which challenges the strict 
dichotomous line of thinking in Arendt‟s theory. 
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4.3.1 Differences Between Labor, Work, and Action 
In order to clarify the in-between position that the concept of work occupies 
within the context of public versus private dichotomy, it is crucial to start with 
underscoring its differences between labor and action, respectively. Looking into the 
differences depicts how Arendt situates the concept of work by differentiating it from 
the other activities of vita activa. This endeavor leads to questioning the place of 
work within the mainstream dichotomy.    
 
4.3.1.1 Labor versus Work 
As it is already mentioned the concept of work is among the activities of the 
vita activa. The basic difference between the concepts of labor and work is that while 
labor is related to the activities done because of the bondage to necessity, work is 
related to production. It is the production of an unnatural and artificial, man-made 
world. At this point, it is important to note that this differentiation between „labor of 
our body‟ versus „work of our hands‟ is thought to be one of the most prominent 
contribution of Arendt to this literature. With regard to that, Applebaum (1992: 492, 
495) suggests that Arendt‟s most important contribution is to differentiate between 
work and labor, as she is critical of John Locke, Adam Smith, and Karl Marx, who 
elevate labor to the highest rank in the vita activa. They all equated labor with work, 
as labor for them is the source of property, wealth, and productivity, respectively. At 
this point Arendt makes a similar distinction between Marx‟s differentiation between 
the quantitative and qualitative aspects of labor. Her signature is that she calls the 
former labor and the latter work. This point is also supported by Parekh (1992: 502), 
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who states that “[l]abor assimilates man to nature, while work distinguishes from it.” 
In labor man adopts to the mechanical and cyclical process in nature, on the other 
hand, in work, man is free to produce his own project through manipulating the 
natural material. 
The difference between labor and work could also be observed in the context 
of means-ends category. Arendt states that the process of making in work is totally 
determined by the means-ends category. According to her, labor also has the end of 
consumption but the end product, which is the thing to be consumed, lacks worldly 
permanence, as it would be consumed immediately after the production for the sake 
of subsistence and the reproduction of labor power. This is why production in labor 
is a self-defeating activity within the context of the means-end category. In Arendt‟s 
(1958: 143) words, in the process of laboring, “the end of the process is not 
determined by the end product but rather by the exhaustion of labor power, while the 
products themselves, on the other hand, immediately become means of subsistence 
and reproduction of labor power.”  
On the contrary, in the process of making, the end product is the ultimate end. 
It is durable and stands as an independent entity in the world of human artifice 
(Arendt, 1958: 143). In relation to that, within the context of the means-end category 
in line with her criticism of the modern world, Arendt is highly critical of channeling 
nature‟s never-ending process into the human world. Because the modern world‟s 
mode of production is driven by automation, the distinction between the operation 
and product and the product‟s precedence over operation no longer make any sense 
(Arendt, 1958: 151-153). The importance of end product fades away within the 
process of operation.  At this point Arendt does feel uneasiness at the invasion of the 
public realm by labor as a private activity. Never-ending process interrupts the world 
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that is created by the activity of work. The world as the product of work becomes 
obsolete when its prominent activity becomes laboring. The stable end product of 
work becomes disposable. 
With regard to the difference between the labor as a self-defeating activity 
and the work as the activity of producing stable and solid end products, another 
important point corresponds to the difference between repetition and multiplication. 
The cyclical movement in laboring repeats itself is endless. However, when 
something is produced through laboring, it is doomed to be consumed for further 
production. This is how the cyclical movement in laboring is preserved. On the other 
hand, work corresponds to multiplication. The image or the model that guides the 
fabrication of work does not disappear. In Arendt‟s (1958: 142) words, 
“[m]ultiplication, in distinction between from mere repetition, multiplies something 
that already possesses a relatively stable, relatively permanent existence in the 
world.” This difference between repetition and multiplication is highly related with 
the difference between the natural cyclical laboring of our body and creative and 
manipulative making of the world through the activity of work. 
 
4.3.1.2 Action versus Work 
At first glance, it is much easier to differentiate the concept of work from 
action if one looks through the means-ends category. While work has a definite and 
ultimate end as the final product, action has no definitive end. Arendt (1958: 140-
141) clearly states:  
The actual work of fabrication is performed under the guidance of a 
model in accordance with which the object is constructed. This 
model can be an image beheld by the eye of the mind or a blueprint 
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in which the image has already found a tentative materialization 
through work. In either case, what guides the work of fabrication is 
outside the fabricator and precedes the actual work process much 
the same way as the urgencies of the life process within the laborer 
precede the actual labor process.  
At this point, the model for the product of work foretells how the end product 
would look like. On the other hand, as already mentioned, action has the 
characteristic of unpredictability. Its consequences and ends are unpredictable 
(Arendt, 1958: 233). 
Arendt does not elaborate much on the differences between action and work 
other than in the context of means-ends discussion. But, there are some points, where 
concepts of action and work come closer in terms of the space they belong. For 
instance, in the context of world building, just like action, the activity of work as 
fabrication and reification is done outside the private. Arendt (1958: 141) makes her 
point as follows:  
What claims our attention is the veritable gulf that separates all 
bodily sensations, pleasure or pain, desires and satisfactions- which 
are so “private” that they cannot even be adequately voiced, much 
less represented in the outside world, and therefore are altogether 
incapable of reified- from mental images which lend themselves so 
easily and naturally to reification that we neither conceive of 
making a bed without having some image, some “idea” of a bed 
before our inner eye, nor can imagine a bed without having 
recourse to some visual experience of a real thing.  
In this quotation one could come to the conclusion that the things that are 
attributed to labor are labeled as private. On the other hand, the reification process 
within the concept of work links it to reality and visibility that are attributed as 
public. Reification needs contact with the real world of action at some level.  
Pointing out the differences between the concepts of labor, work, and action 
shows that Arendt herself differentiates the concept of work from other activities of 
vita activa. The concept of work has a unique stance in Arendt‟s political theory, 
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because it is different from private labor and public action. In addition, it has a 
unique stance with respect to interdependent relationship between the activities in 
question. The concept of work emerges as a loophole in the context of dichotomous 
thinking as it becomes a bridge between the concepts of labor and action. Both the 
animal laborans, the subjects of activity of labor, and acting/speaking men of the 
public, need the help of the subject of work, namely homo faber. Animal laborans 
needs homo faber to ease his labor and remove his pain. Acting and speaking men 
need him for reification of the story of their activity. Both of them need homo faber 
to have a home on earth for their life on earth and human artifice to fit for action and 
speech. Homo faber constitutes the common ground in this interdependent 
relationship. Without him, both animal laborans and acting/speaking men could not 
survive. In reality, his activity of work, which does not correspond to labor or action 
totally, emerge as a third activity that nourishes the other activities of vita activa. 
 
4.3.2 The Concept of Work: Neither Public, Nor Private 
All of the above mentioned differences and similarities lead one to question 
the space to which the concept of work belongs. As is indicated, the concept of work 
has differences from the concept of labor, which belongs to the private space.
6
 On 
the other hand, although there are clear differences between work and action, there 
are some points where the concepts of creative work and action come closer, and are 
definitely closer to each other than either is to the disposable achievements of labor. 
Work becomes indispensible for acting and speaking man as homo faber builds the 
                                                          
6
 For the discussion on private labor versus public action see Levin, 1979: 523. 
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solid world that action turns into the public. However, Arendt did not explicitly 
discuss the semi-public character of work and identify exactly which space it belongs 
to.   
It is interesting to observe that some readers of Arendt situate the concept of 
work within the public without engaging in a thorough discussion of its implications 
for the fixed dichotomy between the public and the private. For instance, Applebaum 
(1992: 491) situates work versus labor within the framework of the public versus the 
private along with the same lines of power versus violence, story versus history, 
thinking versus knowing. Additionally, while stating the difference between the 
activity of labor and working activity, Frampton (1979: 102) says:  
Arendt amplified on her unusual distinction between work and 
labor--that labor, by being a constantly transforming but repetitive 
producer akin to the cycle of biological survival, is inherently 
processal, private, and impermanent, whereas work, by virtue of 
being the precondition for the reification of the world as the space 
of human appearance is, by definition, static, public, and 
permanent.    
 In addition Parekh (1992: 502) also says that work-things are public and 
objective entities that are produced independently by homo faber. Keeping in mind 
these evaluations, this section does not take work‟s public character for granted and 
tries to make a closer reading of that concept in order to question the public character 
of work. Following that I argue that the concept of work in Arendt‟s theory has a 
flexible in-between position within the public versus private dichotomy, which acts 
as a loophole that transcends the dichotomous thinking. I state my argument by 
pointing out: 
a) work‟s ability to create the world for both animal laborans and acting-speaking 
men.  
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b) the public character of the work of art 
c) homo faber’s capacity of establishing his own public. 
 
4.3.2.1 Work’s Ability to Create the World  
Although Arendt emphasizes the interrelated qualities of the three activities 
within the vita activa, it is clear that action is the most privileged category as it is the 
only activity that can result in human excellence. However, one should not ignore the 
important place that work occupies in Arendt‟s political theory, because work 
provides self-assurance, satisfaction, self-confidence, and provides the conditions, 
both in terms of the made world and human subjectivity, in which human action can 
be performed (Arendt, 1958: 140).  
Besides these characteristics Arendt (1958: 19) appreciates the concept of 
work as follows:  
The task and potential greatness of mortals lie in their ability to 
produce things-works and deeds and words- which would deserve 
to be and, at least to a degree, are at home in everlastingness, so 
that through them mortals could find their place in a cosmos where 
everything is immortal except themselves. 
This kind of appreciation of work may be partly due to the fact that in Greek 
language the word erga corresponds to both work and deed. Arendt (1958: Footnote 
19) indicates that “if they are durable enough to last and great enough to be 
remembered” to same word can encompass both works and deeds.  
The relationship between work and deeds is constructed through the concepts 
of durability and stability. Both of them help mortals to find their places in the world. 
This is one of the most crucial points, through which public action –words and 
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deeds-, and work come closer. More importantly, in relation to this, Arendt states 
that the activity of work and its subject, homo faber, create the conditions of stability 
and solidity for unstable and mortal man. Work, as an activity category, creates the 
world in which political man acts and speaks with his equals (Arendt, 1958:136). 
Moreover, the activity of work and its end products are important for the 
achievement of a stable individual identity that is one of the crucial determinants for 
acting within a space in which the citizen is equal with others but also  distinct from 
them. Arendt (1958: 137) puts this argument as follows:  
…the things of the world have the function of stabilizing human 
life, and their objectivity lies in the fact that-in contradiction to the 
Heraclitean saying that the same man can never enter the same 
stream-men, their ever-changing nature notwithstanding, can 
retrieve their sameness, that is their identity, by being related to the 
same chair and same table.  
Without the products of work, man would be deprived of a stable world and 
chance to acquire a distinctive human identity (Parekh, 1992: 503). 
It is apparent that „worldliness‟, which is “the environment of humanly 
constructed artifacts” is created by the work of homo faber, and it alone transcends 
the insubstantial futility of both labor and action (Suchting, 1968: 48). Arendt (1958: 
173) makes this point as follows:  
The man-made world of things, the human artifice erected by homo 
faber, becomes a home for mortal men, whose stability will endure 
and outlast the ever-changing movement of their lives and actions, 
only insomuch as it transcends both the sheer functionalism of 
things produced for consumption and sheer utility of objects 
produced for use. Life in its non-biological sense, the span of time 
each man has between birth and death, manifests itself in action 
and speech, both of which share with life its essential futility. The 
“doing of great deeds and the speaking of great words” will leave 
no trace, no product that might endure after the moment of action 
and the spoken word has passed. 
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In this quotation, it is clear that work differs from the concepts of labor and 
action in terms of its ability to creating a world of durable artifacts. Therefore, one 
could argue that the concept of work could be thought as having a quasi-public 
character, because its products have similar characteristics with deeds in terms of 
durability, and the activity of work could not be situated within the public, because it 
somehow transcends the elements of the public with its ability to build a world.  
This transcendental character of the concept of work and its situation of being in-
between could also be sensed in points where Arendt prioritizes homo faber over 
animal laborans, whose domain is private, and acting/speaking men, whose domain 
is entirely public. In accordance with this, Arendt identifies homo faber as lord and 
master of his doings and himself. Arendt (1958: 144) continues as follows:  
This is true neither of the animal laborans, which is subject to 
necessity of its own life, nor the man of action, who remains in 
dependence upon his fellow men. Alone with his image of the 
future product, homo faber is free to produce, and again facing 
alone the work of his hands, he is free to destroy. 
If homo faber is the only truly independent activity subjectivity, then that is 
another way in which it is in between the other two categories. This kind of 
subjectivity is different from the subjectivity of animal laboran’s and 
acting/speaking man. The subjectivity being inherent in the activity of work has a 
characteristic of being free in the process of working activity. At this point the 
subject of working activity also emerges as a loophole in Arendt‟s theory as he has 
the distinct characteristics of being his own master. His distinct characteristic 
transcends the characteristics of animal laborans and acting/speaking men, who 
belong to private and public spatially in the context of the public versus private 
dichotomy. 
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4.3.2.2 The Public Character of Work of Art 
According to Arendt, the reality and reliability of human action and human actors 
rest on a stable and permanent world that is created by work. Human life depends on 
a constant reification of human artifice, namely worldliness as a condition (Arendt, 
1958: 95-96). This reification is different from the production of impermanent 
consumer goods that are the products of labor. The reification process of worldly 
permanent use-objects is “performed under the guidance of a model in accordance 
with which the object is constructed … an image beheld by the eye of the mind or a 
blue print” (Suchting, 1962: 48). As Arendt (1958: 167) puts it the best example of 
this reification process would be work of art:  
Among the things that give the human artifice the stability without 
which it could never be a reliable home for men are a number of 
objects which are strictly without any utility whatsoever and which, 
moreover, because they are unique, are not exchangeable and 
therefore defy equalization through a common denominator such as 
money; if they enter the exchange market, they can only be 
arbitrarily priced. 
The reification process of the work of art is crucial as action and speech 
which are the fundamentals of human and political relations, must be transformed 
into written pages, printed books, paintings, records, and/or sculptures in order for 
them to become worldly things of memory and durable recognition (Applebaum, 
1992: 493). The work of art is also an important concept as in modern times it 
remains the only example of a product of work that constitutes worldliness. As the 
process of automation starts to control our lives and as craft-work gave way to 
factory production, we no longer use human standards of utility or beauty in the 
design of ordinary things, other than for the work of art. Now we design for the 
  102 
fulfillment of a function whose shape is determined by the operation of a machine 
and the economic considerations of profit, efficiency, and consumption rather than 
beauty, durability, or worldliness (Apllebaum, 1992: 498). Therefore work of art 
seems to remain as the only example of a product of work, which transforms and 
reifies action, speech and thought into deeds, facts and events. 
The reification process in the work of art is a good example of the fluidity of 
human action and its need of work in order to become public and visible. This 
example shows us that, once again, work as a concept transcends the definition of its 
public character as it is also the source of that public character in question. Beside 
this situation, Arendt also points out the difference of the activity of work from the 
activity of labor in the context of the work of art. According to Arendt, the source of 
art work is the human capacity for (creative) thought. This capacity is different from 
capacities that are attributed as private, such as feelings, wants, and needs. It is a 
consequence of some type of transformation. Arendt (1958: 168) says:  
Thought is related to feeling and transforms its mute and 
inarticulate despondency, as exchange transforms the desperate 
longing of needs- until they all are fit to enter the world and to be 
transformed into things, to become reified. In each instance, a 
human capacity which by its very nature is world-open and 
communicative transcends and releases into the world a passionate 
intensity from its imprisonment within the self. 
At this point reification of a thought image is important in terms of its entrance 
into the world and becoming visible. This point is also important in the sense that it 
depicts the process of transformation of a phenomenon from one realm to other. A 
feeling that belongs to the private transforms into a thought and through reification it 
becomes a stable and solid element of the public world. It shows that the transition 
from one realm to another is possible. The bridge activity of the transition from the 
private to the public is the activity of work. It does not essentially belong to one 
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specific realm. It emerges as a loophole in the context of the public versus private 
dichotomy. 
 
4.3.2.3 Homo Faber’s Capacity of Establishing His Own Public 
When it comes to the subject of activity of work, namely homo faber, it is 
interesting to observe that he also has in-between characteristics in terms of the 
public versus private dichotomy with regard to his capacities. In the context of 
antiquity, Arendt (1958: 159) states:  
…antiquity knew full well types of human communities in which 
not the citizen of the polis and not the res publica as such 
established and determined the content of the public realm, but 
where the public life of the ordinary man was restricted to 
“working people” at large, that is, to being a demiourgos, a worker 
for the people as distinguished from an oiketes, a household laborer 
and therefore a slave.  
With regard to this, Arendt argues that homo faber is capable of having public 
realm of his own. His public realm is the exchange market, but it may not be a 
political one. Although it fulfills the condition of plurality, homo faber finds himself 
in a relationship with other men only by exchanging his products with theirs, not 
exchanging the words and the deeds. Moreover, these products are produced in 
isolation and this is related to the privacy and private realm (Arendt, 1958: 160-161). 
Consequently, we could argue that the activity of work can be identified with the 
characteristics of both the public and the private. While establishing relationships 
through exchanging refers to a quasi-public character, creating the products of 
exchange in isolation refers to a private experience. 
The important point in here is that although Arendt accepts the possibility of 
the existence of different publics, such as medieval market places, she calls them 
  104 
non-political. The reason behind this evaluation is the concept of isolation. Arendt 
(1958: 161) states: “[t]his isolation from others is the necessary life condition for 
every mastership which consists in being alone with the “idea”, the mental image of 
the thing to be. This mastership, unlike political forms of domination, is primarily a 
mastery of things and material and not of people.” As homo faber is alone with the 
mental image of his future product, he is deprived of the plurality and the condition 
of being with his equals, which are important elements of existing in a public 
political sphere. However, Arendt (1958: 162) also states:  
The people who met on the exchange market, to be sure, were no 
longer the fabricators themselves, and they did not meet as persons 
but as owners of commodities and exchange values, as Marx 
abundantly pointed out. In a society where exchange of products 
has become the chief public activity, even the laborers, because 
they are confronted with “money or commodity owners,” become 
proprietors, ‟owners of their labor power.‟ It is only at this point 
that Marx‟s famous self alienation, the degradation of men into 
commodities, sets in, and this degradation is characteristic of 
labor‟s situation in a manufacturing society which judges men not 
as persons but as producers, according to the quality of their 
products.  
At this point I argue that the activity of exchange is a quasi-public activity. 
With regard to its public character, I state that it is a type of relation to others. There 
is no identity beforehand. The identity of the producer is established as a 
consequence of the mentioned relation in the exchange market. Even though it is 
mediated between things, the important point is the relationship that is established 
between people. But it is still an intermediate relation between the isolation of the 
private laborer and the public/political presence of the actor among equals; the 
workers come together in an intermediate public space of exchange, yet always 
constrained by the fetishization of their commodity-product.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the concept of work in Arendt‟s theory is a distinguished one. 
Arendt separates clearly the activity of work from two other activities of vita activa. 
While doing this, she points out its differences, and also its important function as a 
bridge in the context of interdependent relation between three composing activities of 
vita activa. Work as an activity is vital for providing life on earth and producing 
human artifice to be acted upon. The work with its reification capacity enables the 
transformation of a private feeling into a stable human artifice of the public world. In 
addition, with regard to subjectivity, homo faber as the subject of working activity 
has the capacity to establish a limited public realm of his own. However, during the 
working process of reification, homo faber is an isolated-private subject and is 
deprived of the fundamental condition of plurality of belonging to a public realm. In 
his capacity, the subject of working activity experiences both the public 
characteristic of establishing relations to others through exchange of his end 
products, and the privacy of producing the very same product in solitude. These 
points show that work as an activity could not be situated within a dichotomous 
categorization. It could not be fully public or private. Its in-between position in 
Arendt‟s theory creates a loophole in the context of public versus private dichotomy. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
THE SOCIAL IN ARENDT: SECONDARY READINGS ON 




The previous chapter elaborates on the concept of the work in Arendt‟s 
political theory. It argued that the concept of work has a crucial place in Arendt‟s 
theory not only for being the activity that creates the „world‟, but also it is a concept 
where the strict dichotomy between the public and the private is transcended. In the 
context of the public versus the private dichotomy, the concept of work could not be 
situated spatially. Along with labor, work as an activity is not included within the 
public. However, it has some quasi-public characteristics that differentiate it from 
labor. Because of its vital role in establishing the world for the survival of activities 
of labor and action, and homo faber‟s capacity of establishing his own limited public 
space, work transcends the public versus private dichotomy. Therefore, it is argued 
that the concept of work in Arendt belongs to an in-between space that is neither 
public nor private. It emerges as a loophole in Arendt‟s dichotomous way of 
thinking.
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Along with the same lines, the present and following chapters will introduce 
another concept in Arendt‟s political theory, which emerges as a loophole. I argue 
that the concept of social challenges the strict dichotomy of public versus private. In 
this dissertation, the concepts of work and social are not selected randomly from 
Arendt‟s political theory. I argue that both of these concepts could not be situated 
spatially in the context of a dichotomous thinking. In addition to that, the context of 
modernity appears to be a common ground. In her book, The Political Thought of 
Hannah Arendt, Margaret Canovan (1974) states that in her critique of Modernity, 
Arendt develops critical concepts. Among these concepts two of them have an 
utmost importance. The first one is “worldlessness” that has being experienced in 
modern times, and the second one is the society
7
 that is a modern phenomenon in 
Arendt‟s theory (Canovan, 1974: 81). As it is indicated in Chapter 1, the former 
concept refers to the loss of the human world of artifacts that hosts action and the 
political, i.e. the loss of means of being truly human. This situation is a consequence 
of totalizing modern conditions of living that destroy human potential and capacity to 
act individually, as the modern life expects conformity and obedience. As a 
consequence, people become worldless. At this point, the activity of work in 
Arendt‟s theory becomes relevant, as it is the activity that creates the world in 
question. As is also indicated in Chapter 2, the activity of work in Arendt becomes 
meaningful in the context of Arendt‟s critique of modernity. 
Being related to the same context of modernity, the social is the second 
concept that I chose for displaying how the strict dichotomy between the public and 
the private is loosened in Arendt‟s own political theory. The social as a noun rather 
                                                          
7
 In her book Canovan uses the term „society‟ instead of the social. This may be a result of Canovan‟s 
preference for using the noun form of what Arendt refers as the social. This may be also a result of the 
fact that Arendt is also using these two terms interchangeably in her different works. 
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than an adjective is a modern phenomenon that signifies a hybrid realm in which the 
borderline between the public and the private becomes blurred (Arendt, 1958: 28). 
The fixed characteristics of the public and private realms are combined within this 
newly emerging realm. This leads to the emergence of an absorbing and 
transformative phenomenon of the social. When it comes to her critique of 
modernity, the rise of the social is considered as the main theme in Arendt‟s theory. 
Arendt‟s well-known insistence on keeping the public and the private intact 
leads to a negative conception of the term social, which is essentially neither public 
nor private. This situation also leads to a one-dimensional reading of the term social 
in Arendt. It is simply read as the intrusion of what is essentially categorized as the 
private into the political realm of public (Villa, 1996: 20, 24; McGowan, 1997: 263) 
or it is equated with economics and is seen as the expression of Arendt‟s reaction to 
communism, socialism and the welfare state (Pitkin 1998: 16).  This one-dimensional 
and negative perception closes the doors for any in-between conception that could be 
constructive in terms of contemporary political experience and leads to the exclusion 
of many social issues from the agenda of politics. In order not to be trapped in this 
kind of negative conception of the social in Arendt‟s political theory, this dissertation 
suggests making use of a multi-dimensional perspective that points out different 
facets of the term social in Arendt. I argue that because of the mentioned multi-
layered way of thinking in Arendt, one could find out different facets of the same 
concept in different works of Arendt. Pointing out the different facets of the social in 
different historical contexts could open the doors for an in-between space that could 
eliminate the difficulties of reading Arendt in the light of the public versus the 
private dichotomy. Finding out a positive and constructive meaning of the social in 
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Arendt‟s political theory paves the way for a fresh outlook of Arendt‟s concept of the 
political in contemporary political context. 
Before, analyzing the multi-dimensionality in Arendt‟s works in terms of the 
concept of the social, and presenting my multi-dimensional reading that construct the 
theoretical framework for this concept in the dissertation, it is crucial to look into the 
secondary literature that inspire me in this direction. Baring the general reading of 
the social as the intrusion of the private into the public in mind, this chapter basically 
aims to look through a secondary literature that has a multi-dimensional perspective 
on the concept of the social. In order to fulfill this aim, the works of Margaret 
Canovan, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, and Seyla Benhabib are referred respectively. Each 
writer, one way or another, emphasizes multiple facets of the social in Arendt. 
Reviewing their work would open the door for developing a positive understanding 
of the term social in Arendt‟s political theory, which embraces both the public and 
the private in an affirmative way. This kind of positive reading of the social would 
enable a new reading of the political, which would lay a claim to socially labeled 
phenomena. 
 
5.2 Call for a Multi-Dimensional Perspective: Different Facets of the Social in 
Arendt 
Defining the social in terms of the intrusion of the activities that belong to the 
private, such as economic activities or any activity that is connected to necessity and 
survival of human species, could not draw a clear picture of this term in our minds. 
Besides the development of complex economy in modern world and accompanying 
division of labor, the social becomes an administrative phenomenon in which life 
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process of the members of society is organized and regularized. It‟s the very same 
society that expects a certain totalizing behavior from each member in order to 
sustain its existence. If one looks through this definition carefully, it would be seen 
that there is no one single dimension of the social in Arendt. It‟s multi-dimensional 
in terms of definition. It refers to intrusion of economics and biological survival into 
public concern as well as rise of mass society whose chief characteristic is 
conformism.  
In addition to this one-dimensional reading in the literature, there is also a 
multi-dimensional and broader reading of the social. This alternative reading 
designates different facets of the social in Arendt by referring to different historical 
and political contexts that exist in Arendt‟s works.  
 
5.2.1 Canovan’s Reading of the Social: The Society as a Critical Concept in 
Arendt’s Theory 
This kind of multi-dimensional perspective is firstly presented in Margaret 
Canovan‟s book, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt. As it is indicated, in her 
book, Canovan presents the concept of society as a critical one. According to 
Canovan, in Arendt‟s analysis of modernity, there are certain concepts, through 
which Arendt invites us to evaluate our age critically. Society is one of these 
concepts (Canovan, 1974: 81). With regard to this concept, Canovan claims that 
Arendt is not just a critical theorist of mass society, but she is critical of the concept 
of society itself, which “constitutes a new and specifically modern mode of 
organized living together…” (1974: 85). The basic characteristic of this new mode of 
living together is the disappearance of separating line between the public and the 
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private realms. According to Canovan (1974: 85), Arendt sees the modern society as 
an “inflated form of ancient household”. The biological and natural cares of the 
private become public concerns. The best example for that is the intrusion of 
economics as the most crucial activity of the whole society into public realm in 
modern world. This kind of intrusion gradually makes people come together around a 
common interest, and necessitates them to behave in a certain manner and to 
conform the dynamics of society (Canovan, 1974: 85).  
Canovan (1974: 86) argues that Arendt‟s first reference to the idea of society 
as a space of conformity is in the context of “„polite society‟ of modern Europe, … 
the world of the salons…”. In addition to „polite society‟ in 19th century Europe, for 
Canovan, Arendt also makes reference to the way modern people live under gigantic 
supervisor/administrator, which is the nation state. According to Canovan, Arendt 
makes analogy between ancient Greek household and nation state. Both of them are 
dominated by natural and biological needs; they are united around one common 
interest that is represented by the head of the household or nation state; and members 
of both need to show conformity to orders of the unit to which they belong. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the modern society is a larger type of ancient 
Greek household (Canovan, 1974: 86).  
Following this substantiation of the term society, Canovan (1974: 105) says 
that there are two different strands of meaning in Arendt‟s political thought, and the 
connection between them is not clear. The first meaning refers to high society that is 
dominated by conformity and hypocrisy. The second meaning that corresponds to a 
different conception refers to modern society administered by nation state, which is 
dominated by nature and biology. Therefore, Canovan basically argues that there are 
two different conceptions of society in Arendt, whose connection stays ambivalent.  
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This dissertation adopts this kind of multi-dimensional approach and argues 
that there are multiple conceptions of the social in Arendt‟s political thought. In 
order to clarify the approach in question, it is crucial to cover the scholars of 
Arendtian political theory, who have a multi-faceted perspective on the social. 
Although Canovan‟s analysis led many Arendtian scholars to make use of different 
meaning of the social in different contexts, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin and Seyla 
Benhabib are the ones, who make a profound analysis of the social from a multi-
dimensional perspective.  
Before elaborating on each work separately, it should be stated that the space 
that is given to analysis of works of Pitkin and Benhabib would seem not equally 
distributed. There is a reason behind this treatment. As it will be indicated below, 
Pitkin wrote a whole book on the concept of the social in Arendt and its analysis. 
Benhabib elaborates on the subject in one section of a broader project. This is why 
this chapter elaborates on Pitkin‟s work more in terms of quality and quantity. As 
Pitkin makes a book length detailed analysis, this is also why one could have a 
chance to observe similarities between her points and other Arendtian scholars‟ 
readings of the social in Arendt. Therefore, the following section, does not only gives 
Pitkin‟s multi-dimensional reading of the term social. It also contains references 
from other Arendtian scholars, who underline a specific dimension of the social in 
Arendt. Through inserting references of similar points that is indicated by other 
Arendtian scholars, this section shows that Pitkin‟s is a comprehensive work on the 
social that indicates many facets of the term in question. 
 
5.2.2 Attack of the Blob: Pitkin’s Reading of the Social in Arendt 
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The most comprehensive work on Arendt‟s conception of the social is 
Pitkin‟s book, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social. This 
book simply tries to clarify the meaning of the concept of social in Arendt‟s political 
thought by tracing the gradual formation of the concept in Arendt‟s works. Pitkin 
(1998: 1)argues that the social in Arendt merits attention as the concept is ambiguous 
and confused. Pitkin also draws our attention to the fact that Arendt uses an adjective 
as a noun and she personifies and demonizes this noun. The guilty behind the 
alarming situation of modern life is simply the social. In Pitkin‟s (1998: 3) words 
“Arendt depicts it [the social] as a living, autonomous agent determined to dominate 
human beings, absorb them, and render them helpless.” In fact, this very specific 
reading of Pitkin is derived from the mentioned sections of The Human Condition. 
According to Pitkin, the social in Arendt is highly related with the paradox of 
modernity, in which we have to deal with the problematic consequences of our 
growing powers as an alien force. In this context, Pitkin (1998: 196) says:  
The social is Arendt‟s way of talking about a collectivity of people 
who, though they are interdependent and active- their doing therefore 
continually shaping the conditions under which they all live- behave 
individually in ways that preclude coordinated action, so that they 




This kind of reading of the social as in the form of the denial of the human 
agency as a consequence of an illusion, which is self-imposed helplessness against 
human-made conditions, is new to the literature. However, this newer reading is a 
combination of two different conceptions of the social that are derived from other 
works of Arendt. In order to understand the newer reading of the social in Arendt, we 
                                                          
8
 For similar elaboration see also Pitkin (1998: 8). 
  114 
should indicate how Pitkin traces the works of Arendt that include different facets of 
the social. 
Basically, Pitkin talks about three different facets of the social in Arendt. The 
first one is high society or respectable society, which is also referred as the 
conformist parvenu social. It is the opposite of the nature and at the same time of the 
state. The second one is the economic/biological social that sees society as a 
bourgeois minded agent combined with the idea of inevitability that is inherited in 
nature. This idea of the social is a consequence of the emergence of imperialism, 
anti-Semitism and racism, in which human created arrangements and categories 
started to be seen as natural and inevitable. The last conception of the social is the 
above mentioned one: social as the other of the political, which refers to the defiance 
of human agency. Pitkin argues that the last conception of the social as denial of the 
human agency is the combination of two different facet of the social that are depicted 
in earlier works of Arendt, which are the conformist parvenu social and 
economic/biological social.  
Vague terms like conformist parvenu social or economic/biological social 
need more elaboration in order to track the changes in the ways Arendt uses this 
term. Firstly, conformist parvenu social is a concept that could be derived from 
Arendt‟s earlier works. The main source for this concept of the social is Rahel 
Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess. This book will be analyzed profoundly in the 
following chapter. However, at this point we should look into what parvenu means in 
the 18
th
 century Romanticism in Europe. Rahel Varnhagen is a biographical work. 
Arendt wrote the biography of a Jewish woman. It is the life story of Rahel who tried 
to survive in the social life of the 18
th
 century Berlin.   
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This is in fact the story of self-realization of a German-Jewish woman, who 
had a salon that had a significant importance in the social life of that time. Through 
Arendt‟s narration, we are exposed to the private experience of being a Jew within a 
non-Jewish society. Personal strategies for joining that society had become the story 
of assimilation. This is the context that gives rise to the concept of respectable 
society to which social striving parvenu tries to join.  
The parvenu who is one of the subjects of the social as the respectable 
society, is associated with the characteristics of tactlessness, political stupidity, 
inferiority complexes, and money grubbing (Arendt, 1978: 66). Being a Jew was a 
personal problem for them. Parvenus tried to get rid of Jewishness through becoming 
a member of respectable society that excluded them. They either became assimilated 
or present themselves as „exceptional Jews‟ to the society.   
The parvenu‟s counterpart in the context of respectable society is „conscious 
pariah‟. „Conscious pariah‟ status was a result of the specific attitudes of specific 
people at that time. „Conscious pariah‟ was an outsider. S/he was outside of the 
respectable society that was composed of non-Jewish people and assimilated parvenu 
Jews.  They are associated with the characteristics of Jewish heart, humanity, humor 
and disinterested intelligence and being engaged in politics (Arendt, 1978: 66). 
Pariah people were aware of their outsider status and affirmed that. Contrary to 
parvenu people they welcomed their Jewishness and stayed consciously outside of 
the society. Pariah people also contribute to construction of the social as they signify 
the other of the social that is known as being conformist parvenu.  
With regard to this kind of depiction, Pitkin argues that Arendt sees Jews as 
always had been paying with “political misery for social glory and with social insult 
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for political success” (1998: 72). Pitkin continues that “[h]ere political seems to 
mean no more than state-related, but “social” could mean either civil society, in the 
conventional contrast to the state, or respectable society, the object of parvenu 
striving.” (1998: 72). In this respect, what is biologically given and inescapable, such 
as being Jewish at that time, is related with nature that also signifies the simple 
pleasures directly enjoyed such as gratifying green things. Pitkin argues that in both 
respects, nature is the other of society, social artifice and parvenu deception. “Being 
social meant turning away from nature, giving up the simple pleasures, and striving 
to overcome or conceal the club foot.” (Pitkin, 1998: 76). Pitkin also underlines that, 
for the parvenu, social norms must be obsessively obeyed and social classifications 
should be absolute and definitive. The content of these norms has no importance. The 
only thing that matters is the legitimate source of these contents, which is superior 
“they”. Therefore, the social attitude demands from the parvenu not just conformity 
but also loving the source of these norms, which is members of respectable society 
(Pitkin, 1998: 185). In this context, social is depicted as a superior norm-enforcing 
entity that is also called high society. 
According to Pitkin, the second facet of the social in Arendt‟s political theory 
is economic/biological social. Pitkin argues that the rise of the social involves the 
development of trade, money, division of labor and a market system. In this system 
of production and exchange, everybody is interdependent and the regulation is 
actualized through the invisible hand of the market. Outcomes are not under the 
control of the members of this market economy. The market seems to control each 
and every consequence as an alien irresistible power. People‟s own conduct 
confronts them as an inevitable uncontrollable power. Pitkin (1998: 11) argues that 
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this situation of irresistibility and inevitability fits well to Arendt‟s linking of 
economics to biology and natural necessity. 
This new idea of the social as economic and biological necessity is articulated 
in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Pitkin (1998: 70) argues that the second part of 
this book, “Imperialism”, added economics and biology, the body and its needs, any 
kind of activity that satisfy these needs, natural processes and necessity to the notions 
of high society and social climbing. What Arendt talks about in “Imperialism” is how 
the content of the political has changed with the political emancipation of the 
bourgeoisie. Arendt argues that imperialism emerged when bourgeoisie opposed 
national limitations to their economic expansion. Because of the economic necessity, 
bourgeoisie turned to politics and wanted impose the law of economic growth 
(expansion for expansion‟s sake) as a political goal (Arendt, 1966: 126). Politically 
emancipated bourgeoisie saw the expansion of power for power‟s sake as the only 
principle of politics. Therefore, private practices and devices of economics were 
gradually transformed as the rules for conducting public affairs. In Arendt‟s (1966: 
138) words, “private recklessness elevated to the one publicly honored political 
principle.” Never-ending process of wealth growth replaces political action (Arendt, 
1966: 147).  
At this point, Pitkin is not the only one who directs our attention to economic 
social. Young-Bruehl indicates that the rise of the social has corresponded to 
relentless expansion of capitalism in geographical and political terms. The rise of the 
social signifies the rise of the business-minded European states, which were also the 
modern nation states that were intolerant of and prejudiced against their minorities 
and colonials (Young-Bruehl, 1997: 319). James Barry (2007) also underlines the 
consequences of more productive labor in the context of the nation states when he is 
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depicting the social in economic and biological terms. Barry argues that when the 
waves of more productive labor crashed the protective boundaries of the state, the 
modern nation state commenced to be called with a different name: modern mass 
society. In this new structure, it becomes impossible to find a stable centre as the 
nation changes daily by its metabolic impulses. This is the sign of the arrival of the 
social realm. New economic and industrial priorities of the imperialist project led to 
rise of an absorbing living organism. (Barry, 2007: 115, 117).   
Within the same lines, D‟ Entrèves (1994) also points out that the rise of the 
social has started in the 18
th
 century. The social means the expansion of economic 
activities to a point in which they become a political concern of the society in the 
context of modernity. This situation led to the destruction of the public realm and 
creation of a society of job holders, in which conformity and the isolation are the 
principles (D‟ Entrèves, 1994: 45-46). In a way, D‟ Entrèves seems to refer to mass 
society as another conception of the social in Arendt by emphasizing conformity and 
isolation of mass man. However, he does this by relating the phenomenon of mass 
society to economics, because he elaborates on the conformity to the dictates of 
economic necessity (D‟ Entrèves, 1994: 25). 
Moreover, in this context of economic social, writers like Wellmer (2007: 
225) argue that the social in Arendt is a shortcoming of liberal thought, which forgets 
the political in favor of the social, the private and an instrumental conception of 
action that can be called behavior. The interesting point in this analysis is the way it 
takes the private and the social as referring to not the same but to similar realms. 
Along with the private, the social is presented as the opposite of the public. This 
confusion of core distinction between realms could result from the effort that 
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prioritizes the conception of politics, which is autonomous in terms of being valuable 
in itself and not relying any higher aim or purpose (Wellmer, 2007: 225).  
Different from the other writers, who emphasize economic conception of the 
social in Arendt, Pitkin‟s argument proceeds by stating that assimilation of society to 
nature is the central theme of “Imperialism”. The idea of process is the key that 
substantiates the concept of social with economics, biology, the body, and necessity 
all of which defies human agency. Introducing human created arrangements and 
categories, such as the idea of market and the idea of race that is a main political 
device of imperialist rule, as inevitable and natural, market society defies human 
agency and its capacity to start anew. Pitkin (1998:187) elaborates on this point by 
saying that  
Arendt is talking about the development of wage labor and a market 
society, so that a central model for her biological version of the social 
seems to be the market itself: people so organized that each is arrayed 
separately and competitively against the rest, yet all affecting each 
other so that their individual activities result in large-scale 
consequences that none of them can control or even intentionally 
influence. … Although primarily and originally economic, this market 
model of human organization can be applied to all sorts of processes 
and systems in which “values” are collectively produced by a system 
of exchange among individuals. 
However, Pitkin‟s emphasis on the biological social in the context of 
economy by calling it simply the market would not be sufficient in terms of covering 
the social as biological necessity. With regard to this, it should be noted that Arendt 
(1990: 59-114) reserves a whole section in On Revolution that elaborates the physical 
intrusion of the body into the realm of politics as “The Social Question”. Although, 
this idea of the social as the intrusion of human body into the public realm will be 
analyzed in the following chapter, it should be pointed out that it is another way of 
substantiating the social as the biological. In relation to that point, Moruzzi (2000: 
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14) argues that in On Revolution physical bodies confront directly to the political. 
Contrary to the strict distinction between the private realm of the necessity and the 
public realm of free political subjects in The Human Condition, On Revolution 
revolves around “The Social Question” that is a characteristic of modern political 
life.
9
 In this respect, Moruzzi tries to show that according to Arendt, the essentialist 
body of physical reality breaks through the secure borders of the political space. This 
situation signifies the collapse of any possibility for political identity, freedom and 
action. The socially marked body intrudes into the political through bursting into the 
streets. The biological social, i.e. the social as the body, appears and transforms the 
political into itself. It is a “mixed category within which private needs become 
matters of public policy” (Moruzzi, 2000: 18). This analysis of the social as the body 
is much clearer and more direct conceptualization of the biological social.  
Apart from above-mentioned different facets of the social in Arendt, 
emphasis on the defiance of human agency brings us to the third conception of the 
social in Arendt that is underlined in The Human Condition. The social as the denial 
of human agency presents the social as “the lack of politics where politics could and 
should be.” (Pitkin, 1998: 240). Pitkin is talking about our self-imposed helplessness 
in front of humanly created processes. She is talking about how we start to see 
things, which are our own making, as inevitable and natural, and therefore 
unchangeable. This situation is the result of the combination of acquisitive greed of 
the bourgeoisie and surface conformity of the parvenu. The competitive 
individualism and the anxious self-concern led to isolated self-abnegation, in which 
illusions of helplessness in dealing with our problems become the main characteristic 
                                                          
9
  Moruzzi‟s original attempt is to deconstruct Arendt‟s idea of revolutionary politics of speech and 
action through negotiating the so-called impossible relationship between the social and the political. 
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of the modern world (Pitkin, 1998: 92-93, 192). In Arendt‟s understanding the main 
characteristic in question is nothing more than the rise of the modern phenomenon of 
social. 
 
5.2.3 From La Bonne Société to Mass Society: Benhabib’s Insightful Reading 
of the Social 
The other Arendtian scholar who writes extensively on the concept of the 
social in Arendt is Seyla Benhabib. Benhabib argues that there are different socials in 
Arendt. The first part of her book, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt 
(1996), is dedicated to Hannah Arendt‟s biography of Rahel Varnhagen.10 
Benhabib‟s main motivation in this part is „asking women‟s question‟, which she 
sees as a movement from margin to center. With regard to this intension, Benhabib 
(1996: 4-5) prefers to start her search in the marginalia, in the less recognized works 
of Arendt. This is why Benhabib turns to Rahel Varnhagen as a source of her 
political interrogation about Arendt. 
Benhabib begins with a general conceptualization of the term social. She 
presents the social in Arendt as amorphous, anonymous, and uniformizing reality, 
which corresponds to “glorified national housekeeping in economic and pecuniary 
matters” (Benhabib, 1996: 23). This is the concept of the social that is prominent in 
The Human Condition. After stating this comprehensive but still vague 
conceptualization of the social, Benhabib argues that there are three dominant 
meanings of the social in Arendt‟s work. The first one is capitalist commodity 
                                                          
10
 This is a longer version of Benhabib‟s article: Benhabib, Seyla. 1995. “The Pariah and Her 
Shadow,” Political Theory 23 (1): 5-24. 
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exchange economy; the second one is mass society; and the third one is the social as 
sociability, which refers to the quality of life in civil society and civic associations 
(Benhabib, 1996: 23). Similar to Pitkin, Benhabib points out three different facets of 
the social in Arendt. However, except for the third one, which is apparently extracted 
from Rahel Varnhagen, Benhabib does not specify books for each conceptualization 
like Pitkin does. 
The first conceptualization of the term social in Arendt, the social as the 
capitalist commodity exchange economy, is related with spread of free exchange 
relations, which signifies the change of everything into commodity. Benhabib argues 
that this kind of understanding of emergence of commodity exchange economy is 
compatible with Marxian point of view. In this regard, bourgeois society is the first 
one in history that legitimizes social and political relations of power and inequality 
on the basis of human relations rather than on the basis of nature (Benhabib, 1996: 
24). Moreover, exchange relations emerge as an open and unrestricted medium of 
social interaction for all people who own commodity (Benhabib, 1996: 25). This type 
of understanding corresponds to Arendt‟s conceptualization of newly emerging 
hybrid realm of social, which is the intrusion of the market economy into public 
affairs, which are essentially political.  
According to Benhabib, the second meaning of the social in Arendt is mass 
society, which is introduced through the contrasts between behavior and action. This 
insight comes from Arendt‟s idea that society excludes possibility of creative and 
spontaneous action. Society demands certain type of behavior from its members 
under the labels of normalization, leveling, and homogenization. At this point, 
Benhabib does not go into a detailed elaboration. The reason behind this lack is her 
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idea that in Arendt‟s works, there is no analysis of mechanisms of social control and 
integration (Benhabib, 1996: 26). 
In Benhabib‟s view, the last conception of the social in Arendt is the social as 
the sociability that signifies civil and associational life. Being a product of 
modernity, the social as sociability corresponds to tastes and manners of high or 
refined society of the 18
th
 century. Benhabib defines this understanding of society as 
the aggregation of social patterns of human interaction; modalities of taste in food, 
dress and leisure time activities; differences in aesthetic, religious and civic manners; 
socialization patterns that contains formation of marriages, friendships, 
acquaintances and commercial exchanges (Benhabib, 1996: 28). This realm of social 
as sociability differs from economics, politics and any administrative structure.  
It could be argued that this kind of conception of the social as sociability 
demonstrates great similarity with Pitkin‟s idea of the parvenu social that 
corresponds to respectable society for which the parvenu strives. The similarity is 
that in the social as sociability we still have the parvenu as an actor. Parvenu 
demands acceptance and equality from the social realm that could function as a 
homogenizing medium of tastes, manners and attitudes in the form of la bonne 
société. This is exactly what Pitkin calls as parvenu social. The difference is that 
Benhabib adds the other actor of the social outsider context, namely the conscious 
pariah and the space in which this actor really acts. As is mentioned before, the 
conscious pariah is an outsider in terms of manners, tastes and socialization patterns. 
He has a political stance and is fully aware of his distinctiveness. In fact, he needs 
the others, i.e. the society or small group of friends/acquaintances in order to make 
his distinctiveness visible. According to Benhabib (1996: 29), this is exactly what 
Rahel Varnhagen‟s salon was: a space of sociability, in which you could express 
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difference and distinctiveness. Besides la bonne société, these types of salons are the 
product of modernity, in which you can be exposed to new forms of social 
interaction, patterns of association, manners and life styles. This is the social as 
sociability for the conscious pariah. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
As it is stated in the introduction of this chapter, along with the concept of work, 
the social occupies an important place in the context of Arendt‟s critique of 
modernity. Beside this commonality, I argue that these concepts also the ones, 
through which the strict dichotomy between the public and the private in Arendt 
could be loosened. They could not be attributed as belonging neither to the public nor 
to the private. They are the sites that combine the public and the private. The 
previous chapter elaborates on the concept of work and tries to show its in-between 
character that transcends the public versus the private dichotomy. This chapter is a 
kind of an introductory one with regard to the other important in-between concept: 
the social. 
The social in Arendt is simply read as the intrusion of the private into the public 
in modern conditions. Although this general conception is valid, I argue that the 
concept of the social in Arendt has multiple facets. It has many dimensions. Before 
presenting the multi-dimensional reading of this dissertation in relation to the social, 
this chapter introduces the secondary literature on the concept of the social that 
emphasizes the multiple meanings of the term. These are the works of Arendtian 
scholars, who inspire the multi-dimensional reading in this dissertation.  
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For this aim, the works of Canovan as the first one to draw attention to multiple 
meanings of the social, Pitkin, and Benhabib are indicated respectively. Canovan 
argues that there are two strands of meaning for the concept of social in Arendt. 
These are high society and a modern way of living together that is dominated by 
nature and biological needs. Pitkin argues that there are three different socials in 
Arendt. These are the conformist parvenu social that refers to high or respectable 
society, economic/biological social, and the social as denial of human agency. And 
as the last one, Benhabib also thinks that the social has three different meanings in 
Arendt. The first one is the social as the capitalist commodity exchange economy, the 
second one is the mass society, and the third one is the social as sociability. 
In spite of the differences between Pitkin‟s and Benhabib‟s readings of the social 
in Arendt, the way they present the existence of different facets of the term in 
question is remarkable for the purpose of this dissertation. The subsequent chapter 
(Chapter 6) is basically shaped by following their multi-dimensional perspective, and 
presents my reading of the four different facets of the social in Arendt. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE SOCIAL AS SOCIABILITY: AN ALTERNATIVE SPACE 




Chapter 5 demonstrates that in the secondary literature about Arendt‟s conception 
of the term social, some Arendtian scholars, such as Canovan, Pitkin, and Benhabib, 
make a multidimensional reading of the term social. Basically, they are arguing that 
there is no single dimension of the social in Arendt. The concept of the social is 
multi-dimensional in terms of definition. In its broader sense, it refers to intrusion of 
economics and biological survival into public concern, as well as the rise of the mass 
society, whose chief characteristic is conformism. It has economic, biological, and 
conformist elements in it. In addition to these elements, Pitkin and Benhabib refer to 
the earliest work of Arendt (1957), Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, and 
argue that the social refers to the society in eighteenth century Europe. In this 
context, Benhabib is the one who extracts an affirmative meaning from the term 
social by saying that the social in that work of Arendt denotes the aggregation of 
social patterns of human interaction; modalities of taste in food, dress and leisure 
time activities; differences in aesthetic, religious and civic manners; socialization 
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patterns that contains formation of marriages, friendships, acquaintances and 
commercial exchanges.  
In relation to this meaning, this dissertation also adopts mentioned multi-
dimensional reading of the term social. Furthermore, I argue that seeing the social in 
Arendt as sociability in terms of the quality of life in civil society and civic 
associations refers to a possible in-between space in which the political in Arendtian 
terms could be actualized under modern conditions. This affirmative social 
represents that in-between space which challenges the strict dichotomy between the 
public and the private spheres in Arendt. This challenge would answer the criticisms 
asserting the exclusive character of Arendtian conception of politics that is based on 
the exclusion of any private and social issues of modern age. Adopting an 
understanding of the social as sociability in Arendt‟s theory would leave us with an 
inclusive and comprehensive idea of a social space. This is the very same social 
space in which the lost treasure of the political could be re-discovered.   
In order to substantiate my argument on affirmative social as an in-between 
space that includes the political in modern times, firstly, I present my multi-
dimensional reading of the social in Arendt. By following the path that is opened by 
mentioned prominent Arendtian scholars, I also argue that there are four different 
facets of the social in Arendt that touch upon different dimensions, such as 
economic, biological, conformist (the social as mass society) and civic (the social as 
sociability). I argue that the mentioned multi-dimensionality could be situated in a 
broader context, which is the dichotomy between the public and the private in 
Arendt. With regard to that, the social could be read as the intrusion of what is 
private into the public realm. However, reading the social in Arendt as a space 
neither public nor private could seem vague unless you substantiate essentialist 
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characteristics of the public and the private in Arendt‟s political thought. In fact, 
what Arendt means by the term social as well as the elements in her famous 
dichotomy of the public versus the private, are still controversial issues. In order to 
understand this phenomenon of modern age, one has to start with the dichotomy in 
question and see how Arendt, herself, deals with the issue on the basis of public 
versus private dichotomy. Therefore, in the first section of this chapter, how Arendt 
substantiates the modern phenomenon of the social is indicated by referring to her 
prominent theoretical work, The Human Condition. The Human Condition is a major 
source to resort in dealing with this challenging task as Arendt (1958: 27-78) devotes 
a whole chapter for the public and the private realm and also two separate sections in 
this chapter for the concept of the social. 
After substantiating the term social in Arendt in the context of public versus 
private dichotomy, I elaborate on four different dimensions of the term social by 
referring to different works of Arendt. In the third section, I represent the social as 
sociability in terms of the quality of life in civil society and civic associations as a 
possible in-between space, in which the political in Arendtian terms could be 
actualized under modern conditions. In support of this argument, I mention works of 
Seyla Benhabib, Carolina Armenteros, and Jennifer Ring, who write on several 
political characteristics of the social space. All of these Arendtian scholars elaborate 
on alternative conception of the social by referring to Rahel Varnhagen; but they are 
doing this on different levels. In the last section of the chapter, I also argue that this 
early work of Arendt (Rahel Varnhagen) is a tremendous source to analyze the co-
existence of the public and the private in a personal life story. If we depict the social 
in Arendt as a third space, which is neither public nor private, Rahel Varnhagen as a 
case of personal life story, provides us an excellent example of how a political figure 
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could engage in both public and private experiences at the same time in sociability 
context; and how this kind of experience would not be detrimental to the political 
experience of that person. 
 
6.2 The Human Condition: The Social in the Public versus Private Dichotomy 
As it is mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, The Human Condition is a 
major source to resort in dealing with the challenging task of situating the modern 
phenomenon of the social within the strict dichotomy of the public versus the private. 
In the section that Arendt elaborates on the difference between the polis and the 
household, she identifies the social realm as a modern phenomenon whose political 
form arises in the form of the nation state. In this text, she clearly puts that the social 
realm is neither public nor private and the dividing line between these two realms is 
entirely blurred. While arguing that, Arendt substantiates the essential characteristics 
of these realms respectively. She indicates that the dividing line between the polis 
(which corresponds to the public) and the household (which corresponds to the 
private), as well as, the line between the activities that constructs the common public 
world and the private activities that are related with the maintenance of life, have 
been evaporating. This situation leads us to see communities of people in the image 
of a family that is taken care of by “nation-wide administration of housekeeping.” 
(Arendt, 1958: 28)
11
. In other words, in modern age, the idea of the family, which in 
fact, belongs to the private, and whose maintenance is an administrative issue rather 
than a political one, commences to capture the public. What is private in its origin 
becomes a public concern. Moreover, the public concern in question, which is 
                                                          
11
Also see “collective housekeeping” (Arendt, 1958: 29). 
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political in its origin, starts to be dealt with administratively. In Arendt‟s words, 
“with the rise of society, that is, the rise of the “household” (oikia) or of economic 
activities to the public realm, housekeeping and all matters pertaining formerly to the 
private sphere of the family have become a “collective” concern.” (Arendt, 1958: 
33). 
The rise of the society
12
 in which life processes in the private realm is exposed to 
light of the public realm, has distinctive characteristics. Most importantly, this new 
realm assumes one interest for the whole society and its conformist demands 
excludes the possibility of action. Arendt states that society, through imposing rules 
and regulations, expects one type of behavior from its members. This kind of 
unifying and homogenizing imposition leads to the destruction of spontaneous, 
creative and contingent idea of action. Moreover, the gradual absorption of different 
social groups under the umbrella of one interest would eventually lead to the idea of 
mass society, in which all members of the society is controlled and embraced 
equally. The distinction and difference are absorbed by the mass society in its 
totalizing efforts (Arendt, 1958: 40-41). 
This idea of society as “the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the 
sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities 
connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public” is an exemplar of 
how Arendt (1958: 46) substantiates the concept of the social on the basis of the 
public and the private dichotomy. The social is depicted as an intrusion of the private 
into the public. However, this depiction should not be understood as the victory of 
the private over the public realm. Arendt carefully underlines that the rise of the 
                                                          
12
 Arendt uses the social and the society interchangeably.  
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social realm is destructive to both realms. The social devours the public and the 
private at the same time. The nature of the specific realm changes when an activity, 
which essentially belongs to another realm, is engaged in that specific realm. 
Moreover, nature of the activity that is engaged changes, too (Arendt, 1958: 45-47). 
Therefore, engaging the activities connected with sheer survival within the public 
realm ruins the nature of both private activity and the public realm, respectively. 
Comprehensive substantiation of the social in The Human Condition points out to 
three different dimensions in the conceptualization of the term in question. The first 
dimension is the intrusion of the economics into public concern. The second one 
refers to the intrusion of the necessity that corresponds to biological survival. This 
dimension could also be read as the intrusion of the body into politics and the public 
realm. The last one is the emergence of the mass society that demands a conformist 
attitude from its members. These dimensions are underlined one way or another by 
the Arendtian scholars, who make a multi-dimensional reading of the term social. As 
is stated in the previous chapter, Pitkin argues that there are three different 
conception of the social in Arendt‟s works. The first one is the social as high and 
respectable society which she calls the conformist parvenu social. The second one is 
economic/biological social that relates economics with the idea of inevitability in 
nature and biological survival. The last one is the combination of the conformist 
parvenu social and economic/biological social: the social as the other of the political 
that denies human agency and refers to alienation from being active political human 
being. Benhabib also talks about three different meanings of the social in Arendt. 
The first one refers to capitalist commodity exchange economy; the second one is 
mass society; and the third one is the social as sociability, which refers to the quality 
of life in civil society and civic associations. 
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Within same lines, I also argue that there are different facets of the social in 
Arendt. As stated in Chapter 1, the reason behind these different facets is Arendt‟s 
multi-layered way of thinking. While telling the stories of different historical figures 
from different contexts, Arendt depicts different layers of a given phenomenon. At 
this point, although my reading of the social is a combination of the readings of 
Pitkin and Benhabib, it differs in certain ways. I argue that there are four different 
dimensions of the social in Arendt that are substantiated in different works. These are 
economic social, biological social, the social as mass society, and the social as 
sociability. 
 
6.3 Four Different Dimensions of the Social in Arendt 
Following the same lines with Pitkin, I argue that starting with The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, the concept of social emerges as the intrusion of economic concerns 
into the public affairs. Especially, “Part 2: Imperialism” of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism is loaded with Arendt‟s concern with the political emancipation of 
the bourgeoisie and how the basic tenet of imperialism, which is economic expansion 
for its own sake, becomes a political goal. At this point Arendt argues that there is a 
sharp contrast between the economic and political structure. The political structure 
cannot be expanded indefinitely like the economic structure (Arendt, 1966: 126). 
Therefore, bourgeoisie turned to politics out of economic necessity, because 
capitalist production came up against national limitations and necessitated more 
markets outside the national borders. In this context, basic principle in politics 
became attainment of power. Searching for the expansion of power for power sake 
had its origins from the capitalist principle of expansion of economic growth for its 
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own sake. So, power becomes the content of politics and private recklessness of the 
bourgeoisie became publicly appreciated political principle (Arendt, 1966: 138). This 
is how the intrusion of economics into public and political space corresponds to rise 
of the social as intrusion of private space into public one. 
Baring the relationship between economics and any kind of activity that could 
satisfy biological/bodily needs in mind, I argue that social as the interference of 
bodily/biological needs into public space corresponds to different course of events in 
history. This course is elaborated in Arendt‟s (1990) another tremendous work, On 
Revolution. Therefore, unlike Pitkin, I would rather treat the intrusion of the body 
into politics and public concern as a separate conception of the social. In relation to 
that, Arendt saves a whole chapter in the book. “Chapter Two: The Social Question” 
highlights Arendt‟s main concern, which is the rights of freedom and citizenship 
rather than rights of life. Since she is concerned with re-discovering the lost treasure 
of the political life, in which man is acting with his equals, Arendt is highly critical 
of the burst of the biological needs of the body into the realm of action. The 
historical example that affirms her insight is French Revolution. In French revolution 
poor people, who were driven by their bodily needs burst on the scene (Arendt, 1990: 
59). Under the rule of biological necessity multitude of the poor sent the French 
Revolution to its doom. “When they appeared on the scene of politics, necessity 
appeared with them, and the result was the power of the old regime impotent and the 
new republic was stillborn; freedom had to be surrendered to necessity, to the 
urgency of the life process itself.” (Arendt, 1990: 60).  Poverty becomes a political 
concern. This is what social question is. The most dangerous thing is to solve this 
private problem, which is called The Social Question by Arendt, through political 
means (Arendt, 1990: 114). 
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Arendt points out that this reality of the social question corresponds to a modern 
imagery that is called society. It is “one supernatural body driven by one 
superhuman, irresistible „general will‟” (Arendt, 1990: 60). And this idea of the 
social question or society has not been apparent since the revolution has opened the 
gates of the political realm to the poor. In fact, this gate-opening moment is the exact 
moment when the political realm had indeed become social (Arendt, 1990: 90). 
Arendt (1990: 90-91) argues that  
It is true that social and economic matters had intruded into the public 
realm before the revolutions of late eighteenth century, and the 
transformation of the government into administration, the replacement 
of personal rule by bureaucratic measures, even the attending 
transmutation of laws into decrees, had been one of the outstanding 
characteristics of absolutism. But with the downfall of political and 
legal authority and the rise of revolution, it was people rather than 
general economic and financial problems that were at stake, and they 
did not merely intrude into but burst upon the political domain. Their 
need was violent, and, as it were, prepolitical; it seemed that only 
violence could be strong and swift enough to help them. 
By the age of revolution, rather than expansionist power politics, it was the needs 
of people‟s bodies became a political/public concern. This is why the biological 
social or the social as the intrusion of bodily concerns into the public/political realm 
should be treated as separate conception of the social in Arendt.  
Thirdly, we have the social as mass society. Despite the fact that Arendt sees the 
social as a modern phenomenon, mass society refers to more contemporary facet of 
the social. The social as a mass society firstly appears in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism. In “Volume 3: Totalitarianism”, Arendt speaks of the masses of 
modern times, which make emergence of totalitarianism possible. In this context of 
totalitarianism, the movement‟s claim is the abolition of the separation between the 
public and the private life (Arendt, 1966: 336). Atomized and structureless masses 
contribute to emergence of the modern condition of the disappearance of the 
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separating line between the public and the private. The subject of this modern 
phenomenon is the mass man. He is in isolation and abandons himself into the mass 
(Arendt, 1966: 316-317). The movement starts to dominate each isolated member in 
each and every sphere of life (Arendt, 1966: 326). On the one hand, the isolated 
individual loses any kind of private family relationship. On the other hand, he loses 
his sense of belonging to the world of public, as he belongs only to the totalitarian 
movement any more (Arendt, 1966: 324). The private and the public perish at the 
same time. They merge into a new space of mass society. 
With regard to this reflection, it is patent that Arendt sees the social as a modern 
phenomenon. However, she uses the term of mass society to refer to the 
contemporary condition of society. In her article, “Society and Culture”, she clearly 
separates the idea of society from mass society. She argues that “[m]ass society 
comes about when “the mass of the population has been incorporated into society”” 
(Arendt, 1960: 278). At this point, Arendt argues that the mass society is the enlarged 
“good society” constituted by elites. Mass man‟s characteristics of loneliness, 
excitability, capacity for consumption, inability to judge and alienation from the 
world have been present in the elites of “the good society” of the 18th and the 19th 
century (Arendt, 1960: 278). The only difference is that these are the characteristics 
of each and every individual anymore. The mass society becomes a different, more 
contemporary facet of “the good society” of the 18th century.  
In fact, Arendt emphasizes this difference in The Human Condition, too. She 
states that with the emergence of mass society the social has reached the point at 
which it embraces and controls every member. The mass society equalizes every one 
in every way. This equality is based on conformism. In this context of conformism, 
behavior replaced action. The social conquered the public realm, which was the only 
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space to display difference and distinctness. But, now the difference and distinctness 
have become the matters of the private (Arendt, 1958: 41). The separating line 
between the public and the private disappears.   In the social as mass society “social 
behavior” has become the standard for all spheres of life (Arendt, 1958: 45). 
The fourth facet of the social in Arendt is the social as sociability in terms of the 
quality of life in civil society and civic associations. This conception of the social in 
Arendt is firstly underlined by Seyla Benhabib as it is stated in the previous chapter. 
Benhabib argues that there is a different conception of the social in Arendt in her 
search for the recovery of the public world under conditions of modernity. This is a 
kind of “alternative genealogy of modernity” in Arendt (Benhabib, 1995: 14). 
Benhabib suggests that we can discover a different genealogy of modernity at the 
beginnings of Arendt‟s works. By beginning she means Rahel Varnhagen: The Life 
of a Jewess. Benhabib (1995: 14) argues that in this book the rise of the social, as the 
prominent characteristic of modernity, “designates the emergence of new forms of 
sociability, association, intimacy, friendship, speaking and writing habits, tastes in 
food, manners and arts, as well as hobbies, pastimes, and leisure activities”. In terms 
of spatial distinction, this newly emerging sociability types, associations and 
activities take place in an in-between space neither private nor public. This space, 
named as the salon, is “a curious space that is of the home yet public, that is 
dominated by women yet visited and frequented by men” that is based on egalitarian 
principle (Benhabib: 1995, 14). The members are the outsiders who come from 
different classes and religious groups. They are excluded by the norms and rules of 
the dominant high society of the 18th century German society. Through the spacial 
facility that is provided by the salon‟s atmosphere, these outsiders express their 
difference and distinctiveness, which finally turns into an intersubjective reality 
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(Benhabib, 1995: 17). New members of the newly emerging civil society create 
bonds that culminate in the idea of friendship through conversation and 
communication (Benhabib, 1995: 17-18). This kind of conception of the social as a 
space of civic associations that is created through sociability could be thought as an 
alternative in-between space, in which politics in Arendtian terms (sharing of words 
and deed among peers) could be actualized in contemporary context. In order to 
support this point, one should look through the characteristics within this alternative 
conception of the social that could be thought as carrying political connotations. 
 
6.4 How Political the Social Could Be: Alternative Political Spaces and 
Alternative Political Actors 
In support of my argument that the social as a neither private nor public space 
could be thought as an alternative space of modern times, in which the lost treasure 
of the public world of the political could be actualized, Benhabib remarks the 
commonalities between the salons of the eighteenth century and the agonal public 
sphere of Greek city state. Before pointing these commonalities, she, firstly, draws 
our attention to differences. Benhabib accepts the fact that predominance of women 
in salons and the forms of interaction, speech and writing is in contradiction with the 
characteristics of the agonal public space of the polis that predominates The Human 
Condition. Besides the women presence in salons, the serious form of speech within 
the public space of polis is absent in the salons. The speech in the salons is rather 
playful and fluid. Although visibility is an ideal that rules both of the public space of 
the polis and the eighteenth-century salon, transparency is the rule of the game only 
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in the former one. Self-revelation and self-concealment take the place of 
transparency in the salon (Benhabib, 1995: 19). 
Besides these differences, Benhabib also talks about commonalities on which we 
can build modern public space in Arendtian terms. These commonalities become the 
characteristics of the social in Arendt as sociability through/in which contemporary 
political actor could act. The first common point between the salon and the agonal 
public sphere is that both of them are based on the principle of equality. In the polis 
the equality principle corresponds to equal political rank of the participants as 
citizens. In the salon, beside the differences in participants‟ existing social, economic 
and political inequality, they are equal in terms of the humanity they shared and their 
specific talents, abilities, and capabilities as individuals sharing certain tastes and 
sensibilities (Benhabib, 1995: 19). The second important commonality according to 
Benhabib is that both the agonal public sphere and the salons create bonds among 
their members. At this point Benhabib (1995: 19) gives reference to Aristotle and 
indicates that “"friendship" among citizens of the polis is the virtue that good 
lawgivers try most to cultivate”. Benhabib sees the salons as the places where 
friendship is also cultivated. Although these are personal rather than political 
relationships, Benhabib thinks that the line between them is not clear. She argues that 
in both of the spaces civic friendship is cultivated and it does not change the nature 
of the friendship in question whether the subjects are a group of citizens or a group 
of private, like-minded individuals who can gather for a common political purpose. 
The friendship that is formed in the private atmosphere of the salon may result in 
political bonding, which is called networking in contemporary civil societal life 
(Benhabib, 1995: 19). This is why Benhabib argues that the salon could be seen as a 
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transitory space that allows at the same time a certain amount of transgression 
between the boundaries of the public and the private.  
Benhabib is right in emphasizing the concept of friendship and its potential in 
terms of the political. Arendt herself underlines the importance of friendship as a 
source of political engagement in the context of “dark times”. It is well-known that 
the concept of the political is pluralistic in Arendt‟s thought. This pluralism comes 
from the idea that the political could only be engaged in public between equal 
citizens. However, throughout the history, there were exceptional times. Arendt calls 
these times as “dark times”. In her book Men in Dark Times, Arendt (1995: viii) 
states that there are times when the public realm could not fulfill its functions, which 
are mainly “throw[ing] light on the affairs of men by providing a space of 
appearances in which they can show in deed and word, for better and worse, who 
they are and what they can do…”. There were times in the history this light of the 
public is extinguished by “credibility gaps” and “invisible government” who used 
speech not to disclose but to “degrade all truth to meaningless triviality” (Arendt, 
1995: viii). At this point Arendt (1995: 11) talks about the dark totalitarian times, in 
which public realm has been obscured by the invasion of vital self interest and 
personal liberty. In these times flight from the world is justified as long as reality is 
not ignored. In this flight, humanity could be fulfilled through friendship among 
certain groups of people, pariah peoples, for whom “the times become so extremely 
dark” (Arendt, 1995: 13). Here Arendt does not refer friendship as a phenomenon of 
intimacy between private people. She refers to the concept of friendship as Greeks 
did. Arendt (1995: 24) remarks:  
[F]or Greeks the essence of friendship consisted in discourse. They 
held that only the constant interchange of talk united citizens in a 
polis. In discourse, the political importances of friendship, and the 
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humanness peculiar to it, were made manifest. This converse (in 
contrast to the intimate talk in which individuals speak about 
themselves), permeated through it may be by pleasure in the friend‟s 
presence, is concerned with the common world, which remains 
“inhuman” in a very literal sense unless it is constantly talked about 
by human beings. 
It is apparent that the bond of friendship is not totally an apolitical or pre-political 
phenomenon in Arendt. This specific type of relationship has the potential to create 
the political as long as the world is the object of the discourse. Therefore, the 
friendship bond and the form of sociability that are created in the salon atmosphere 
have the potential of being political as long as the content of the discourse is related 
with the world. 
Benhabib is not alone in arguing that the salon is a kind of public sphere which 
hosts the political in Arendtian sense. Carolina Armenteros (1998: 94, 96) also 
presents the concept of the salon in Rahel Varnhagen as a “social area outside 
society” which is “the prototype of the public sphere” in Arendt‟s theory. 
Armenteros argues that any historical explanation of Arendt‟s philosophical 
originality is highly related with intellectual, personal and historical circumstances in 
her book on Rahel Varnhagen. Armenteros elaborates on this argument by 
emphasizing the concept of freedom in Arendt‟s theory. She argues that from the 
beginning Rahel Varnhagen has some romantic qualities that resonate Arendt‟s 
conception of freedom. In the first place, Rahel is original in terms of her enthusiasm 
in combining different ideas in unexpected and new ways. Rahel‟s curiosity and the 
way she values knowledge as something desirable for its own sake is the attribute 
that is inherent in the nature of freedom (Armenteros, 1998: 93). Freedom is an 
ultimate end in itself. You perform your freedom, you act with your equals for no 
higher aim than being free. In a nutshell, Armenteros argues that this pattern of 
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thinking in Arendt‟s political theory starts to be shaped in her very first work on 
Rahel Varnhagen.  
With regard to this argument what is important for the sake of my point on the 
social as being an alternative in-between space for the performance of political action 
in contemporary period is that Armenteros also argues that the salon as a social space 
in Rahel Varnhagen is also a preliminary conception of the public sphere in Arendt‟s 
political theory. Armenteros represents this in-between space as a public sphere as 
the romantic virtues such as curiosity, originality, and unconventionality in that salon 
attracts people. According to Armenteros (1998: 94), “[l]ack of convention meant 
freedom of ideas and from social rigors: Rahel‟s salon was the ideal forum in which 
to achieve the kind of humanity central to Arendtian political philosophy.” At this 
point, Armenteros differentiates the society and the social atmosphere of the salon. 
Rather than arguing that the social in Rahel Varnhagen refers to the 18
th
 century high 
society or different emerging traits or life styles within that society as Pitkin does, 
similar to Benhabib Armenteros sees the social in Arendt as a space that emerges as a 
specific exclusion of the dominant societal traits of the 18
th
 century. The important 
contribution of Armenteros‟ (1998: 94) argument is that the social in Rahel 
Varnhagen is a social area outside the society that “excluded the possibility for 
action; and that one could create truly public spaces for political action- become truly 
human- only outside of it. …the salon was a stage where people represents 
themselves…”. The self-realization through self display is the dominant 
characteristic of Rahel‟s salon. Armenteros argues that this characteristic makes 
Rahel‟s salon the prototype of the public sphere in Arendt. Social outsideness and 
theatricality in this type of Jewish salons are the essentials in Arendt‟s re-
appropriation of the Aristotelian concept of the polis (Armenteros, 1998: 96). This 
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does not mean that the salon is the ultimate public sphere. Armenteros (1998: 96) 
also states that it is a “liminal space” between public and private; but it is uniquely 
liberating sphere of self-actualization and action. This supports the argument that the 
social as an in-between space could include Arendtian conception of political action. 
Rahel Varnhagen not only becomes a source for pointing out the spatial 
possibility of the social in Arendt as an alternative conception that inherits the 
potential of being political for Arendtian scholars. Besides the spatial argumentation, 
this early work of Arendt also becomes a source for alternative reading of the social 
in Arendt by presenting an alternative political actor, who is the subject of the very 
same social, namely the pariah. As it is argued in the preceding chapter, according to 
Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen is one of the important figures in history who has become a 
„conscious pariah‟ at the end of her life. Moreover, the guests of her salon are social 
outsiders of the eighteenth century, which is the distinctive characteristic of a pariah 
people. At this point, one asks the question in a reverse direction. Before assigning a 
political character to eighteenth century salon, we could interrogate to what extent 
the subject of the eighteenth century salon is a political figure or an actor. 
With regard to that question, by referring to Rahel Varnhagen in the first place, 
Jennifer Ring (1991) argues that apart from the Greek hero within the polis, pariah 
could be thought as the alternative political actor in Arendt‟s political theory. This 
kind of argumentation needs to point out a divergence or a shift in the context of 
Arendtian political action. The shift is from a need for permanent place for the action 
to intangible conception of power that is portable and emerges simultaneously when 
actors acts among themselves. Ring emphasizes the fact that in earlier parts of The 
Human Condition the public sphere is a tangible physical space of the polis. 
However, later in the book the political action itself starts to create public space 
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(Ring, 1991: 439-440). According to Ring, the reason behind this shift is the political 
character possessed by the pariah. The pariah is a political actor without a tangible, 
physical public space. His public space has been taken away from him in one of the 
previously mentioned “dark times”. In these times, freedom could go underground 
and the light of the public space could only shine in hiding places (Ring, 1991: 444). 
Although the pariah does not act among his peers or for community of equals, he acts 
as a member of outsiders, like the outsiders of the eighteenth century society, who 
find their peers in the salons. Ring argues that conscious pariahdom invites 
combination of the public and the private concerns. According to her, Arendt seeks 
to highlight the public aspects of the pariah‟s private life, which is still defined by 
politics. Even though the pariah knows that his outsider status is not an essentialist 
characteristic, he accepts the fact that he has some choices for and responsibility in 
what he is going to do with that status (Ring, 1991: 441). He could make the world 
aware and conscious of the intrusion of politics into his private existence (Ring, 
1991: 443). This is his political role. This combined character of the pariah as the 
actor in Arendt‟s political theory also demonstrates the possibility of the existence of 
politics in an in-between space (the social) that emerges as a consequence of his 
actions. The pariah, whose concerns are the combination of the public and the 
private, is political in terms of his conscious actions among other outsiders. Within 
same lines, Rahel and her guests in her salon are conscious of their outsider status 
and they act among themselves out of their private concerns. This is a perfect 
representation of how an in-between character (who could turn his privacy into 
public concern) could become political within an in-between space (which is neither 
private nor public) that is a product of his own actions.  
  144 
As it is mentioned in the above sections, the idea that there is a different 
conception of the social in Arendt that allows for the emergence of the political in an 
essentially neither private nor public space could be driven from Arendt‟s earliest 
work, Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess. This conception of an alternative 
social in Arendt is supported by different Arendtian scholars in different levels. 
Benhabib and Amerentos support the argument by saying that the concept of the 
salon in Rahel Varnhagen resonates the conception of public sphere in Arendt‟s 
political theory. Even Amerentos argues that the salon is the prototype of the public 
sphere in Arendt‟s later works. Other than this spatial analysis, another Arendtian 
scholar, Ring, points out the political character of the subject of the social space in 
question. Ring argues that the pariah of the 18
th
 century is the alternative political 
actor in Arendt‟s political theory. The in-between character of the social space has its 
implications on its subject this time. The pariah is the political actor, who combines 
the public and the private concerns. Through his actions, he reconstructs the political 





6.5 The Social as the Political: A Personal Life Story 
Besides these argumentations, in this section, I would like to make another case 
that supports the main argument in this chapter. By referring to Rahel Varnhagen as 
the main text, I would argue that this early work of Arendt is a tremendous source to 
analyze how the co-existence of the public and the private in a personal life story is 
possible. Taking up Rahel Varnhagen as the main text, I argue that in Arendt, 
parvenu versus pariah identities correspond to public versus private dichotomy in 
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Arendt. Throughout the text in question, I show that at some points it is difficult to 
separate these two distinct identities from each other. A person could experience both 
the pariah and the parvenu experiences at the same time in a societal context. This 
kind of experience should not be detrimental the political experience for that person. 
The person (Rahel in this case) could manage both identities in the associational 
atmosphere of the 18
th
 century salons. She could carry the private concerns to the 
public space of equals through sociability. 
 
6.5.1 Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess  
This book is the biography of a Jewish woman who had a significant position 
within the Romanticism of the 18
th
 century Berlin. It is among the earliest works of 
Arendt, which is often treated as a separate/isolated piece in relation to her later 
political writings. In this work, Arendt endeavors to narrate the story of Rahel‟s life 
through giving quotations from her diaries, and her correspondences with her friends. 
However, Arendt‟s endeavor does not correspond to writing within the context of 
classical genre of biography. With regard to this, Arendt (1957: xii) states that 
“[w]hat interested me solely was to narrate the story of Rahel‟s life as she herself 
might have told it.” This is somewhat a challenge to the genre of biography as 
throughout the whole book the line between auto-biography and biography is not 
clear. In relation to this Liliane Weissberg (1997: 5) suggests that Arendt wants to 
slip into Rahel‟s skin.   





century Berlin society is in fact a narrated story of a self-realization. It is the private 
and intimate self-realization attempt of a German-Jewish woman, whose salon had a 
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great significance for the social history of that period. This is actually why the book 
is considered to have a claim of historical (re)construction “from within” (Weissberg, 
1997: 17). Arendt basically narrates the story of how Rahel tries to deal with her 
Jewish identity in a social context, which holds the idea that being a Jew is an 
individual and at the same time private matter. In other words, Rahel‟s story is a 
culmination of unique strategies for assimilation into a non-Jewish society.  
In relation to these strategies, the first eleven chapters of the book, which 
were completed by 1933, somewhat constructs the identity of Rahel as if she is one 
of the „exceptional‟ parvenus of 19th century Germany. However, surprisingly, the 
last two chapters of the book, which were completed in 1938 depict a brand new 
identity for Rahel, namely the pariah.
13
 In fact, in her essay, “We Refugees”, Arendt 
(1978: 65-66) depicts Rahel as a member of pariah tradition.
14
 
The concept of „conscious pariah‟ emerged as a result of the attitudes of a few 
people within the mentioned pariah tradition. „Conscious pariah‟ is an outsider status 
that is marginal among European society and parvenu Jews. By definition, s/he 
affirms her/his Jewish particular identity and her/his right to have a place in general 
European life (Feldman, 1978: 18). The pariah is a political person and her/his duty 
is to stay outside of the society consciously and to awaken his/her fellow Jews to a 
similar consciousness in order to rebel against the society (Feldman: 1978: 33). The 
pariahs were new class/anti-class of the intellectuals, journalists, the critics, and the 
free-lance writers in the 19
th
 century European society (Cahnman, 1974: 163). They 
are associated with the characteristics of Jewish heart, humanity, humor and 
                                                          
13
 For a detailed analysis of the difference between the first eleven chapter and the last two chapters 
of Rahel Varnhagen, see (Moruzzi, 2008: 31, 33, 36-37). 
14
 In Arendt‟s essay Bernard Lazare, Heine, Sholom Aleichem, Franz Kafka, and Charlie Chaplin are 
also associated with pariah tradition. 
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disinterested intelligence and being engaged in politics (Arendt, 1978: 66). In fact, in 
Hannah Arendt‟s personal lexicon, Wirkliche Menschen, real people, were “pariahs”” 
(Young-Bruehl, 1982: xv). 
On the other hand, the pariah‟s counterpart in the social outsider context, 
namely the parvenu, is depicted as an upstart “who tried to succeed in the world of 
Gentiles but could not escape her/his Jewish roots.” (Feldman, 1978: 18). The 
parvenu is associated with the characteristics of tactlessness, political stupidity, 
inferiority complexes, and money grubbing (Arendt, 1978: 66). They were the 
financial magnet and monied upstarts in 19th century European society (Cahnman, 
1974: 163). Parvenus‟ conception of their Jewish identity as an individual problem 
and their efforts in getting rid of their Jewishness through assimilation and depicting 
themselves as „exceptional‟ Jews were actually what make them anti-political in 
Arendt‟s typology.  
With regard to above-mentioned dichotomy in the context of the social 
outsiders in the 19
th
 century Europe, namely the pariah versus parvenu, it is stunning 
to observe that they are situated as opposites in terms of „the political‟. The pariah is 
political, where as the parvenu is politically blind. Therefore, they have their proper 
places within the prominent dichotomy in Arendt‟s political theory: the public versus 
private dichotomy. As it could be seen in the second chapter of The Human 
Condition, the distinction between the public and private corresponds to the 
distinction between the political versus household, freedom versus necessity, 
permanence versus futility, and honor versus shame (Arendt, 1958: 28, 73). As a 
consequence of this interdefinitionality, the political pariah finds her/his place within 
the framework of the public, and the anti-political parvenu finds her/his proper place 
within the private realm. 
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In the light of this categorization, I argue that the book, Rahel Varnhagen: 
The Life of a Jewess, could not be read through the safe ground that is provided by 
this strict dichotomy. In other words, it is not easy to claim that Arendt‟s Rahel 
Varnhagen is actually a pariah or a parvenu. Throughout the text, she shifts between 
both categories and there are times that she carries the traces of both. Although she is 
depicted as a conscious pariah and a political figure by Arendt, her life story shows 
us that the life story of that particular historical figure has an in-between character. 
At some parts of her life, parvenu characteristics of her become dominant. At other 
times, she becomes a conscious pariah. And from time to time, she is both of them. 
These shifts do not prevent Arendt in exemplifying Rahel as a political figure. She is 
a political figure with her “social” life, which could not be classified solely  as a 
public or a private experience. By this way, I also try to show that a life of a political 
figure could not be read/analyzed easily through basing it on the strict dichotomy 
between the public and the private. Besides the shift between two realms, Rahel‟s life 
story also provides an in-between space of sociability that we could call the social 
space. So as to clarify this argument, in the following sections, I will state the parts 
of the book, in which Rahel is an actual parvenu, a genuine pariah and an obscured 
status that shifts between parvenu and pariah identities, respectively. 
 
6.5.2 Rahel as the Actual Parvenu 
Rahel‟s parvenu status puts its seal throughout the first eleven chapter of the 
book. This situation is highly related with her own conception about being a Jew. In 
her own words, having born a Jewess was the “greatest shame, which was the misery 
and misfortune of my life…” (Arendt, 1957: 1). Her definition of her own problem is 
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 century of Europe. Jews of that period see „being Jewish‟ as a personal 
problem, a personal misfortune. As Arendt (1957: 4) puts it, “Jews did not even want 
to be emancipated as a whole; all they wanted was to escape from Jewishness, as 
individuals if possible.”15 Their conception of their status within the society as a 
personal problem signifies their position within the private realm. Personal strategies 
for coping with their status fail in becoming political, as they do not act collectively 
to heal the conditions for the Jewish identity. In accordance with this, Rahel‟s 
experience also turned out to be a private one, and turned into herself. Arendt (1957: 
9) indicates that “Rahel‟s struggle against the facts, above all against the fact of 
having been born a Jew, very rapidly became a struggle against herself.” 
In order to get rid of uneasiness that would be a result of the struggle against 
oneself, Rahel did not hesitate to employ personal strategies in order to be a member 
of the society, to which she never belonged. In fact, Rahel‟s strategies for being 
accepted into „the world‟, to the society that she wants to be a member of and her 
willingness to have a place within, are general feminine strategies for assimilation of 
that time. These strategies namely are loving and being loved, being proposed to and 
marrying with the members of non-Jewish society. (Benhabib, 1995: 12-13; Moruzzi, 
2008: 36). Arendt (1957: 27) exemplifies this attempt by saying that Rahel‟s 
engagement to Finckenstein, who was a member of a non-Jewish noble family, was 
seen as the only choice left to Rahel for social assimilation. 
                                                          
15
For a more detailed analysis of personal identification of „being a Jew‟ by Jewish people in 19th 
century European context Arendt (1966), “Chapter 2: The Jews, the Nation-State, and the Birth of 
Anti-Semitism” of Volume 1: Anti-Semitism in The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
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Rahel‟s on-going attempt for assimilation to the society is closely related with 
her conception of reality. As Arendt (1957: 144) puts it: “The world and reality had, 
for Rahel, always been represented by society. „Real‟ meant to her the world of those 
who were socially acknowledged, the parvenus as well as the people of rank and 
name who represented something lasting and legitimate.” In relation to the reality, 
feeling herself as real was also up to make her presence felt. Rahel wanted no 
originality or naturalness. All she wanted was to be a person among others by 
acquiring higher social position. With regard to that Arendt (1957: 96) says:  
If she wanted to live, she had to learn to make her presence felt, to 
display herself; she had to unlearn her previous acceptance of the 
bareness and sketchiness of her external existence as something final; 
she had to renounce originality and become one person among others. 
She had to prepare to occupy a higher social position.  
So as to fulfill her aim and become another person outwardly, she even 
changed her name from Rahel to Friederike Robert (Arendt, 1957: 96-97). Therefore, 
it could be argued that Rahel did her best to become an actual parvenu through her 
personal strategies that were headed solely to be accepted as a person who had a 
social status. In relation to these strategies, Arendt (1957: 164) also underlines 
Rahel‟s parvenu status and claims that “[l]ike all parvenus, she never dreamed of a 
radical alteration of bad conditions, but rather of a shift of personnel that would work 
out in her favor, so that the situation would improve as if by the stroke of a magic 
wand.” 
At this point, it is interesting that although Rahel provided a great space for 
sharing of the personal stories in a warm and friendly atmosphere in her salon, and 
despite her talent in abstraction and generalization of human experience, she lacked 
the ability to comprehend her Jewish identity as a general one and was stuck in her 
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parvenu status. Arendt (1957: 144) indicates Rahel‟s fixation in the parvenu status as 
follows: 
Her passion for generalizing, for making apparently absolute 
privacies communicable to all, experienceable by all, for feeling 
out the general human lot in the most personal details-her whole 
gift for abstraction had, characteristically never led her to the 
point of regarding her fate as a Jew as anything more than a 
wholly personal misfortune. She had never been able to fit her 
private ill luck into a scheme of general social relationships; she 
had never ventured into criticism of the society or even to 
solidarity with those who for other reasons were likewise 
excluded from the ranks of the privileged. 
 Interestingly, towards the end of the book, one could encounter the 
emphasis on the negative effects of parvenu status. These negative effects and 
characteristics of being a parvenu were recognized by Rahel. Parvenu is depicted as a 
condemned existence, who is experiencing a pseudo-reality in a world that has not 
been designed for her/him (Arendt, 1957: 183). S/he loses the abilities of grasping 
generalities and recognizing relationships. Arendt (1957: 174) says “[t]he parvenu 
pays for the loss of his pariah qualities [to be grateful, to be considerate to others] by 
becoming ultimately incapable of grasping generalities, recognizing relationships, or 
taking an interest in anything but his own person.” Through experiencing these losses 
Rahel “discovered that it was necessary for the parvenu- but for him alone- to 
sacrifice every natural impulse, to conceal all truth, to misuse all love, not only to 
suppress all passion, but worse still, to convert it into means for social climbing.” 
(Arendt, 1957: 169-170). At this point it is interesting that a person like Rahel, who 
failed to comprehend her identity as a part of a general scheme or to criticize the 
society that she wanted to be a part of, experienced a turning point and became one 
of the important figures, who signifies the conscious pariah in Arendt‟s political 
thinking. 
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6.5.3 Rahel as the Genuine Pariah 
Did Rahel suddenly become a pariah out of nothing? Is her pariah status only 
an artificial characteristic that signifies Arendt‟s political awareness that she acquired 
during writing the last two chapters of the book? Although, the pariah status of Rahel 
is mostly emphasized in the last two chapters of the book, her pariah characteristics 
are present from the beginning. For instance, Rahel is demonstrated as a figure of 
liberation as she had the gift of being a social outsider (Arendt, 1957: 45). As she did 
not belong to a specific world, her desire to be a part of the world led her to discover 
and experience everything by herself. She needed to learn everything from the 
beginning. At this point, her ignorance became a chance, and “she provided an 
example of liberation and lack of fixation upon a particular historically conditioned 
world.” (Arendt, 1957: 26). 
Rahel herself was born outside of the world. With people like her, who are 
standing outside of the world but not necessarily born outside of the world, she was 
able to find out the reasons for demanding a better world (Arendt, 1957: 61). 
Consciously staying out of the world, criticizing and rejecting the conditions within 
that world, and desire to acquire a better one are exactly the characteristics of the 
conscious pariah. 
Although Rahel is depicted as an actual parvenu in the first place,  Arendt 
attributes the characteristics of a genuine pariah to Rahel and she clearly defines 
Rahel as a conscious pariah at the end of the book. One of Rahel‟s friends, Marwitz, 
prepared the ground for Rahel‟s transition to conscious pariah throughout their 
friendship. Arendt (1957: 136)states:  
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Rahel interpreted her own alienation accordingly, no longer believed it 
inflicted by an incomprehensibly abstract fate which could be 
understood only in generalized categories –life in itself, the world. She 
now saw it as the specific misfortune of having been born in the 
wrong place, assigned by a history of a doomed world like Marwitz.  
It is patent that Rahel changed the way she conceived her Jewish identity. In 
fact, this was the moment at which she understood the world that she wants to be a 
part of is in fact a corrupted one.  
Thereafter, Rahel becomes an example of the conscious pariah, who 
possesses more reality than the parvenu. Throughout her parvenu experience, “Rahel 
had always stood outside, had been a pariah, and discovered at last, most unwillingly 
and unhappily, that entrance into society was possible only at the price of lying, of a 
far more generalized lie than simply hypocrisy.” (Arendt, 1957: 169). Although, as it 
is mentioned above, Arendt claims that Rahel could not truly escape from her 
parvenu stance in relation to her own understanding of her Jewishness, Arendt does 
not hesitate to indicate that Rahel always had been a pariah. Accordingly, in Arendt‟s 
(1957: 185) words “Rahel [who had a rebellious spirit] had remained a Jew and 
pariah.” 
 
6.5.4 Between Parvenu and Pariah 
Up to this point, it could be argued that at some points Rahel Varnhagen 
could be easily read within the context of the private realm, and at other points, it 
could be read within the context of the public. Therefore, one may argue that this 
work of Arendt is strictly divided between the two social status, namely the parvenu 
and the pariah, which correspond to the private and the public respectively. One may 
also point out that this work could easily be read within the safe ground that the 
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public versus private dichotomy in Arendt‟s political theory creates. With respect to 
these arguments, I would like to underline the points where Rahel Varnhagen could 
not be situated within either of the status and distinctions. 
Firstly, in terms of the personal parvenu strategies that Rahel employed 
during her struggle to be a part of the social world, it is seen that her strategies were 
not exclusively related to feminine strategies that were mentioned above. In other 
words, her parvenu strategies were not confined to the privacy of the concepts of 
marriage and family. Besides the strategies for acquiring a place within the world 
that are conducted through relating oneself to others in terms of intimate 
relationships, Arendt also tells Rahel‟s story of personal exit strategies in getting out 
of the problem of „worldlessness‟. For instance, in Chapter 5 the reader witnesses 
how Rahel decided to be devout in order to acquire a link to other beings, namely 
through God (Arendt, 1957: 65). Another personal experience was her celebration of 
her Prussian citizenship after getting married her husband, August Varnhagen 
(Arendt, 1957: 166). Although at first she resisted becoming a nationalist, requiring 
the sense of reality which she lacked and her desire to be a member of some entity 
constitutes her personal experience and stance in the 19
th
 century European context 
afterwards. With regard to this point, one could accuse Rahel of being an 
opportunistic parvenu as she wanted to be a patriotic person when she realized that 
otherwise she would be isolated from the society (Arendt, 1957: 101). Even though 
these were the endeavors of a parvenu, it is interesting to observe that they are not 
limited to the feminine private strategies but had something to do with the concepts 
of the grand projects, such as nationalism. The dilemma she went through is that 
although she tried to maintain her “self” i.e. her privacy to some extent, she 
understood that this maintenance was impossible to achieve in solitude. She had a 
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desire to get to know herself through a third party, namely God or the idea of 
national belonging. This demonstrates clearly that a concern for the private self 
construction could result in having public concerns. This is an in-between “social” 
experience that is neither private nor public.  
Moreover, in relation to the above mentioned point, one could argue that they 
are all personal strategies, therefore, are cursed to remain as the strategies of the 
parvenu, and they do not carry the traces of the pariah status. A possible reply to this 
objection would come from Arendt. Arendt (1957: 102-103) says that “For all that 
her later patriotism may have seemed opportunistic, for all that it assumed parvenu 
forms, the fact remains that she reached it strictly by insight, reason, principled 
convictions.” This is actually what a conscious pariah would do. We witness how a 
parvenu act could be combined with a pariah insight. Private concerns could be acted 
through public and political insight. This is an excellent example of how the private 
and public could be combined and still denotes an experience of a political person. 
Rahel‟s intertwined experience of her parvenu and pariah status could also be 
observed in contradictions she experienced while she shifted from one status to 
another. With respect to Rahel‟s attempt to change her name from Rahel to 
Friederike Robert, the contradiction she experienced is expressed as follows: “The 
former was not socially acceptable; the latter could not summon up the resolution to 
make a fraudulent self-identification.” (Arendt, 1957: 172). On the one hand she 
would be deprived of anything that the general social conditions could offer, but on 
the other hand her attempt of acquiring a social existence would mean sacrificing her 
nature (Arendt, 1957: 173). This also shows the contradictory requirements of self-
survival. With regard to these contradictions, Arendt states that Rahel could not get 
rid of her faults: gratitude and considerate. These attributes kept Rahel from being a 
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true parvenu, or in other words to live happily as a parvenu. Arendt (1957: 174) says 
“Rahel never rid herself of her „faults‟. They kept her from becoming a real parvenu, 
from feeling happy as a parvenu.” Additionally, for being a real parvenu one should 
abandon truth, one should abandon who s/he really is, and Arendt (1957: 167) 
indicates that Rahel was not ready to do this. However, it is also difficult to get rid of 
the achieved parvenu status as Arendt (1957: 171) puts it:  
This tendency to undo what she had achieved gathered strength as she 
became aware that her rise was only a semblance, that a pariah 
remained, in truly good society, nothing but a parvenu, that she could 
not escape her intolerably exposed position, any more than she could 
escape insults. 
This great contradiction that Rahel has gone through demonstrates how it is 
difficult to separate her parvenu experience from the pariah one. Despite the fact that 
at some part of her life she lived as an actual parvenu, she also carried the 
characteristics of the pariah. When she is characterized as the conscious pariah, she 
was also aware that she remained as a parvenu in the eyes of the society against 
which she rebelled. A woman who had remained as a conscious pariah and a political 
figure in Arendt‟s eyes acquired this characteristics through an intertwined 
experience that is neither private nor public. This clearly shows that a political 
experience could flourish in a social context of sociability, which is also neither 
private nor public. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter elaborates on the affirmative conception of the social as a third 
space in Arendt that could be thought as a fertile ground for the flourishing of the 
political in modern political context. To that end this dissertation adopts an 
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alternative reading of the social in Arendt that has been pioneered by Canovan, 
Pitkin and Benhabib. In the light of this alternative reading, I argue that there are 
different layers of meaning of the term social in different works of Arendt. Different 
from these writers, whose works are discussed in the previous chapter, I argue that 
there are four different facets of the social in Arendt. These are economic social, 
biological social, the social as the mass society, and the social as sociability. The 
social in Arendt is usually referred as a negative phenomenon of modern age that is 
detrimental to political experience, because of its in-between character in terms of 
the public and the private distinction. However, seeing the social as a space of 
sociability in terms of the quality of life in civil society and civic associations as 
Benhabib sees it, would give us the possibility of drawing a more inclusive picture of 
politics in Arendtian sense. Demonstrating that an affirmative conception of the 
social space, which is still neither private nor public would facilitate to include 
several social issues into the space of politics. It would also pave the way for creating 
political spaces in modern conditions, which do not allow ancient conception of 
politics that is confined to polis. 
After elaborating on four different facets of the social by giving reference to 
different works of Arendt, I underscore the fourth conception of the social as 
sociability as a possible third space that could include the political in modern 
political setting. At this point, my argument is built upon the works of Arendtian 
scholars, who also point out political characteristics of the social in question. In the 
last section, by taking Rahel Varnhagen as the main text, in which the social as 
sociability is apparent, I exemplify a political figure‟s life story as an in-between 
experience. Therefore, I support my point that a political experience could survive in 
a “social” context of a life story. 
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Following that line of thinking, I argue that finding out a different and 
affirmative conception of the social as a third kind of space (which would be called 
“civil society” as an associational one in the following chapter) that brings together 
the public and the private gives us the possibility of including contemporary political 
issues into the public/political space in Arendt‟s theory. Before elaborating on how 
we could read the social realm of civil society as a space of experience for the 
Arendtian vision of politics in the contemporary political context, firstly, I am going 
to elaborate on Arendt‟s conception of the political in the following chapter. In this 
way, I try to clarify the conception of the political in Arendt‟s theory that could be 
included by the social space of sociability. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 




Arendt‟s political theory is shaped by certain strict dichotomies. Among these 
dichotomies the public versus the private is more important than others in terms of 
drawing the limits of what is political and what is not. In analyzing this dichotomy, I 
argue that there are in-between concepts and spaces in Arendt‟s theory. Chapter 4 on 
the concept of Work, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 on the concept of the social in Arendt 
elaborate on this kind of concept and space respectively. With regard to the concept 
of work, I argue that this specific concept could not be situated spatially within the 
public versus private dichotomy. It has both public and private characteristics. In 
addition, at some points it transcends the dichotomy in question. With regard to the 
concept of social, I argue that there are multiple facets of that concept in Arendt‟s 
theory. Among these different facets, I represent „social as sociability‟ as an 
affirmative conception of the term. „Social as sociability‟ in terms of the quality of 
life in civil society and civic associations depicts the very same concept as a third 
alternative space, in which the public and the private experience co-exist.
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  This kind of identification of the social as the third sphere, where the public 
and the private coincide, would provide a space for the political to be actualized 
under modern conditions. As the political is thought to be the synonym for the 
public, pointing out such a hybrid space of the social means that political could 
survive in its co-existence with the private. In other words, within such a hybrid 
space of sociability, private concerns of the modern times such as economic and 
social issues could be handled politically. This kind of understanding carries the 
possible answers to the criticisms that emphasize the exclusivist characteristic of 
Arendtian conception of politics, which is based on the preclusion of any private 
interests and social issues of the modern age.   
Before showing how this co-existence of the private and the public in a social 
space of civic associations is possible through an Arendtian perspective, i.e. how 
public/political experiences of private persons could be handled within a social 
context, we need to elaborate on what political is in Arendt. The main objective of 
this chapter is to give an account of the political in Arendt. Although throughout the 
dissertation, the concept of the political is stated in the context of the public versus 
private dichotomy several times, a clear definition of the term political has not been 
made. This chapter on the political, firstly, reviews previous chapters to point out 
where political stands within the dichotomous context. It is seen that the political in 
Arendt could not be substantiated easily. It is not given and has many dimensions. It 
has many dimensions, firstly because political appears under different disguises in 
different works of Arendt, and secondly in Arendt‟s theory there is the complex 
interplay of different concepts. The concept of the political is substantiated by 
different eminent concepts such as action, plurality, equality, exclusion of necessity, 
freedom, reality, and the public space of Arendt‟s political theory. So, we cannot 
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deduce an essentialist/monolithic view of the political in Arendt. Therefore, my 
objective in this chapter, which is to clarify the concept of the political in Arendt, 
turns out to be breaking apart the fixed understanding/conceptualization of the 
political in Arendt and pointing out different instances of the political by questioning 
fixed/monolithic/given relation  between the political and public. I conclude that 
splitting the concept of the political in Arendt into its different components would 
ease situating the political into the social space. As is already indicated in Chapter 6, 
I point out an alternative space, in which the concept of the political in Arendt could 
be actualized under modern conditions. In this chapter, I extract and present the 
compatible elements and dimensions of the political, which could make such co-
existence possible.  
 
7.2 The Concept of the Political in the Context of the Public versus the Private 
Dichotomy: A Review 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 refer to the concept of the political in the context of 
the public versus the private dichotomy several times. It is important to look through 
these points in order to have a comprehensive idea about how Arendt discusses what 
political is and where it stands in the mentioned dichotomous context. As was argued 
in Chapter 2, Arendt sees politics as a plural, contingent, and unexpected 
phenomenon. In terms of her theory of politics, Arendt develops her ideas on the 
basis of actual political events through re-thinking of actual actions of actual political 
actors. With regard to that, her idea of politically acting subjects/actors refer to 
politics of plurality of equals, who debates and deliberates for the sake of no higher 
aim than acting together (Villa, 2007: 7-8). Debate and deliberation is an important 
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component of being political as Arendt (1958: 3) defines speech as the act that makes 
human beings meaningful and political. Action in the form of words and deeds is 
what founds and preserves political bodies (Arendt, 1958: 8). Founding something 
new, founding something that has never existed before through words and deeds 
among the equals explains what action is. In relation to that Arendt defines action as 
“finding the right words at the right moment”, and consequently to be political means 
deciding everything through words and persuasion, not through force and violence 
(Arendt, 1958: 26). Moreover, while the actor is acting among his equals, he 
becomes free. The plurality of equals provide the plurality of perspectives for the 
specific event. They provide the public for that specific action. Arendt (1993) clearly 
makes the connection between freedom, action, the public and the political in her 
essay called “What is Freedom?”. In this essay she indicates that raison d’étre for 
politics is attainment of freedom. The activity that assign political characteristic is 
action and action takes place within the public realm, in which plurality of human 
beings interact and perform (Arendt, 1993: 146, 149). Arendt (2005: 95) also makes 
this point by arguing that “there is … no real political substance. Politics arises in 
what lies between men and is established as relationships.” To summarize, in 
Arendt‟s theory of politics, raison d’étre of politics is freedom. To be free means two 
things: not to be subjected to the necessity of life or command of another and not to 
command oneself (Arendt, 2005: 117). Freedom is ontologically rooted in the fact of 
natality, which signifies beginning something anew that is actually the capacity for 
action. Action is the field of experience of freedom. In this field of experience one 
realizes one‟s individuality through acting and speaking, i.e. through performing and 
disclosing, within the public realm, which could only emerge through human 
plurality. This plurality signifies the fact of being seen and heard by others and this 
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brings us the concept of reality, which is articulated through politics. By being 
political one attains human excellence. 
The account of the political stated in Chapter 2 is also supported by secondary 
readings on Arendt, which are indicated in Chapter 3. For instance, Dossa (1989) 
says that the content of Arendtian politics is the exercise of freedom in action and 
speech in the public realm. Public realm is the space of appearance (Dossa, 1989: 
73). Dossa argues that there are two factors for being political. Firstly, the actor 
should degrade natural privacy, and secondly, the actor should be seen and heard by 
others (Dossa, 1989: 64). Here, Dossa refers to the exclusion of necessity that is 
attributed to nature, and reality, respectively. In this context, the public realm is 
depicted as the space for fulfillment of human potential par excellence through 
acting, i.e. through being political. Gottsegen (1994) also points out the co-existence 
of action, public realm and political. He argues that the public realm in Arendt is the 
lasting space and the world that is built by action. This realm is filled with the light 
of speech, which illuminates everyone and everything appeared within its confines 
(Gottsegen, 1994: 50). He argues that what is shared in the light of the common 
realm of the public becomes political. In relation to that space for appearances, Villa 
(1997) depicts that space as a space for action and underlines Arendt‟s insistence on 
preserving this space of appearances from necessity and privacy. Villa (1997: 183) 
argues that concern for the protection of public realm of appearances is based on the 
presence of stable boundaries between the “space of freedom”, which is the public 
space, and automism of nature and labor that belong essentially to the private space. 
Exchange of opinions through speech, i.e. the political, could only take place in a 
distinct realm of the public that excludes the private concerns of each citizen. This 
understanding underscores plurality and equality at the same time.  
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Moreover, Pitkin (1981: 328) also gives us a great account of 
interdefinitionality in Arendt‟s conception of politics by arguing that in Arendt‟s 
theory the public is synonymous with the political and the political implies action in 
a community of peers. The political realm is composed of equals. This equality has 
nothing to do with universal natural rights, talent, wealth or ability. The equality in 
question is an artificial one that is the equality of status (Pitkin, 1981: 331). Seeing 
politics and political equality as collective action and mutual engagement of peers in 
the public realm is also pointed out by Dietz (1994). While depicting the political in 
Arendt as the collective action and mutual engagement, Dietz (1994: 247) presents 
Arendtian actor as “the speaker of words and doers of deeds.” Plurality, equality, 
action and the public character in the context of the political are also underscored by 
Dietz. 
 
7.3 The Political as a Dynamic Concept 
In my review of the secondary literature I realized that conventional 
understanding of the political in Arendt is derived from her basic texts on action, 
public space, and freedom. For instance, in The Human Condition, according to 
Arendt, what makes people political and meaningful is their ability to act and to 
disclose their action through speech in the public sphere. Free and equal human 
beings found and preserve political bodies through acting in the form of words and 
deeds. Deciding everything through words and persuasion is what being political is. 
Moreover, in her famous essay “What is Freedom?”, Arendt states that the purpose 
of politics is attainment of freedom. Action is what makes a phenomenon political 
and it takes place within the public realm composed of human beings, who interact 
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and perform. In this mainstream understanding of the political, there is a fixed 
relationship between the political, action, freedom and the public sphere. This 
essentialist relationship leads a monolithic understanding of the political that is based 
on a static rather than a dynamic conception of the political. In this chapter, while 
trying to give a clear account of what the political is in Arendt, I challenge this 
monolithic conception. I argue that in different works of Arendt, the political appears 
under different disguises. In addition, associating the concept of the political with 
other important concepts provides dynamism to the political. In each and every 
relation one could point out different instances of the political. The following 
sections point out these different disguises. It also indicates the relation of the 
political to other concepts, respectively, in order to depict the dynamism of the 
concept. 
 
7.3.1 The Political Appearing Under Different Disguises in Different Works of 
Arendt 
In some works of Arendt I observe that the mentioned predetermined 
relationship is somehow broken because of the context. Despite the fact that these 
alternative and/or marginal contexts do not completely challenge the essential 
characteristics of being political, they nevertheless question the strong connection 
between the political and freedom on the one hand, the political and the public on the 
other hand. For instance, in “Men in Dark Times” Arendt (1995) underscores the 
historical moments when totalitarian governments were in power as exceptional 
times. In these dark exceptional times the light of the public is extinguished by 
“credibility gaps” and “invisible government” who used speech to “degrade all truth 
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to meaningless triviality” (Arendt 1995: viii). In these times speech lost its function 
of disclosing. Again in these times self interest and personal liberty invaded public 
realm (Arendt, 1995: viii). So, it is all right for one to flight from the shared world 
into underground. This flight is justified as long as the reality is not ignored. 
According to Arendt (1995: 13), in these dark times, the web of relationship could be 
formed through friendship among certain groups of people, who are pariah people, 
for whom “the times become so extremely dark”. Pariah people would fulfill their 
human potential through constant interchange of talk in their friendships. Here, 
pariah people are the ones who lost their access to the world, who become spaceless 
in terms of the public. Through forming a new web of relationships, they construct 
their own public space. In this specific context, they act in Arendtian sense. This is a 
perfect example of how the political, which is isolated from accepted/approved 
political in fact constitutes its own public. Therefore, the predetermined relationship 
between the political and the public that is dominant in the earlier parts of The 
Human Condition is broken. The idea that the political could only emerge within a 
public sphere filled by free and equal citizens lost its determinant power. The 
political in the above mentioned context does not necessitate a given public. It 
creates its own public.  
In addition, in the above mentioned context the political actor is the pariah. 
Arendt refers to political experience of the pariah in the context of his/her private life 
experience long before writing Men in Dark Times. As it is elaborated in Chapter 6, 
Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess Arendt presents the pariah as the political 
actor in the life story of Rahel, which is the private and intimate self-realization 
attempt of a German-Jewish woman. Giving Rahel as an example, Arendt depicts the 
„conscious pariah‟ as a political actor who has an outsider status that is marginal 
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among European society and parvenu Jews. By definition, conscious pariah affirms 
her/his Jewish particular identity and her/his right to have a place in general 
European life (Feldman, 1978: 18). The pariah is a political person and her/his duty 
is to stay outside of the society consciously and to awaken his/her fellow Jews to a 
similar consciousness in order to rebel against the society (Feldman, 1978: 33). The 
pariahs were new class/anti-class of the intellectuals, journalists, the critics, and the 
free-lance writers in the 19
th
 century European society (Cahnman, 1974: 163). They 
are associated with the characteristics of Jewish heart, humanity, humor and 
disinterested intelligence and being engaged in politics (Arendt, 1978: 66). 
Jennifer Ring (1991) is the one who draws attention to political/public 
character of pariah‟s private experience. Ring underlines that showing how the 
public intrudes into the private is also political in Arendtian terms. Ring argues that 
pariah‟s experience is composed of mingling of the public and the private concerns. 
Although, the pariah is aware of the fact that his/her outsider status is not naturally 
given, s/he accepts that s/he has some choices and responsibility in what to do with 
this given status (Ring, 1991: 441). His/her political duty is to stay outside of the 
society consciously and to awaken his/her fellow Jews to a similar consciousness as 
Rahel did. In other words, s/he could make the world aware of the intrusion of 
politics into her/his private existence (Ring, 1991: 443). Once again, from the 
political experience of the private life of pariah, we see that the predetermined 
relationship between the political and the public composed of equal and free human 
beings is broken. Pariah as a political actor, is devoid of the light of the public in 
question, but deals with his/her private condition politically within a limited public of 
his/her fellow Jews. In the early parts of The Human Condition any experience or 
activity within the private sphere is entitled non-political or prepolitical. (Arendt, 
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1958: 29, 31, 32). Therefore, what would be entirely non-political or prepolitical 
according to the core dichotomy between the public and the private in The Human 
Condition, becomes political in the above mentioned context.  
 
7.3.2 Giving an Account of the Political: An Interplay of Different Concepts 
When it comes to substantiating and understanding what political is in 
Arendt‟s works, above mentioned appearances of the political leaves us with a 
complex interplay of the eminent concepts of Arendt‟s political theory. As is argued, 
in addition to its different appearances in different instances in several contexts, the 
political in Arendt is not a monolithic conception because of its relations to other 
concepts. A different dynamic comes to the stage when one goes through its relation 
with each concept. In order to have a full picture of the political in mind, we need to 
look into how political is substantiated in its relation to the concepts of action, 
plurality, exclusion of necessity, equality, reality, the public and freedom through 
which Arendt constructs her theoretical framework. 
 
7.3.2.1 Action: A Synonymous Concept  
With regard to reviewing the conceptual interdependence in Arendt‟s theory, 
the starting point should be the concept of action. As it is indicated above, action is 
the activity that assigns the political character of a certain phenomenon. Action as 
performing and speech as disclosing of this performance are what make human 
beings meaningful and political (Arendt, 1958: 3). Within the moment of acting the 
actor is also experiencing being political. Therefore, action is thought to be the 
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synonym for the political. This is why the concept of action is the most essential 
concept for us to understand the political in Arendt. 
In Chapter 4, I analyzed the important relationship between action and 
political. In this context, action as one of the activities is presented in relation to 
founding and preserving political bodies. It is actually what creates human history 
(Arendt, 1958:8). In her conceptualization of action, Arendt argues that praxis 
(action) and lexis (speech) constitute the realm of human affairs (Arendt, 1958: 25). 
A man who acts is fully human. For Arendt, this is why human being is a political 
animal, not a social one. Moreover, this is why Arendt argues that action and speech 
are the activities that create human life. They are the means of attaining human 
excellence. They are the activities, which reveal man‟s unique distinctness among his 
equals (Arendt, 1958: 176). In relation to that the political realm of affairs rises 
directly out of acting together, out of sharing words and deeds (Arendt, 1958: 198). 
Sharing words and deeds has also some characteristics such as boundlessness and 
unpredictability. Arendt argues that any reaction given to a specific action is also a 
new action, which strikes out on its own and affects others. Action always establishes 
boundless relationships that inherent new possibilities (Arendt, 1958: 190). 
Moreover, action is always unpredictable. As it is associated with beginning 
something anew, we can say that action has a definite beginning. However, its 
consequences and possible end/s are unpredictable, as action has no definite end. It 
would endure till the mankind comes to an end (Arendt, 1958: 233). This means that 
we could not evaluate an Arendtian conception of action within the confines of 
means-ends category. As it is also stated in Chapter 2, Arendt is highly critical of 
degradation of political action into the categories of means and ends. Depicting 
action as a means necessary to achieve a higher end rather than itself, disturbs her, 
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because this situation also connotes another disturbing modern experience of seeing 
subordination of politics to economics (Kohn, 2005: xxvii-xxviii).  
 
7.3.2.2 Plurality, Equality, and Exclusion of Necessity: Conditions for the 
Political 
The concept of the political emerges concurrently when the individual acts in 
Arendtian terms. However, there are some conditions for this performing moment to 
be political. I argue that the first condition for the political and action is plurality. As 
Arendt (2005: 93) puts it “[p]olitics is based on the fact of human plurality”. In The 
Human Condition Arendt reminds us the activities in vita activa, which are 
traditionally within the range of every human being. One of them is action and 
Arendt argues that human condition for action is plurality. Action could only create 
power in plurality (Arendt, 1958: 7). At this point, Arendt is talking about plurality 
as an inevitable condition for action, as she presents the concept of action in the 
context of founding and preserving political bodies. According to her, the political 
could only be engaged in the public between equal citizens. This is the heart of 
plurality in Arendt. Plurality of equal others is needed for the individual to show his 
unique distinctness to be remembered. Because what mattered for Arendt is 
“concrete experiences articulated within the context of thinking and acting in a 
community with others.” (Blattler and Martin, 2005: 89) 
The community is based on the principle of equality. As it is discussed in 
Chapter 6, the concept of equality in Arendt has nothing to do with social or 
economic equality but is an equality of political rank of the participants as citizens. 
At this point, one has to be careful about the conception of equality in the mentioned 
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context of acting community, because Arendt‟s idea of equality here is nothing to do 
with modern conception of justice. Here it simply means “to live among and to have 
to deal only with one‟s peers…” (Arendt, 1958: 32). Arendt also points out that this 
kind of equality presupposes the existence of “unequals” who are outside of the 
realm of acting equals. Here, she turns to her original separation between human 
capacity for political organization that is based on communal order of existence 
(koinon) and home (oikia) and the family. Arendt (1958: 32) argues that the 
household and the concepts of life and necessity as its connotations are at the centre 
of “the strictest inequality”. Men can only be equal as citizens when they step out 
from their home and enter the public sphere of their peers as citizens. In addition to 
the concept of equality, exclusion of private household life from the political life 
becomes condition for the political to be actualized.  
 
7.3.2.2 Freedom, Reality and the Public Sphere: What the political constitutes 
After indicating the conditions for the political to emerge, it is crucial to look 
into what the political constitute in the moment of performance. The first concept in 
Arendt‟s theory that is constituted by or attained through political action is the 
concept of freedom. As it is stated in Chapter 2, raison d’étre for politics is the 
attainment of freedom. Freedom could only be experienced mundanely among acting 
plurality of equals. To begin something new, to take initiative among equals, to set 
something into motion, i.e. to act, is the only way for us to be free. This is why 
Arendt (1958: 177) states that “principle of freedom was created when man was 
created but not before” as it is the beginning of somebody, who emerge as the 
beginner himself. Acting as and becoming a free actor also creates another 
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phenomenon: reality. Reality is another concept that is constituted through action and 
emerges as a consequence of the political. In chapter 4, it is indicated that Arendt, in 
her conceptualization of the public space of acting equal citizens, emphasizes that 
anything that appears in the public in question is seen and heard by others. Arendt 
(1958: 208) argues that “without a space of appearance and without trusting in action 
and speech as a mode of being together, neither the reality one‟s self, of one‟s 
identity, nor the reality of the surrounding world can be established beyond doubt.” 
Reality emerges as a consequence of acting together in a specific space of the public. 
The public space in question is the last constituted element in Arendt‟s 
conceptualization of the political. The relation between the public and the political in 
Arendt is usually thought as simple: Political could only emerge within the confines 
of the public. Essentially, the proper space for the political is the public. This clear-
cut relationship between the public and the political stems from the dichotomous 
fixed nature of Arendt‟s thinking. As already stated in The Human Condition Arendt 
conceptualizes the public through differentiating it from the nature-bounded private 
space of necessity and labor. This dichotomy of the public versus the private 
corresponds to the distinction between the political and the household in ancient city 
state (Arendt, 1958: 28). The political could exist only within the public, which is 
constituted by the actions of equal citizens, who had actually distinguished 
themselves from all others by showing unique deeds and achievements (Arendt, 
1958: 41). The function of this public sphere is to “throw light on the affairs of men 
by providing a space of appearances in which they can show in deed and word, for 
better and worse, who they are and what they can do…”. (Arendt, 1995: viii).  
Although, the relationship between the public and the political is clear at this 
point, how the public is constituted by the political and the action is problematic. 
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This is why Arendt has different conceptions of the public at the beginning and at the 
end of The Human Condition. In Chapter Two of The Human Condition, “The Public 
and the Private Realm” Arendt depicts the public as a physical instituted space that is 
already there for the political to rise. However, in Chapter Five, “Action”, she argues 
that “the political realm rises directly out of acting together, the “sharing of words 
and deeds”. Thus, action not only has the most intimate relationship to the public part 
of the world common to us all, but is the one activity which constitutes it.” (Arendt, 
1958:198). This kind of conception of the public supports my point on the 
constitutive character of the political in terms of performance of an action. 
In fact, Arendt‟s different conceptions of the public are also pointed out by 
other Arendtian writers. For instance, as already stated in Chapter 6, Jennifer Ring 
argues that Arendt‟s theory hosts a shift between a need for a permanent place for 
action to an intangible conception of power that emerges simultaneously when the 
actors act among themselves. Ring also states that in earlier parts of The Human 
Condition the public is a tangible, physical space of the polis. Later in the book, the 
public is created and constituted by the political action itself (Ring, 1991: 439-441). 
Ring argues that what lies beneath this shift is Arendt‟s search for a political public 
sphere for her alternative political actor, namely the pariah. Moreover, Blattler and 
Martin (2005) also discuss the intangible public in Arendt, which is totally different 
from the world created by action. They argue that plurality and freedom are the 
characteristics of the political in Arendt. An intangible space is created within this 
plurality. They indicate that Arendt calls it “„web‟ of human relationships” (Blattler 
and Martin, 2005: 93). Actually, the understanding of the public as an intangible 
space that is composed of web of human relationships and created by political action 
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is the conception, to which I refer to as one of the constituted elements in Arendt‟s 
theory on the political. 
To conclude, this section tries to give a clear account of what political is in 
Arendt. In summary, the political is synonymous with the concept of action and it 
has some conditions such as plurality, equality and exclusion of necessity. Moreover, 
the political in Arendt is a constitutive concept as it constitutes reality, freedom and 
the public sphere concurrently. In political‟s relation to the public, it is interesting to 
find out that the predetermined bond between the public and political in mainstream 
understanding of the term that necessitates a tangible public sphere for the political to 
emerge can be questioned. If we look at different instances and different contexts, the 
predetermined relationship is broken and the public space becomes a constituted 
element rather than a pre-requisite for the political. Demonstrating that the 
predetermined relationship in question could be broken in different instances and 
contexts also shows the dynamic characteristics of the concept of the political in 
Arendt. Before concluding this chapter, it would be crucial to analyze how political‟s 
relation to public space is flexible and can vary if we read the political from a 
different position. This analysis would support the point that the concept of the 
political is dynamic and has many dimensions as it is related to other concepts such 
as the public in Arendt. 
 
7.4 The Political Within the Public: A Predetermined Relationship (?) 
Looking into the nature of the relationship between the political and the 
public space requires an analysis of the relationship between action and the public 
space. As is indicated action and the political could be thought as synonyms, because 
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“the essence of politics is action”, i.e. “politics is action” (Villa, 1996: 4). Therefore, 
in order to question the essentialist bond between the political and the public, we 
need to question the bond between action and the public space. To put the point of 
interrogation differently, we firstly need to question whether action could only take 
place within the confines of the predefined and predetermined public. 
With regard to the mentioned question Villa (1996: 28) raises an important 
point by arguing that “if action is… politics, not all politics is action.” Arendtian 
conception of action is what makes an event political in Arendtian sense. Villa 
(1996: 29) continues by saying that “[a]ny form of “politics” that replicates relations 
or functions appropriate to the household is unpolitical.” Here Villa is talking about 
intrusion of the coercive force of necessity into the realm of freedom. Moreover, 
Villa (1996: 29) adds that if the action is primarily purposive and defined by mean-
ends category again this particular kind of action is not political either. In fact, at this 
point, Villa points out the distinction between praxis (action) and poiesis (productive 
activity). What Arendt sees as action is in fact praxis and it is a self-contained 
activity. It has no higher aim than actualizing itself through performativity. 
Therefore, we could argue that deciding on whether some phenomenon is political or 
not has nothing to do with the question about in which domain it emerges. Instead, it 
is closely related with the nature of the action that assign the political character to the 
phenomenon in question. Any kind of activity that is determined by the force of 
necessity such as “domination, liberation, administration and representation” is not 
political at all. Their unpolitical or prepolitical character has nothing to do with 
whether they emerge within the polis (a predefined public sphere), but is related with 
the fact that they are not self-contained activities. They are not action.  And as for 
self-contained activity, namely action in Arendt‟s theory, we need to understand the 
  176 
concept of energia (actuality). Arendt argues that there is no end to be pursued. The 
end lies in the activity itself and the work of the activity is embedded in the very 
same activity. The work is the performance itself (Arendt, 1958: 206).  While acting 
you are performing and at the same time you are creating a work in itself. Action 
exists in the moment of its performance. As also pointed out by Keenan (1994: 306) 
“[t]rough action you create a tangible worldly entity, which is “embedded” in its own 
production- at once alive in its own right and yet entirely dependent on the moments 
of performance.” 
If we understand the political as “the creation of an intersubjectively shared 
life-world”, then it becomes obvious that action as the self contained activity makes 
this intersubjective shared world possible (Knauer, 1980: 732). Free and equal people 
create the shared world, which is the public space that contains their present and 
future engagement, within the very same moment of acting. As the space is 
constituted by action itself, the political and action do not need a predetermined 
public sphere such as polis. If you assign a political character to a specific sphere 
beforehand by arguing that the sphere in question should exclude any private or 
social concern, it would be ignoring the constitutive character of action. Moreover, 
one could not escape the criticism of making essentialist distinctions. The reason 
behind this is the fact that the very meaning of the political and its public character 
are determined by the nature and the self contained character of action.  
This kind of understanding of the political and the public would not 
necessarily destroy the crucial relationship between these two concepts. It, however, 
raises the possibility of rethinking the nature of this relationship by considering the 
public space as a space of „web‟ of relationships, which is constituted by action. This 
approach excludes thinking the public as an fixed, exclusive, predetermined space. 
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Therefore, the public becomes a constituted element and a result of plural political 
engagement. Co-existence of the public and the political in a specific context remains 
intact.   
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter tries to open up the uncharted territory of the political. As it is 
suggested, the concept of the political in Arendt is not a monolithic concept, but it 
has many dimensions. What could not be classified as political in one work of Arendt 
could be categorized as political in a different context that is covered in another 
work. Moreover, because of the interdefinitionality in Arendt‟s mode of thinking, it 
is difficult to have a clear account of the political. Arendt constantly refers to the 
political by relating it to other concepts. By examining different appearances of the 
political under different disguises and analyzing its dynamic relation with other 
concepts, this chapter tries to depict a clearer conception of the political in Arendt. 
As a consequence, I come up with an account of the political that is synonymous 
with the concept of action. It has some conditions such as plurality, equality and 
exclusion of necessity. Additionally, the political in Arendt is a constitutive concept 
as it constitutes reality, freedom and the public space concurrently. Conceived as 
such, it questions the predetermined relation between the political and the public. At 
the end, I infer that if the political is read as creating of shared world through acting 
and speaking in its constitutive capacity, the public is constituted in the very same 
moment of acting. Therefore, rather than taking the public character of a given 
phenomenon for granted, the moment of acting assigns the political character to that 
specific phenomenon. 
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This kind of understanding that is constructed and depicted in this chapter has 
further implications in a broader context. As is stated in the introduction part of this 
chapter, two previous chapters present the social as the third space, where the public 
and the private coincide. This specific social would provide the space for the political 
to be actualized under modern conditions. Within the hybrid space of sociability, 
private concerns of the modern times such as economic and social issues could be 
handled politically. This chapter not only considers the political in question as a 
dynamic concept. It also questions the predetermined relationship between the 
political and the public. In this interrogation, I argue that if the moment of acting 
would assign the political character to a specific phenomenon regardless of where it 
is situated, the political could be actualized in any space including a social one. What 
matters is performance. This clearly shows that being political does not necessitate 
the public as a predetermined sphere. In the moment of acting/performance, being 
political itself constitutes any kind of context or space as public. Thus, this chapter 
introduces the first step for elaborating on how the social as sociability could be 
combined with being political, i.e. how the political defined as creation of shared 
world through acting could exist within a social context that is defined as civil 
society and civic associations. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
THE POLITICAL WITHIN THE SOCIAL SPACE: REVIVAL OF 




 The previous chapter not only gives an analytical account of the concept of 
the political in Arendt, but also questions the predetermined relation between the 
political and the public. Its main argument is that if the political in Arendt is taken as 
a constitutive concept, which creates a common world for all human beings through 
acting and speaking, then the public is also constituted at the very same moment of 
acting. In this understanding instead of assuming the political as belonging to a pre-
defined public sphere, the moment of acting determines whether a phenomenon is 
political or not. 
This kind of reading of the political opens up a new ground for further 
discussion within a broader context. If the political character of a specific 
phenomenon is constructed in the moment of acting and performance, then any space 
that is essentially labeled as social could also host the political as long as it includes
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 acting and performance. Thus, it could be argued that the political could exist within 
a social space, in which the public and the private coincide.  
As it is stated in the previous chapter, political is a dynamic concept, which 
has many dimensions and appears under different disguises in different works of 
Arendt In fact, Arendt herself denotes the possibility of how the political could 
emerge within a social context of sociability when she presents different accounts of 
the political in her different works. In this context, two prominent works become 
important and relevant in terms of showing how Arendt herself presents the 
possibility of being political within a social context, and how an actor‟s experience 
could combine the public and the private at the same time. As it is stated in the 
previous chapters these two works are Men in Dark Times and Rahel Varnhagen: 
The Life of a Jewess. In both works, Arendt talks about exceptional times of the 
modern age, in which self interest and personal liberty ruled over the public realm. In 
these times, the public lost its character of being a sphere for disclosing and sharing 
different ideas. It was not open to all but a certain segment of the society. Therefore, 
the excluded one who became spaceless in terms of contributing the construction and 
maintenance of the „world‟, became obliged to retreat from the society‟s public. So, 
through a different type of intimate relationship that was performed outside the 
public of the society, excluded ones created their own public space in the context of 
sociability. It shows how an actor could survive outside the so-called public realm of 
the few and still could act politically within a space of sociability that is not 
predefined as public. Here the important point to note is that the public and political 
character could only be assigned after the performance and action of the actor. 
Moreover, even though it was outside the public sphere of the society, this 
experience of acting of the excluded pariah people is a political one. Being aware of 
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their private status of existence, they consciously stayed outside of the society and of 
the so-called light of the public sphere, in order to make other outsiders aware of 
their existence. This is a perfect depiction of how a private concern is acted upon, i.e. 
how a private concern becomes a public and political issue, in the experience of these 
pariah people. The social, which is experienced as sociability between these pariah 
people in the form of close intimate relationship, becomes a space of experience for 
their conscious political act. The political finds itself a space within a social 
experience. 
Within this context, this chapter aims to take a further step. Up to this point, it 
is argued that if the social is read as an affirmative third space in Arendt‟s thought, 
which is in fact a space of sociability experienced in civil society, and the political is 
seen as a dynamic and constitutive concept in her theory, then it becomes possible to 
assert that the political could survive within the social as a combined space of the 
private and the public. But the crucial and concluding question is whether this 
argument has something to say about contemporary political experience. To be more 
clear, if the social and the political are read in the specific way that this dissertation 
suggests, does this specific reading have more to say on how an ordinary citizen in a 
contemporary democracy experiences this co-existence of the social and the political. 
With regard to that question, it is time to elaborate on the contemporary citizen‟s 
political experience in the social space of civil society from an Arendtian 
perspective. 
  The main motivation behind this inquiry and the inspiration for the preceding 
chapters are the fact that Arendt is not a systematic theorist. She did not write her 
thoughts systematically. When one has the feeling of comprehending the critical 
concepts in her theory, one would be surprised by how this very same concept is 
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conceptualized differently in an entirely different context in her another work. This is 
what makes reading her work challenging. As is stated in Chapter 1, the reason 
behind this challenge is multi-dimensionality in her thinking. There are different 
facets of her critical concepts. By pointing out this multi-dimensionality, the 
concepts of the social and the political are substantiated in the preceding chapters. 
The social is already depicted as a civic associational space, in which the political 
action could flourish. As a complementary one, this chapter aims to elaborate on this 
co-existence by trying to read civil society as a space of experience for the political 
from an Arendtian perspective. 
  This attempt should not be read as a redefinition of politics in Arendt‟s theory 
or her vision of politics. It is not a challenge to her conception of civil society either. 
It is rather my attempt to relate a particular reading of Arendt to one of the 
contemporary issues/contexts, namely civil society. This attempt of reading Arendt 
in a particular way and relating this reading to a contemporary and general issue is a 
characteristic trade mark of some of the secondary literature on Arendt‟s works. 
Some Arendtian feminist scholars relate Arendt‟s theory to feminism and social 
identity issues. Despite the general idea that Arendt is gender blind in her theory, as 
the concepts of gender, sexuality and the body are out of the concern of political 
sphere (Honig, 1995: 1), these scholars in their unique readings carry “Arendt to 
feminism as a political movement, or …[bring] feminism as an “identity politics” to 
Arendt…” (Dietz, 1995: 20). For instance, Bonnie Honig (1995) through a careful 
reading of the concept of action in Arendt provides us with a new type of feminism, 
namely agonistic feminism. Additionally, Moruzzi (2000) makes a different reading 
of Arendt through employing the theory of agency as masquerade. Moruzzi (2000: 3) 
argues that “if social identity can be understood as artifice, self-conscious enactment 
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of a social role can be a specific aspect of political agency.” Therefore, she 
introduces us a “plural politics of enacted social identity” in the context of Arendtian 
politics. (Moruzzi, 2000: 154). This specific reading allows a negotiation between 
the political and the social. 
These works have inspired me to present my own reading of Arendt of the 
concepts of the social and the political in particular and the public and the private 
dichotomy in general. I argue that the concept of the social in Arendt‟s theory 
challenges the strict separating line between the public and the private. A particular 
reading of the social as civil society leaves us with an alternative third space in 
Arendt, in which the political could be performed through action and participation in 
the context of plurality. This reading of civil society as a space of experience through 
Arendt‟s vision of politics would offer a perspective to critically reflect on how an 
ordinary citizen experiences contemporary politics. 
 
8.2 Setting the Analytical Frame: Arendt and the Idea of Civil Society 
Reading Arendt in the context of civil society is a challenging task. The reason 
behind this challenge is the general assumption that civil society is thought to be 
one of the cursed concepts if one is dealing with Arendt‟s political theory. This is 
why Cohen and Arato (1992: 177) see Arendt as one of the most passionate 
critiques of modern civil society. Although there is no comprehensive work of 
Arendt on the concept of civil society that depicts her uneasiness with the term, 
most of the evaluations on Arendt‟s critique of this concept are based on her 
critique of the modern society, i.e. the social. The civil society occupies an 
intermediate space in the context of the public versus private dichotomy. Just like 
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the concept of the social, or as an extension of the social, civil society could be 
easily seen as inappropriate for being political in Arendt‟s theory. 
This inappropriateness is reinforced by a dominant understanding of civil 
society in the literature. Beginning with Hegel, civil society is associated with the 
emergence of market economy that created its own bourgeois society. This 
bourgeois society (civil society) is different from the political world of the public 
and the private concerns of the household. It is an intermediary sphere between the 
private individual and the state. Beside its hybrid character, Arendt would also 
criticize civil society‟s existential relation to market economy. This dominant 
conceptualization of the civil society would render my particular reading to a 
difficult position in terms of relating Arendt to the political experience in 
contemporary civil society. It would seem as if I am relating Arendt‟s vision of 
politics to an area that is already ruled out as nonpolitical. In dealing with this 
difficulty, I point out a specific reading of the social in Arendt‟s theory, which is an 
intermediate space that includes political action. This specific reading of the social 
is compatible with the idea of civil society, in which Arendtian participatory 
politics could be realized.  
Moreover, as it is indicated above, the dominant understanding of civil society 
underlines the separation between the state, the society and the individual. It is well 
known that Arendt does not usually touch upon the modern constitutional state in 
most of her works. When she refers to the modern idea of state as a concept, she 
does it for depicting the failures and weaknesses of modern European nation state. 
(Arendt, 1966). Therefore, the absurd point is that, as the literature on civil society 
necessitates a differentiation between the state and the society in particular, I seem 
to suggest a differentiation between two phenomena in Arendt‟s theory while one 
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of them is in fact missing. We have the civil society as the social, but we do not 
have a concept of the state as a functional entity that exerts authority and coercive 
power when it is necessary. Different from this conception of the state, in Arendt‟s 
theory a new model of the state is presented: the council-state system. 
At this point, what I am suggesting is that although the literature makes a 
differentiation between the state and civil society, when it comes to Arendt and her 
theory, we do not need this distinction. This point will be clarified in the following 
paragraphs as I clarify what council state is in Arendt. However, what I want to 
assert is that we should read the state as in the council state system, and civil 
society together, because I am reading Arendt not in the traditional context of state-
civil society distinction, but in the context of Arendt‟s new model of the state that is 
based on action, plurality, and participation in terms of political experience. 
 
8.2.1 The Council-State System as a new Model of the State: A Fertile Ground 
for Civil Society to Flourish 
In this section, I will present Arendt‟s vision of council-state system as a new 
model of the state. As it is argued above, this new model of the state provides a fresh 
and fertile ground for civil society, in which actors experience political life. This new 
model of the state is based on action, plurality and participation that also summarize 
Arendt‟s vision of participatory politics and democracy. Arendt clearly indicates her 
thought on these matters in Crisis of the Republic (1972) where she explains her idea 
of the council-state system as an alternative to modern nation state bureaucracy. In 
this book Arendt (1972: 232-233) makes her point as follows: 
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We want to participate, we want to debate, we want to make our 
voices heard in public, and we want to have a possibility to determine 
the political course of country. Since the country is too big for all of 
us to come together and determine our fate, we need a number of 
public spaces within it. The booth in which we deposit our ballots is 
unquestionably too small, for this booth has room for only one. The 
parties are completely unsuitable; there we are, most of us, nothing 
but the manipulated electorate. But if only ten of us are sitting around 
a table, each expressing his opinion, each hearing the opinions of 
others, then a rational formation of opinion can take place through the 
exchange of opinions. There, too, it will become clear which one of us 
is best suited to present our view before the next higher council, where 
in turn our view will be clarified through the influence of other views, 
revised, or proved wrong.  
In this lengthy passage, it is clear that Arendt‟s vision of politics is based on 
participation through deliberation at the grassroots level. The participators have a 
voice on and power over the political decisions that shape their future. The exchange 
of opinions takes place in a council that presents deliberated opinion to a higher one. 
Canovan (1999: 103) thinks that this type of future polity is the result of Arendt‟s 
belief on the decline of the nation-state. Arendt is talking about “a new federal 
system generated at the grassroots.” (Canovan, 1999: 114). Along with the same line, 
Isaac (1994: 156, 157) argues that Arendt defends a distinctive conception of grass-
roots democracy that is based on contestable public concern.  
In terms of membership and participation in this public debate of common 
concern Arendt (1972: 233) says: 
By no means every resident of a country needs to be a member in such 
councils. Not everyone wants to concern himself with public affairs. 
In this fashion a self-selective process is possible that would draw 
together a true political elite in a country. Anyone who is not 
interested in public affairs will simply have to be satisfied with their 
being decided without him. But each person must be given the 
opportunity. 
At this point, Arendt emphasizes the voluntary character of her vision of 
participatory politics. She depicts the self-selective political actor of her idea of 
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political life par excellence. This political actor is the citizen; s/he is the member of 
the mentioned civic/political association that is composed of her/his equals. In 
secondary literature these citizens sometimes are called “the collective people in 
action” (Canovan, 2002: 413), and sometimes they are depicted as “elites” (Isaac 
1994). With regard to later naming/classification, one should be careful about 
considering Arendt as an elitist theorist. As Isaac (1994: 158) puts it, Arendt‟s elites 
are “self-selected” and “self-constituted”. She is basically talking about voluntary 
participation, and the common concern in this participation process is caring about 
„the world‟ that they share as equal and distinctive members. The common concern, 
which brings them together, is to constitute, preserve and maintain the world that is 
constructed through their action. No one is excluded as long as they want to 
participate. 
After depicting her idea of the participatory actor of her idea of future polity, she 
clearly says that this presents us a new concept of the state. Arendt (1972: 233) 
continues: 
In this direction I see the possibility of forming a new concept of the 
state. A council-state of this sort, to which the principle of sovereignty 
would be wholly alien, would be admirably suited to federations of the 
most various kinds, especially because in it power would be 
constituted horizontally and not vertically. But if you ask me now 
what prospect it has of being realized, then I must say to you: Very 
slight, if at all. And yet perhaps, after all- in the wake of the next 
revolution. 
In this quotation, beside the importance of Arendt‟s declaration that hers is a new 
concept of the state, whose principle has nothing to do with totalizing idea of 
sovereignty, and whose power is constituted horizontally among various councils, 
the last sentence is also equally important. In this sentence, Arendt explicitly states 
her view that the actual political experience has been experienced in „real‟ 
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revolutions. This idea obliges us to turn to one of the most important works of her 
political thought, namely On Revolution. Throughout the dissertation this work of 
Arendt is referred several times. In these references, it is argued that in this work, 
Arendt tries to resituate the concept of freedom into the vocabulary of revolution, 
which becomes a composing phenomenon for the 20
th
 century. With respect to that 
she re-examines the historical facts of the two great revolutions of the 20
th
 century: 
French and American Revolutions. There is no doubt that the revolution she is 
talking about in the above- quoted part from The Crisis of the Republic refers to the 
latter. The wakening moment of the American Revolution in its capacity to constitute 
new institution based on mutual promises corresponds to Arendt‟s idea of political 
action based on voluntary association. As Canovan puts it, at this point, Arendt deals 
with power constructed when people act together in revolutionary moments. 
According to Canovan (1999: 109), Arendt basically refers to “the action in concert 
of many small grassroots communities, linked into a federal structure.” What matters 
most in these grassroots communities is the capacity of people that constitutes it. It is 
the capacity of constructing and maintaining the institution of common shared world. 
The materialization of this institutionalization process could be found in the act of 
constitution making, which is thought as “the true culmination of … revolutionary 
process” by Arendt (1990: 142). This capacity to found and institutionalize is based 
on mutual promises of these subjects/citizens. 
 
8.2.2 Secondary Literature: Arendt and Civil Society 
These ideas of a new concept of council state system and the political character 
of constitutive foundation moment in revolutions lead many Arendt scholars to 
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search for the ways in which her ideas could be adopted into contemporary 
democratic system. They are somehow left with a simple question: How an ordinary 
citizen in a democratic system of government could experience political life par 
excellence in Arendtian terms? This question explains their endeavor of relating her 
ideas to contemporary discussions of civil society. One of the reasons behind this 
endeavor could be Baker‟s (2001) observation that the rhetoric of self-government is 
in rise on the political agenda. According to Baker (2001: 59) call for “„build[ing] 
civil society‟, „creat[ing] active citizenship‟, „empower[ing] communities‟, or 
„widen[ing] political participation‟ are growing day by day.” This rising trend is 
closely related to the category of civil society. As Arendt is seen as one of the 
prominent thinkers of the idea of self government, it becomes easier to understand 
why many scholars try to situate her political thought within the discussion on civil 
society.  
 In relation to these discussions, Wellmer argues that her idea of politics as the 
joint action of free and equal citizens could find a proper place within today‟s 
democracies. However, this could only be possible in the context of democratic civil 
society. The society in question is different from the political society, whose main 
function is to conduct policies, state and private lives of individuals. Wellmer (2007: 
224) states: 
I therefore take her idea of the council system to be a metaphor for a 
network of autonomous or partially autonomous institutions, 
organizations, and associations, in each of which something like the 
self-government of free and equal participants takes place-in each case 
in different ways, with different aims, and with different means for 
recruiting new members: a network whose units might be both 
horizontally and vertically connected, related to or dependent upon 
one another. 
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At this point the general idea he refers to is Arendt‟s idea of experience of 
freedom within the political space through participation in the name of common 
concerns. At times, this idea of participatory active political citizen within civil 
society is seen so compatible with Arendtian theory, that scholars like Brunkhorst 
(2007: 190) does not hesitate to argue as follows: “The egalitarian potential for 
initiatory action turns out to be the origin of the peculiarly non-violent power 
wielded by ordinary citizens (the “people”) in civil society.” It seems that Wellmer 
and Brunkhorst use the concept of civil society without separating it essentially from 
council-state idea in particular or politics in general. Although they have such a 
stance, which is compatible with my suggestion that one should read the new model 
of the state and civil society in Arendt together, they do not do this through 
questioning Arendt‟s core distinctions. Additionally, any detailed interrogation on 
literature‟s separation between the civil society and the state is missing.  
 Dismissing Arendt‟s core distinction of spheres of life as public, private and 
social, or not elaborating on them carefully before engaging a discussion on Arendt‟s 
vision of participatory politics and democracy in relation to civil society, causes 
problems. Wellmer and Brunkhorts refers to civil society as they both see the 
political questions of contemporary world as the common concerns of people, which 
also include the social issues. However, as it is stated at the beginning of this chapter, 
conventional literature on Arendt, which keeps the strict separation between the 
public and the private intact, argues that Arendt would oppose any kind of 
conception of civil society that is trapped between the public and the private. So, it 
could be argued that any conception of civil society that includes social issues and 
common concerns of people, as of Wellmer and Brunkhorst, is not compatible with 
Arendt‟s vision of politics and democracy. In order to avoid such criticisms, firstly, 
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one should substantiate the concept of social and, secondly, set an analytical frame 
that elaborates on the relationship between the state and the civil society.  
 Elaborating on contemporary civil society through Arendt‟s vision of politics 
is not difficult just because of the reason mentioned above. Additionally, within the 
same line, Canovan (2002: 403) says “…while … [Arendt] welcomed direct action 
by people, she also feared and deplored almost all actual cases of grassroot 
mobilization…” that intends any higher aim than establishing a new political 
„world‟. 
This is mainly related with the fact that in Arendt, there is no higher goal than 
the politics. Acting in the public sphere is freedom par excellence that actualizes the 
human potential. Speech and action are the components of the political. Action is 
contingent, spontaneous, and creative. It has a beginning but not a definable definite 
end. One could not talk about any particular interest or intention of any sort in the 
context of action. It becomes hard to talk about common concerns or interests that 
would motivate people to act in concert. So, one should be careful about elaborating 
on civil society in modern democracies while employing Arendt‟s vision of politics. 
Beside these difficulties, there are Arendtian scholars, who find a way to refer to 
civil society while discussing Arendt‟s idea of participatory politics. One way to do 
that is to associate Arendt with republicanism. For instance, Baker (2001: 61) argues 
that Arendt is a member of republican body of thought on civil society, which 
considers the sphere of civil society “as a democratic end in itself.” This idea is not 
far from Arendt‟s idea of politics for the sake of politics and freedom. Along with 
same lines, Isaac also argues that Arendt‟s discussions are conceptually related to the 
idea of civil society. Isaac (1994: 156) states that Arendt‟s idea of “insurgent politics, 
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rooted in civil society,” is not an alternative to state power. According to Isaac 
(1994: 159-160) Arendt is talking about “pluralization of political space” by, for 
instance, decentralization of political authority in terms of governance. In addition, 
Cohen and Arato (1992: 191) argues that Arendt‟s appreciation of the idea of 
revolution, such as American Revolution, in terms of “the self-constitution of “civil 
bodies politic”” is directly related to her revival of “the ideal of civil society as 
politike koinonia”. This idea of civil society consists of politically active citizens 
who have the power to shape their present and future. Therefore, it is still possible to 
argue that Arendtian vision of politics could make its revival in the context of active 
participation in civil society. The following section elaborates on this co-existence of 
the social context of civil society and the political engagement. Civil society is not a 
hollow concept. It has its own literature that defines and substantiates it. It is already 
loaded with specific characteristics and conditions. Keeping this in mind, I try to read 
the civil society in question as a space of experience, in which action, plurality, and 
participation is experienced. This is not a new conceptualization of civil society in 
Arendtian terms, but an elaboration on it by using theoretical tools provided by 
Arendt‟s theory of politics.    
 
8.3 Reading Civil Society as a Space of Experience Through Arendt’s Vision of 
Politics 
The above mentioned inquiry is partly the result of the fact that there is no 
single definition of the civil society. In the literature on what civil society is and is 
not or which ones are the civil society organizations and are not are still controversial 
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issues. There is even an attempt of differentiating civil society from an uncivil one 
(Kopecký and Mudde: 2003).  
 Within this controversial framework, civil society is usually referred as an 
intermediate “realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, 
(largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or 
set of shared rules.” (Diamond, 1994: 5) This intermediate realm is thought to be 
populated by members of society, who constitute diverse organizations in order to 
advance their concerns and interests (Encarnación, 2001: 56). 
In this broader context of civil society, the important point for my analysis is to 
pursue a conceptualization of civil society in modern democracies that would be 
compatible with Arendt‟s understanding of politics, and her alternative conception of 
council-state system. In this regard, I argue that one could develop an idea of civil 
society as a space of sociability that could act as the political sphere in Arendt. In 
fact, Benhabib (1995: 20) also argues that revitalization of political life of public 
sphere could only be possible in civic and associational society, but she does not 
state what she understands from civil society. Moreover, Benhabib does not make a 
further elaboration on how Arendtian politics could co-exist and be experienced in 
that civic and associational society. With respect to that, I argue that the concept of 
civil society, which could be conceptualized and elaborated through Arendtian vision 
of politics would be a buffer zone between the political society and the state on the 
one hand and the private individuals on the other. It is composed of voluntary 
associations that are institutionalized by the voluntary engagement of active citizens. 
It rests on the active participation with regard to common concerns of these citizens. 
Their action would directly contribute to the policy making. This kind of 
understanding of civil society has its own extant literature. In developing this 
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understanding of civil society, which has a distinct tradition of its own, I benefited 
from my joint research with Heper (2011). In this work we refer to main 
impediments to, pre-requisites, and characteristics of the kind of civil society as a 
social entity within an already consolidated democracy that contributes to policy 
making. The following review is based on our research findings.  
 
8.3.1 Different Civil Societies 
With regard to the literature in question on civil society, Michael W. Foley and 
Bob Edwards (1996) make a clear distinction between two different conceptions of 
civil society. According to Foley and Edwards (1996: 39), the first conception of the 
civil society underlines “the positive effects of association for governance”. They 
argue that this conception is depicted by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in 
America and contributed by Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and Francis Hutcheson. 
Their approach emphasizes “the ability of associational life in general and the habits 
of association in particular to foster patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a 
democratic polity.” (Foley and Edwards, 1996: 39). Foley and Edwards (1996: 39) 
calls this conception “Civil Society I”. In addition to this conception, the grassroots 
resistance movements in post-communist Eastern Europe countries and 
“redemocratization” process in Latin America inspired the second conception of the 
civil society, which is also the most common in the literature. According to this view, 
civil society is “a sphere of action that is independent of the state and that is capable-
precisely for this reason-of energizing resistance to a tyrannical regime.”, which can 
be named as “Civil Society II” (Foley and Edwards, 1996: 39).   
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The latter conception is thought to be more widespread within the literature 
because of the accepted essential link between existence of a vibrant civil society and 
democratization. This understanding of civil society is seen as a vital prerequisite for 
getting rid of an authoritarian system of government. However, as it is stated 
Arendtian conception of politics is plural and participatory that is based on 
contingent, spontaneous, and creative action. The main purpose of Arendtian politics 
is to constitute, but most importantly to preserve a common world in which acting 
and at the same time freedom are guaranteed. Although Arendt gives special 
importance to the founding moment of a new body politic, she also insists on 
preservation of that founding moment of action. She does not ask for a single 
founding moment but continuous founding moments within the political experience 
of that body politic. In this respect, Arendt‟s conception of politics would have much 
more to say on former conception of civil society, in which citizens of „a more or less 
consolidated democracy‟ act in their capacity of contributing to policy formation.  
If one looks through the primary characteristics of civil society in question that is 
stated in the literature, one sees that it has Arendtian elements in it. Although Arendt 
is not referred in the literature of such type of civil society, her vision of participatory 
politics has something to say on this kind of civil society, which is composed of 
voluntary associations that are institutionalized by the voluntary engagement of 
active citizens. The following section tries to read „Civil Society I‟ as a space of 
experience, in which important elements of Arendtian vision of politics could be 
found.  
 
8.3.2 Civil Society as a Space of Experience for Arendtian Politics 
  196 
As it is already indicated in Chapter 7, one of the conditions of the political in 
Arendt is the condition of plurality. When it comes to sharing and interaction of 
different views and ideas in the form of disclosing, this condition of plurality 
becomes the basic condition of action and politics. In Arendt‟s (1958: 7) own words 
“…this plurality is specifically the condition- not only condition sine qua non, but 
the condition per quam- of all political life. Political bodies could be founded and 
preserved within the equality and plurality of citizens. As Arendt (1972: 233) 
indicates in The Crises of Republic citizens would sit around a table for expressing 
their own opinions, and at the same time for hearing the others‟.  
This kind of understanding based on plurality of opinions is also central to the 
idea of civil society in question. The literature on civil society emphasizes plurality 
of opinions and differences between them. These differences appear in the form of 
disagreement and conflict. In fact, civil society is a place for conflict. At this point, 
the nature of the disagreement is a friendly one as the members of civil society are 
expected to reach some sort of solutions and conclusions with regard to their present 
concerns.  
Nevertheless, arguing that the pluralism principle in civil society and Arendt‟s 
idea of plurality are referring exactly the same thing would be dismissing Arendt‟s 
originality on this issue. It is true that civil society is seen as a problem solving area 
that facilitates reaching the optimum interest in the literature. Although Arendt 
appreciates the condition of plurality for its capacity to offer different perspectives, 
she is not interested in reaching the most beneficial solution that serves the best 
interest for all. What her concerns is to provide reality to the action itself with the 
presence of others. This understanding of plurality as a condition of action transcends 
any pragmatic end that could be sought in the civil society. However, taking Arendt‟s 
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condition of plurality as the condition for civil society in question in the first place 
would not challenge the pluralism idea in the civil society literature. Plurality in 
Arendtian terms would provide the needed enriching perspective for the civil society. 
This is actually why Arendt makes citizens sit around a table to express their 
opinions and hear other‟s views. Discussions on concerns and/or interest would 
eventually be solved within the atmosphere that would be created by the condition of 
plurality.  
Reaching some sort of solutions and conclusion with regard to friendly 
disagreement between the members of civil society is in fact reaching consensus 
between the members of civil society in the context of debate and dialogue. With 
regard to civil society, “dialogue rather than the imposition of certain views upon 
others is the name of the game” (Heper and Yıldırım, 2011: 4). In this context of 
debate and dialogue, Arendt has a point about reaching consensus. She is saying that 
while we are disclosing our own views and listening the views of other people “a 
rational formation of opinion can take place through the exchange of opinions. 
There, too, it will become clear which one of us is best suited to present our view 
before the next higher council, where in turn our view will be clarified through the 
influence of other views, revised, or proved wrong” (Arendt, 1972: 232). People 
share their ideas with each other. This is not a purposeless and endless activity. At 
the end they reach a consensus. In Arendtian terms, the consensus in question is the 
formed opinion. Consensus in Arendt‟s theory is something a result of performance. 
It is the product of speaking, disclosing, listening, approving or disapproving. In 
short, it is the product of action. Within the civil society people would make their 
points through speaking and disclosing. They would form their opinion and their 
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view would be shared with others. By this way, they would experience becoming a 
part of policy formation. They would experience being political. 
 Last but not least, performative characteristic of consensus in Arendtian terms 
leaves us with another important characteristic of civil society in the literature, 
namely the formation of common good. If plurality of actors is expected to reach 
consensus, they would need a common cause or common concern that would 
motivate their participation in the process. In other words, if the members of civil 
society are expected to reach a consensus on specific issue, one should talk about an 
idea of common good that would bring them together. This idea of common good 
could diverge in specific time and place; therefore, it necessitates a dynamic 
conception of consensus. As indicated by Walzer (1992: 98) and Shils (1997: 346) 
this conception of common good needs a future orientation. What is good for a 
specific society in specific time may not be good for that society in the future. 
Therefore, the idea of common good should harmonize the particular interest of that 
specific time with the general care for future generations. 
The problem with this idea of common good is that one‟s particular interest in 
that specific time would override any future concern. Additionally, as the term 
common good is a vague one, vulnerable to being exploited as a means for 
totalitarian tendencies as in the rhetoric of „national interest‟ or „general will‟, 
Arendt‟s critical outlook would be most useful to offset possible misunderstandings. 
In Arendt‟s conception of politics, there could not be any higher aim or interest other 
than politics itself. As it is indicated before, the idea of politics is based on the 
engagement of active and voluntary citizens. It relies on the active participation of 
each member in accordance with their common concern. However, if a specific idea 
of common good is presented in a specific society, it would offer a concrete purpose 
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and end. Acting for the sake of fulfilling that purpose, reaching that specific end 
would overrule acting for the sake of being political. In addition, presenting a 
specific common good could result in ignoring diverse opinions of different members 
of the society who could have various concerns and interests. Ignoring this diversity 
would make us see everybody as a part of one single common interest, and this 
would sound too totalitarian for Arendt.  
Nevertheless, Arendt underlines the importance of communication between the 
citizens. According to Arendt (1993: 164), if each citizen would think only his own 
thoughts, we would face with a tyranny. She underlines sharing of ideas. As it is 
already stated with regard to the idea of consensus, Arendt sees formation of an 
opinion as the result of this sharing. The question is what makes these people come 
together and sit around a table. There should be a common concern for all of them to 
agree on coming together. This inquiry leads me to look into the possibility of 
reconciling the idea of common good in civil society literature and Arendt‟s vision of 
politics. This reconciliation attempt could be realized in two levels: common good in 
general and common good in particular. Firstly, for Arendt, in the context of politics, 
there is a general and higher concern. This is the respect for and maintenance of the 
„world‟, which is objectively created by action. All acting citizens have this common 
concern of preserving and maintaining the „world‟. (Arendt, 1993: 186, 189). This is 
the driving force behind their togetherness. This is what makes them sit around a 
table and discuss their ideas with each other. This could be called common good for 
all citizens in general. 
Secondly, elaborating on common good in particular in the context of Arendt‟s 
vision of politics would be much more challenging. Critiques argue that Arendt‟s 
  200 
idea of politics and action has nothing to do with the issues of the real world.
16
 Any 
concern, aim, or motivation with regard to one‟s present interest would be 
detrimental to Arendt‟s idea of politics and action. One‟s particular interest cannot 
play any role as the motivation for action, because Arendtian action could not be 
evaluated within means-ends category. As the action has a beginning but not a 
presumed end, presenting a particular common good as a desired end becomes 
problematic. At this point, we could employ a different lens to see this problem. This 
different point of view is offered by Knauer (1980). He basically argues that in 
Arendt meaning of action transcends any motive or goal. Knauer (1980: 729) accepts 
that in Arendt we could not evaluate an action in a means and ends framework. 
However, action‟s characteristic of not having any predefined end does not 
automatically mean that the actor has not got any motive or goal while he or she acts. 
As Knauer puts it, in Arendt‟s theory, the meaning of the action could be understood 
in the framework of a general principle such as „greatness‟. The action is evaluated 
on the basis of whether it is great or not. The motives and goals do not affect its 
greatness and play no part in its evaluation. Besides this, being transcended by the 
general principle of greatness would not destroy the already existing motive and 
goal. Knauer (1980: 725) says:  
The particular ends of action are always transcended by the general 
principles which give them significance and meaning. Insofar as a 
universal principle is manifested in a particular act, it becomes 
possible to judge that act in terms of what Arendt calls the 
“greatness” of the act that is the greatness of the manifestation of 
principle.  
In this respect, any specific actor in the civil society could have any kind of 
motive and goal that could overlap with motives and goals with other members of 
                                                          
16
 For critiques see Pitkin (1998); Habermas (1977); Heller (1991). 
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that particular civil society. This could be their common concern or common good in 
that specific moment. The greatness of their action that is motivated by this or that 
reason would not be determined by these goals but its performance. If we use the 
lenses that is offered by Knauer to look into the problem of a particular interest in 
Arendt‟s concept of action, we would not be limited by the perspective that identifies 
the motives and goals of the actor. Action continues to be evaluated on the basis of 
greatness principle, and any motive or goal of the actor need not to be ruled out. 
Seeing the situation from that point of view provides us with the insight that there 
could also be a common good in particular in Arendt‟s vision of politics experienced 
in civil society. This common good in particular is a contingent one in terms of time 
and space and should be defined as the common good of the people as they 
themselves see it at a given time and space. It would be reached through debate and 
discussion. It could be their driving force for engaging in any action in civil society. 
It would not be decisive in evaluation of whether their action is great or not. In a civil 
society, in which Arendtian politics is performed through active participation on the 
side of the members, the members would reconcile general concern for the „world‟ 
with their particular contingent interest. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
My attempt to elaborate on how Arendt‟s vision of politics could be 
experienced in civil society that is based on active participation of members of 
voluntary associations poses some challenging questions. Although, some Arendtian 
scholars like Benhabib see the future of Arendtian politics in the civil society, she 
does not explain how this co-existence of a particular understanding of politics and 
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specific type of social could co-exist. The primary challenge is first to accept that, on 
the one hand, civil society is seen as a concept that is unwelcome in Arendt‟s theory 
on politics, and on the other hand, the concept of civil society has its own tradition 
accompanied by a particular literature on its own.  
In my attempt, I employ a specific reading of the terms social and political in 
Arendt‟s theory, which I substantiated in the preceding chapters. I argue that if we 
read the social in Arendt as sociability in terms of the quality of life in civil society 
and civic associations, we will end up with a third realm, in which modern political 
experience could take place in Arendtian terms. In this specific reading, the political 
is taken as a dynamic and constitutive concept. Such a reading of the political leads 
to a possibility to situate the political in the social, as a political space of sociability 
experienced in civil society.  
In relation to the concept of civil society, I point out different civil society 
conceptions that exist in the literature. In order to be clear and specific, I chose one 
of these conceptions of civil society that underlines abilities of active citizens in an 
associational life based on the idea of civility. In this specific society, the active 
citizens contribute to policy formation through engaging debate and dialogue. 
In this context, the absence of traditional conception of constitutional state in 
Arendt‟s theory could be seen problematic in the context of civil society-state 
relation. I argue that as Arendt does not deal with a conventional understanding of 
state and she has a conception of state of her own (council-state system), one does 
not need to differentiate the concept of state and civil society while reading the issue 
of civil society through Arendtian vision of politics. Instead of differentiating them, I 
suggest to read them together. Reading them together would not create a problem as I 
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am not reading Arendt‟s new model of state as council state in the context of 
traditional state-civil society distinction but in the context of her vision of politics 
based on action, plurality and participation. 
After setting this analytical frame, in the last section I point out parts of 
Arendt‟s theory of participatory politics that would have a say on the idea of civil 
society as a space of experience. While doing this, I do take into account the fact that 
the concept of civil society is already a loaded and substantiated concept. I put 
forward the primary characteristics of that civil society that would serve as a space of 
experience for plural, participatory, and consensual politics. By presenting how 
Arendtian politics could survive within the social space of civil society, I try to point 
out a contemporary political experience in Arendtian terms. In this experience 
political and social co-exist. Secondly, in relation to the concept of civil society, I 
offer an Arendtian perspective to critically reflect on how we experience politics 
within the space of contemporary civil society. 






 Arendt‟s theory is composed of dichotomies. Among these dichotomies, the 
public versus private dichotomy is important to note in so far as the boundaries of the 
political are drawn within the context of this dichotomy. Based on Arendt‟s method 
of telling stories of actual political events, in this dissertation I developed a method 
of my own, provisionally referred to as an interdefinitional approach, which, enabled 
me to analyze two concepts in Arendt‟s theory – work and the social - from within an 
unchartered territory in the secondary literature on Arendt‟s works. My main 
contention is two-fold: that these two concepts have in-between characteristics, 
within Arendt‟s primary distinction of the public and private spheres and that both 
concepts become significant in the context of Arendt‟s critical understanding of 
modernity.  
In her critique of modernity, Arendt complains about our loss of the 
commonly shared world, in which people act freely and become political. She is 
critical of our lost ability to act. In the modern world, attitudes of people change with 
regard to their relationship to the public life. Labor, rather than work and action, 
becomes valuable and the society turns into a society of laborers. Necessity rules 
over freedom in this society of laborers. Work and action are undermined by the 
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triumph of labor. At this point, work as an activity is valuable as it creates the 
common world, where action takes place. In this argument, labor is associated with 
the private realm of necessity and action is associated with public realm of freedom 
and politics. Work does not belong to any of these. It has an in-between character 
that transcends the dichotomy between the public and the private. It has 
commonalities and differences with labor and action respectively. In particular in the 
experience of working, the characteristics of each realm coincide. I identify the 
concept of work as one instance where the dichotomous thinking in Arendt‟s theory 
is surpassed leaving us with a particular loophole to examine the contingency of the 
public-private distinction. 
With regard to the social as the second conceptual context, I begin my inquiry 
by noting how Arendt is highly critical of the rise of the social as a modern 
phenomenon, because in modern world the core distinction between the public and 
the private disappears. Private concerns are dealt publicly. The private invades the 
public realm. As a result, each realm is ruined. With regard to the private realm in the 
modern world, what should be hidden is exposed to the light of the public. The 
private realm loses its confidentiality. In addition, the content of the public realm is 
subject to decay too. The realm of action, freedom, and the political is invaded by 
private, social, and economic concerns. In this respect, Arendt clearly presents the 
social as a hybrid space in which the public and private are combined. However, hers 
is a negative account of the social.  
At this point, I underline the importance of Arendt‟s multi-layered way of 
thinking by analyzing different conceptualizations of the term social in Arendt‟s 
different works. This unique analysis provides me with a positive account of the 
social in Arendt‟s theory where on the one hand the concept of social refers to 
  206 
intertwining of the public and the private, and on the other it refers to different, 
particular instances and processes in different historical contexts. Among these 
different layers of the social, I present the social as sociability in terms of the quality 
of life in civil society and civic associations as a positive account. This positive 
account of the social does not challenge Arendt‟s theory of politics, but rather it 
opens up an alternative space to analyze both the public and the private, in which the 
political could emerge and survive. I identify this particular positive account of the 
social in Arendt‟s theory as a loophole, which enables us to examine different 
accounts of the political experience. 
The general conclusion is that the concepts of work and the social as in-
between concepts can help us with a more flexible view to what is otherwise 
understood as the strict dichotomy between the public and the private in Arendt‟s 
theory. Moreover, I draw attention to certain implications of this particular 
understanding. The first implication of reading Arendt in a particular way is to be 
able to relate this particular reading to a contemporary issue namely the 
contemporary political experience of an ordinary citizen in the social space of civil 
society. The particular reading in question points out the instances of experience, in 
which the citizen could politically act within the sociability of civil society. 
In developing this argument, I employed a particular reading of the social in 
Arendt. I argue that the social in Arendt is among the most fruitful concepts, through 
which Arendt‟s multi-layered mode of thinking could be observed. With regard to 
this, I state that there are different facets of the social in Arendt. With the help of 
some works on Arendt, which also emphasize the multi-dimensionality in Arendt‟s 
theory, I present four different layers of the term social in Arendt‟s different works. 
The first layer of the social that one can observe in Arendt‟s works is the economic 
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social. Economic social refers to the intrusion of economic concerns into public 
affairs as a consequence of the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie. The second 
layer of the social is the biological one, which refers to the interference of 
bodily/biological needs into the public realm starting with the French Revolution. 
The third one is the social as the emergence of mass society that demands a 
conformist attitude from its members. The fourth layer of the social is sociability in 
terms of the quality of life in civil society and civic associations. This fourth layer of 
the social can be seen as a strategy of recovering the vitality of the public world by 
establishing different social relations of survival under the conditions of modernity. 
Among these different layers of the social in Arendt, the social as sociability 
is an affirmative conception in that the location of the social as a space of civic 
associations raises the possibility of including specific political experiences under 
specific conditions of modernity. In fact, in her different works, Arendt herself points 
out these specific experiences of political actors under certain conditions. As I argued 
in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, Arendt, in Men in Dark Times, draws our attention to the 
political experiences under conditions of modernity where the mass totalitarian 
movements expect nothing but conformity and exclude, even destroy, what is 
different. Arendt argues that in those dark times, public loses its function to lighten 
and speech loses its function to disclose. Self-interest and personal liberty invade the 
public realm. In those times, the shared world retreats to underground. The web of 
relationships is established through the intimacy of friendship. As Arendt also states 
in The Promise of the Politics (2005), through that friendship the „world‟ goes up in 
flames. These intimate relationships are what Arendt (2005: 202) calls the oases in a 
desert. In these oases of sociability, the political emerges through action and speech 
of pariah people, and it creates its own public space.  
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In this dissertation, the political experience of a pariah people in a societal 
context is also examined in one of Arendt‟s earliest works, Rahel Varnhagen. Rahel 
is a Jewish woman, who is one of the significant salon figures of the 18
th
 century 
Berlin. Rahel‟s story is important for this dissertation as it depicts the political 
experience of the 18
th
 century salon figure within the social space. In her life story, 
Rahel deals with her private identity of Jewishness in a political way. In addition, 
this work is also significant in understanding how Arendt writes the life story of that 
Jewish woman in a way that enables us to view the public and the private in a 
combined way. In so far as Arendt‟s story telling as her main method is concerned 
Rahel‟s story itself is the depiction of how the public and the private intertwine in the 
life story of a political figure. In this respect, Rahel is a true pariah as she 
consciously stays out of the world. She criticizes and rejects the conditions of that 
world. However, when one reads her whole story, one sees that there are times when 
Rahel also acts as a parvenu. Rahel as a parvenu employs private and personal 
strategies of assimilation in order to overcome her Jewishness. Moreover, there are 
times that Rahel experiences contradictions, in which she employs private and 
personal strategies reached through a pariah‟s insight. The important point to note 
here is Rahel experiences the public/political pariah identity and the private/personal 
parvenu identity at the same time. This combined experience in the context of public 
- private dichotomy does not prevent Arendt to see Rahel as a political actor, i.e. as a 
true pariah. It instead shows how the political could survive within the combined 
space of sociability. 
Inspired by Rahel‟s story, I argue that from these political experiences of 
private people within the social space of sociability one can begin to challenge the 
predetermined relationship between the public and the political in Arendt‟s theory. 
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As I argued throughout this dissertation the fixed relation between the concepts of 
action, freedom, the political, and the public not only limits our understanding of the 
political but also closes the space for inquiring particular political experiences of 
certain historical figures/actors within the social space of sociability. When we start 
questioning the predetermined character of the public and the political, we begin to 
imagine the existence of a possible contingent realm where these actors do not 
necessarily act within the confines of the already existing public space, but instead 
emerge as political actors from within the social space created by their intimate 
relations of sociability. This type of critical thinking leads me to look into the 
concept of the political in Arendt in a way which has not been discussed in the 
secondary literature on Arendt‟s works. 
As stated in Chapter 7, the political in Arendt is a plural, contingent, and 
unexpected phenomenon. The political is engaged by plurality of equal people, who 
acts through debate and deliberation for the sake of acting together. These people 
found something that has never existed before by words and deeds. When I look into 
this phenomenon of the political from the point, where the predetermined relation 
between the public and the political is broken, I come across with a dynamic 
conception of the political. In this particular conception, the political is synonymous 
with action and it emerges within the moment of performance of that action. It has 
conditions of plurality, equality and exclusion of necessity. It is also a constitutive 
concept, as within the moment of performance the political constitutes freedom, 
reality, and the public space simultaneously. The original perspective of my 
argument is that an understanding of the political as a constitutive concept does not 
require an assumed, predetermined existence of the public space, it instead creates its 
own particular boundaries at the moment of action.  
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The main implication of viewing the emergence of the political within the 
social space of sociability in Arendt‟s own works is to challenge the mainstream 
criticism that the social issues is excluded from the political agenda in Arendt‟s 
theory. Pointing out the particular instances, in which the political and the social can 
co-exist in Arendt‟s theory, leads to an argument that contemporary political 
experience of an ordinary citizen‟s concerns are a combination of the social and the 
political. The particular readings of the social as the realm of experience in civil 
society and, the political as both a constitutive and constituted concept, provides me 
with the possibility to examine how Arendtian conception of politics could be 
experienced within the civil society. 
With regard to this main claim, in Chapter 8, I read the civil society as a 
space of experience for Arendt‟s plural participatory conception of politics. While 
doing this reading, I point out that civil society is a complex concept in its own, 
because there is no consensus on what it really includes. I consider the civil society 
as a space composed of voluntary associations institutionalized by voluntary 
engagement of active citizens. I argue that such an associational space that 
contributes to policy formation is a hospitable space for action, plurality, and 
participation in Arendtian sense.  
In addition, I also underline the fact that this reading of civil society through 
Arendt‟s vision of politics as action and experience is not analyzed within the 
prevalent understanding of state-civil society relations. In most of Arendt‟s works 
there is no coherent conception of the state. In her elaboration on politics, freedom 
and action she offers the reader a new conception of the state. Hers is an idea of new 
council state system, in which power is horizontally directed, and each unit check 
and control the power of each other. In this new conception of the state, people 
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voluntarily participate in the course of policy making by creating their own public 
spaces. Because of these characteristics of the new model of the state, I suggest to 
read the civil society with this idea of council state system together. As some of the 
authors argue, it is difficult to put Arendt‟s theory and civil society in the same 
context. By taking this cautionary point into account I do not situate civil society in 
its conventional position with regard to the state. Instead, I approach Arendt‟s 
conception of plural and participatory politics as one instance which opens up the 
possibility of elaborating on the idea of civil society.  
In my reading of the civil society, I argue that Arendt‟s emphasis on plurality 
is important for the idea of civil society in terms of establishing the space for 
reaching a consensus. In the literature, civil society is a space for sharing and 
interaction of different views and ideas in the form of disclosing. It is a space for 
conflict and friendly disagreement, as the parties reach some sort of consensus at the 
end. I argue that Arendt‟s depiction of actors who sit around a table and express their 
own opinions provide the space for reaching consensus. For Arendt, consensus is not 
a vague term but the rational formation of opinion that emerges as a result of debate 
and deliberation. In addition, I argue that Arendt‟s conception of politics also 
substantiates the idea of common good in civil society literature as a motivation for 
coming together. Although in Arendt‟s theory there is no higher aim than coming 
together for the sake of acting in the context of politics, she elaborates on the 
motivation for coming together in two levels. Firstly, in Arendt‟s theory respect for 
the „world‟ that is preserved and maintained by action is a general motivating force 
for people to engage in political action. I argue that the respect for the common 
world could be thought as common good in general. Secondly, in Arendt‟s theory, an 
evaluation of action is based on the principle of greatness. The aims and concerns of 
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the actors have nothing to do with whether an action is great or not. This is why 
Arendt argues that the action could not be situated within a means-ends category. Its 
end could not be foreseen. At this point, I argue that one does not need to rule out the 
aims and concerns of the actors at the beginning and could accept their existence. 
One should simply accept that these aims and motivations have nothing to do with 
the greatness of the action. I state that if we employ such a perspective that does not 
deny the aims and motivations of the actors in civil society, we would end up with an 
idea of common good that is contingent. This idea of common good is formed at a 
specific time and place as the actors themselves see it. This could be also thought as 
common good in particular. 
The importance of providing such a reading of civil society through Arendt‟s 
vision of politics is two-fold. Firstly, some of the secondary literature could not put 
the idea of civil society and Arendt‟s theory together, because of Arendt‟s critical 
approach to the idea of society and the social in general. I argue that if we read the 
social and the political in Arendt in a specific way, and clarify the idea of civil 
society as a space composed of voluntary associations institutionalized by voluntary 
engagement of active citizens, we could do an Arendtian reading of civil society.  
Secondly, in general, elaborating on Arendtian political experience within a 
social context presents the instances of experience in which the social and the 
political co-exist. If we view membership in civil society as a voluntary act in which 
citizens contribute to policy formation through debate and deliberation among their 
equals, this type of action can be understood within the sociability context of civil 
society. The moment of deliberation spatially refers to the spontaneous co-existence 
of the political and the social.  While a fixed reading of Arendt‟s core distinction 
between the public and the private situates the social and the political in a mutually 
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exclusive position, it is important to note that even in Arendt‟s own writings, this 
mutually exclusive character is often dismantled in telling the stories of political 
experiences within a social context. This is inspiring enough to point out instances of 
experience that brings Arendtian participatory and plural politics and civil society as 
a space of experience together. This moment of two realms coming together enables 
the Arendtian reader to employ an Arendtian perspective in dealing with 
contemporary concerns and issues. 
Finally, this dissertation has something to conclude about the idea of politics as 
a lost treasure in Arendt‟s theory. This study sees the civil society as an alternative 
space of experience, in which Arendt‟s participatory vision of politics could be 
actualized. This perspective carries the idea of politics inspired by the political 
experience in Greek city-states into the contemporary political context. The civil 
society that combines both the public and the private realms  in the specific context 
of sociability provides a space for an ordinary citizen to act, to participate, to debate 
and to have a say on the political course of his/her country. This type of political 
engagement is the lost treasure of the political that Arendt had longed for in her 
works. According to Arendt, the world is the only place, in which meaningful human 
action could take place. Humans act upon this world, and they guarantee its existence 
by acting constantly. In modern conditions, with the emergence of totalitarian 
movements, human beings stop acting and start behaving in a totalizing movement. 
To stop acting also means to stop being political as one could be political as long as 
one acts.  
In this regard, ceasing to act becomes detrimental for the existence of the world 
whose maintenance is guaranteed by action. In the Epilogue of The Promise of 
Politics Arendt (2005: 201) refers to withering away of everything between us, 
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which results in losing of hope that we are able to transform a desert that is the desert 
we live in now into a human world. The withering away of everything between us 
also means losing of plurality. The lost hope, the lost ability to act that could recreate 
the world, in which humans could be humans again by acting, is to reinstate the lost 
treasure of the political. 
This idea of lost treasure is also stated clearly in Arendt‟s reflections on 
revolution. As this dissertation argued, the concept of revolution is important for 
Arendt‟s vision of politics and freedom. According to Arendt, true revolutions 
emerge out of the experiences of actors who have the will to participate in the course 
of future public affairs. The founding moment of a new body politic as the result of 
this willingness to participate is political action par excellence. It is that specific 
moment of acting people becoming truly free. This is the spirit of action observed in 
the course of revolution which Arendt had also longed for. According to her, in 
French Revolution, even though the Revolution had given freedom to people it could 
not provide a space for its performance. For Arendt public speech in expression and 
discussion is important. If people do not have their space to express and discuss their 
views, the public space for freedom, which is created as a consequence of revolution, 
would vanish. People would surrender their power to representatives. Then, some 
experts start to decide political matters as matters of administration (Arendt, 1990: 
235-237). As a consequence, people would lose their ability to act and their plurality. 
This dissertation presents such an idea of civil society as a space of experience for 
Arendtian politics, which keeps the moment of action alive. As the members of that 
civil society would express and discuss their views in front of plurality of equals, and 
as they contribute to policy making regarding their future, they would become 
political and free as Arendt would have wanted them to be.  
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 With regard to this political experience, I argue that the idea of civil society 
that emphasizes abilities of active citizens in an associational life based on the idea 
of civility constitutes an alternative third space where the citizen would be 
determined to act, to have joy in action, and to be able to change things through 
action. In fact, these are the abilities, which Arendt (1972: 202) had implied as the 
lost treasure of the political. I conclude that seeing the political experience within the 
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